Sentences with phrase «by the intuition of»

However, he does hold that the goal towards which physical processes are directing the behavior of an animal finds conscious expression at the level of spirit by its intuition of the goal's essence under the form of the good.

As the 27th novel unfolds in Donna Leon's exquisite chronicle of Venetian life in all its blissful and sordid aspects, Brunetti is ever more impressed by the intuition of his fellow Commissario Claudia Griffoni, and by the endless resourcefulness and craftiness of Signorina Elettra, Patta's secretary and gate - keeper, and reminded of the ever - lasting virtues of his own family.

Not exact matches

And much of what I stumbled into by following my curiosity and intuition turned out to be priceless later on.

«I'm not entirely convinced that it's possible to beat the market consistently, whether you're trading manually, guided by experience and intuition or algorithmically, which amounts to following an encoded set of rules... It's easy to lose money with algorithmic trading, just like with any investment.»

That key intuition comes from Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz, of Columbia University, and Linda Bilmes, of Harvard University, who've been studying the matter for years trying to bring some method to the madness of accounting for the budgetary and broader economic costs of war (which remains, by their own admission, a bit of an educated guess).

The notion of leading by intuition, as romanticized by Jack Welch and his disciples, still holds sway over many in the business world.

By offering strong evidence of mini flash crashes increasing transaction costs through widening the desired execution price between a market's buyers and sellers, while at the same time decreasing the number of opportunities to buy and sell in a market, Golub et al. [21] corroborated and quantified the intuition that mini flash crashes do indeed harm market liquidity.

Although at times Hartshorne has spoken as though his account of experience rested on some intuition of its essence as exhibited in his own experience, 2 his predominant view and his philosophical practice advance a concept of experience that is generated by dialectical argument rather than by appeal to direct introspection or intuition: «The philosopher, as Whitehead says, is the «critic of abstractions.»

To that assessment this essay will contribute modestly by arguing (1) that an account of experience must be compatible with the fact that there is no one thing which is what experience is or is the essence of experience, (2) that no philosophically adequate account of what experience is can be established merely by appeal to direct, personal, intuitive experience of one's own experience, (3) that generalization from features found in human experience is not sufficient to justify the claim that temporality is essential to experience, but (4) that dialectical argument rather than intuition or generalization is necessary to support the claim that experience is essentially temporal.

The claim of privileged access is not saved by arguing that each of us intuitively grasps this self without analysis or argument, that each of us singly grasps the essence of experience in this intuition, and that the analysis or argument is required only (1) to call it to the attention of those who have not noticed it, or (2) to defend the claim of such an intuition against those who deny it for no or bad reasons, or (3) to develop its implications and describe its content.

Their truth can not be established (or disestablished) by any privileged direct intuition of one's own experiencing, or by any direct, nondialectical inventory of the contents of one's own experience.

It is a consciousness of consciousness, a taking by the subject of its own past, now become objectified for present intuition.

Hence, the suggestions that arise from the application of the general scheme of thought to this special question of the nature of God may be weakened or may gain cogency according to the reading of these great intuitions of the race by which men live.

Nevertheless, in order to understand the genuine sources from which theology legitimizes its irreplaceable intuition, and in order to preserve the revelation - theological relevance of process - theological theory, we may contrast the main position of process theology by identifying the counter question: Can there be found any genuine place for a revealed theology within Whitehead's work so that theology does not have to be subordinated to general metaphysics but, rather, finds its connection to metaphysics in mutual influence?

«Religious intuition,» as analyzed, has two aspects, or directions of motion: (1) Singularity: religious intuition is a «direct intuition» which can not be resolved by general terms (rationality, metaphysics), but may only be experienced.

Although one can expect, to a certain extent, such an influence by revealed theology on the developments of metaphysics, especially in the context of Whitehead's theory of «religious intuition,» Whitehead appreciates the Alexandrian theology not for its specific content and «highly special form» (AI 167), but to the extent that it suggests «the solution of a fundamental metaphysical problem» (AI 167).

Any excessive dependence of the Sufis on intuition and rites will be corrected by recourse to the Qur» an by educated men.

We can say that Whitehead sees his interpretation of the doctrine of God's being within the pattern of St. Augustine's «faith seeking understanding», provided by faith we do not understand the acceptance of dogma; but the religious intuition born out of the impact of Jesus upon the world.

This «uniqueness» does not just mean a unique «intuitive experience» of God, but the «historical event» by which the intuition appears within the world.

Here's the confusion: Arkes proposes and defends the notion that natural law best accounts for our intuitions of equality and justice; Prof. Smolin responds by pointing out that people have believed evil things in the name of natural law.

Instead, we have two competing research programs, each with its own fundamental intuitions and program of inquiry to pursue, as in Imre Lakatos's philosophy of science.15 Only «over the long haul» can we judge which will be more progressive more able to handle the classical challenges raised by the entire history of metaphysics, by dialogue with existing religions (Christian and otherwise), and by the experience of contemporary religious believers.

As Heidegger journeyed more and more deeply into his intuition of Being, it became ever more clear to him that a central problem in Western culture is the forgetfulness of Being, and that this forgetfulness is symptomized by the will - to - power: that impulse to dominate and subjugate the world in light of human projects.

(This is an intuition of such universal acknowledgement that it is granted even by the «skeptics» who deny that time is a feature of the external world, e.g., Grünbaum, Weyl, Costa de Beauregarde.)

In other words, one can conclude that this basic intuition of the infinite relates to the theme of God only by reflecting on the process of religious history.

For Reid it is by a «natural kind of magic» that we take them to stand for these objects; there are no grounds in experience for making this association.9 As we have seen, Whitehead disagrees with Reid in that he holds that we have a direct intuition or «feeling» of external objects as causes of sensations.

This article by Dr. Wickman, and some of the commenters are trying to hijack science to bolster their intuition and claim that the Big Bang, or the Anthropic Principle proves God.

Where I would previously have been inclined to agree with Whitehead's characterization of Bergson that the intellect cart only grasp by spatializing, I now think (and have argued above) that I had failed to recognize fully the implications of the claim I had argued for in 1993 — that if there can be no intuition without intellect, and if intuition can grasp intelligible things without spatializing, then there is a sense in which the intellect, insofar as it is manifest in intuitive operations of consciousness, can grasp experience without spatializing it.

Ebner's and Buber's intuitions of the origin of insanity have been confirmed by Viktor von Weizsäcker, a doctor and psychiatrist who has made an important contribution to the field of psychosomatic medicine.

Dewey calls this value «quality,» but by the term he means neither mathematical nor secondary qualities; he uses the term to refer, first, to the wholeness or deeper reality, in some aspect of the world, often as that wholeness is presented in a work of art. 24 If this were called the objective locus of quality, the subjective locus would be the emotional intuition of the objective quality; this subjective quality gives the experience itself the unity which makes it that particular experience.25 It is this empirical discernment of quality which provides the substance of the derivative and propositional resolution of the conflict between the individual and its environment.

If we have achieved our purpose, then we have found one way of justifying some of these intuitions by his own principles.

The authors attempt to find a way of justifying some of these intuitions by Whitehead's own principles.

«27 This is hardly what Bergson means by intuition — it is closer to the opposite of intuition — and the fact that Whitehead says otherwise indicates a fair gap in his grasp of Bergson.

Mr. Futterman's reference to quantum computers solving problems by a «leap of intuition» is therefore less a matter of sober scientific assessment than rhapsodic misdirection by a scientist who should know better.

John entered by the knowledge of faith and wisdom into a unique intuition of the Divinity of Our Lord.

In the theory we are offering, since knowledge is by intuition and perception, not by abstraction of only part of the singular real, this ultimate universalism of the nature as sort or species, is said to be a singular real and also a concept defined within a distinct limit of formal variability, both as real, and also as concept.

«Memory, inseparable in practice from perception, imports the past into the present, contracts into a single intuition many moments of duration, and thus by a twofold operation compels us, de facto, to perceive matter in ourselves, whereas we, de jure, perceive matter within matter» (MM 80).

By the next century, however, the dialectic of classical theoria was evident in the scholastic conceptualism which put concepts and logic before understanding, so that knowledge was misunderstood as an intuition of nexi between concepts.

It is quite difficult to describe how someone else comes by an important intuition, but in the case of this discovery, I have always had a hunch that Russell simply saw something about propositions and classes of these that reminded him of the sorts of levels or hierarchies mathematicians take for granted in geometry or function theory.

John Cobb recently has given a fine account of these prehensions of the consequent nature.3 Without an adequate account of our consciousness of God, here achieved by prehension of the consequent nature, these intuitions would have no rational justification that they really came from the divine.

Kant explains the possibility of this cognitive State by an appeal to a pure intuition which provides the required objective domain.

He writes: «But objective immortality within the temporal world does not solve the problem set by the penetration of the finer religious intuition.

One may then generalize this intuition and, employing the criterion of «active singularity,» further argue by analogy that whatever is experienced to act as one must also feel as one, whether this be an animal or a cell, a molecule or an atom (1970a, 36, 143f.

The answer, he believes, is «that we know what «knowledge» is partly by knowing God, and that though it is true that we form the idea of divine knowledge by analogical extension from our experience of human knowledge, this is not the whole truth, the other side of the matter being that we form our idea of human knowledge by exploiting the intuition... which we have of God» (155).

Although he goes on to insist that this is not the whole truth, what he takes to be the other side of the matter is that we form our idea of human knowledge, not by exploiting our intuition of God as eminently knowing, but by exploiting our intuition of God — period.

Every rational being uses certain capacities, the categories and the forms of intuition, by which he experiences and orders the world.

According to Shi`a, whatever the Prophet of Islam said or did was done by the order of God, and perceived through revelation and intuition.

I can only give expression to my own intuition that this possible emergence of a new consciousness should be given shape by a utopian vision of a planetary brotherhood at peace with nature and with God, united with all of life in the enjoyment of its potentialities.

We both, along with most of our culture, have our moral intuitions informed by this very image and images like this.

Origin in immediate intuition; origin in pontifical authority; origin in supernatural revelation, as by vision, hearing, or unaccountable impression; origin in direct possession by a higher spirit, expressing itself in prophecy and warning; origin in automatic utterance generally — these origins have been stock warrants for the truth of one opinion after another which we find represented in religious history.

Yet if good arguments can be made on behalf of both propositions, then by definition the moral intuitions can not be self - evident.