Sentences with phrase «by the past occasions»

Now to say that the past is present in actual occasions is to say that they prehend the forms bequeathed them by past occasions.

The occasion is informed not only by past occasions but also by possibilities.

They are decided by the past occasions for the present one.

Not exact matches

During the past 15 years in corporate America, I've worked for three different companies that were acquired by larger organizations on four different occasions.

Early on in the conference at two separate occasions past attendees reached out to me as to how inspired they were by my presentation last year where I shared the iQmetrix ESOP success story.

If we think of the occasion as a whole, we may distinguish between the totality of causal influences inherited from the past actual world and its causa sui which is finally expressed in the way it has completely integrated these causal influences (by inclusion and / or exclusion) in the satisfaction.

One way to illustrate the full scope of this problem would be to look more closely at the horizonal character of the ecstatic past in contrast with the past of the ordinary interpretation of time, which is only understood by negative contrast with the present.5 Here Mason, apparently following Whitehead, allows us to make a particularly striking contrast: we can never change the past» he says (p. 95), meaning to evoke what Heidegger calls Dasein's «facticity» and to compare it with the objectivity with which perished actual occasions confront the concrescing actual entity in Whitehead.

Hence, a neuronal occasion in the human brain prehends the very minute disturbances of the electromagnetic field occasioned by other neuronal occasions in its immediate past, since these «minor» disturbances are absolutely essential for its own reaction (self - constitution).

(5) The aim now needs a source outside the occasion, which can not be provided by the multiple past actual occasions, either individually or collectively.

Yet by means of «presentational immediacy» occasions project the concrescence of contemporaries as possible «atomizations of the potential extensive continuum according to available knowledge of their past.

It is only by virtue of God's ordering of the eternal objects that one conceptual feeling, conformal to that of a past temporal actual occasion, can give rise to a new conceptual feeling of an eternal object not present in the prehended occasion.

Like the Leibnizian monad, the occasion is individuated by its individual essence, its particular perspective; but unlike the Leibnizian monad this essence is not predicated of the occasion as a substantial substratum, but enters into the inner constitution of the occasion as «a vector transmission of emotional feeling» or, in the language of physics, «the transmission of a form of energy» from past occasions via the eternal objects that communicate the emotional form and make possible the subsequent reenactment by the prehending occasion (PR 315 / 479f.).

Hence I have previously proposed that initial aims be derived from propositional feelings by God, whose logical subjects constituted the entire past actual world of a nascent occasion (PPCT 292n9; IPQ 13:350 - 52).

This would contravene his claim that all past occasions are prehended by the concrescent occasion.

For full freedom of decision, the occasion needs all possible alternatives, as conditioned by the past, including divine valuation.

There is a succession of occasions that are largely informed by their inheritance from the personal past.

Although every actual occasion must perish, it perishes by the subject of the occasion becoming object or by the transition of the present into the past.

To be an actual occasion is to occur and then become part of the past, succeeded by other actual occasions.

We find direction in the present as much by studying our past errors as by finding inspiration in those occasions when our ancestors in the faith used their freedom wisely.

The tension I have in mind is generated by (i) this process of temporally ordered actual occasions articulating his vision of the metaphysical ultimatum — atomism — and (ii) the complex product of this process which he so obviously cherished as an organic interconnectedness — the web of interrelations which comprise a world so badly misunderstood by the science Whitehead himself prehended from out of his immediate past.

There is an order - isomorphism between the following two sets: the set (ordered by later) of the actual occasions in the causal past of a given subject actual occasion, and the set (ordered by earlier) of the simple physical feelings in the process of concrescence of that subject actual occasion.

In terms of final causation the actual occasion guides its own experience, but at the same time it is being guided by the past in terms of efficient causation.

For, no matter what is meant by an objectified actual occasion, it is almost universally agreed that the objectified past occasions are data for the feelings originated by the new concrescence or subject.

The effects of past occasions are identified as emanating from a region of space defined by PI.»

Looked at from the point of view of its prehension of past occasions, an actual entity (say, in the personally ordered society of actual entities which constitute the «self» of a human being) can be viewed as conditioned by, caused by, the other entities which it objectifies.

Part of the confusion of Cobb's position stems from the fact that the extensive continuum, conceived of as a set of relations underlying past, present, and future, is part actual and part potential — actual in as far as it is constituted by actual entities enjoying actual relationships legislating what are real potentialities governing the relationships of future occasions; and merely potential in so far as these relationships are viewed as factors determining what forms of definiteness are, and are not, possible as factors in future fact.

Thus in one moment the soul would be constituted by the present reception of stimuli from the ear drums, while inheriting from a past occasion that was stimulated from the big toe.

If our world were a centered universe, a universe with an all - seeing (i.e., all - prehending) God with the ability to introduce, on his own, new information pertaining to the past into the experience of emerging actual occasions by means of their subjective aims, then our world would be a much more harmoniously ordered world than it in fact is.

One possible position, held in the past by Charles Hartshorne, is to affirm an alternative I have rejected, i.e., to affirm that God does prehend actual occasions as they are concrescing.

Having eliminated the need for God to be ground for the remote past, by eliminating categoreally the possibility of prehending the remote past, we must flow ask whether God is necessary to enable an actual occasion to prehend a contiguous past occasion.

The Whiteheadian answer to these questions is simply that the past is preserved as objectively immortal in the consequent nature of God and has what efficacy it has on the present as a result of the role played by God at the birth of every actual occasion.

In a simple, unstructured environment oblique occasions will offer no significant alternatives to the aim presented by the dominant past entity and concrescence will be essentially reiteration of prior forms of definiteness experience will be at the level of what Whitehead calls, technically, physical purposes.

Process and Reality, An Essay in Cosmology 345 - 346 and 435 imply clearly that (b) is the alternative Whitehead had in mind, for in each passage he presents a situation where a given occasion, X, inherits from another occasion, Y, in its past, which in turn inherits from Z, which is in its past — the point of each passage is to say that X inherits doubly from Z, both immediately and as mediated by Y. Z is not in the immediate past of X, and yet X is exhibited as prehending Z directly.

Hartshorne's interpretation of God resolves the problem of the past, granted, but it does so only by violating the principle of contemporary independence and assuming that it is possible for the region that constitutes the standpoint of one occasion to include the regions that constitute the standpoints of other occasions, an assumption which I trust by now has been seen to be quite incompatible with Whitehead's scheme of ideas.

It is by reason of the body, with its miracle of order, that the treasures of the past environment are poured into the living occasion.

To whatever extent in primitive men or young children dominant occasions of experience are determined more by new stimuli received through the body than by continuity with past dominant occasions, the requisite identity through time is lacking.

This remainder is far larger in human experience than in most other occasions of experience, but no event is wholly determined without remainder by its past.

Moreover, in developing this rejoinder to Hume and in attempting to distinguish between the «present» implied by «presentational immediacy» and the «past» of causal efficacy, Whitehead on occasion makes inconsistent claims.

A part, and a very important part, of the relations by which each new occasion is constituted is its prehension of its own past, that is, of past occasions in the life of the same soul.

Where past occasions are objectified by their physical poles, all that are not contiguous are mediated through the contiguous occasions.

If this divine efficient causality transcends the past conditions in some unlimited way, then the occasion would be completely determined by its past, and could not exercise its own self - creativity.

So far as this principle is concerned, every past occasion, near or far in time or space, might be directly prehended by every becoming occasion.

They are constituted by their relations to the occasions in their past.

Third, the new possibilities (relevant to the past, of course) are seen and felt by God and become the «lure» (in Whitehead's own word) to which occasions may respond, to their (and to God's) enrichment.

While this twofold claim is in accord with Cobb's interest in arguing for Jesus» «causally efficacious nonexistence,» or the «unmediated prehension by a presently concrescing actual occasion of occasions in the remote past,» it is not in accord with his remarks concerning the providential guidance of God.

As prehended by a certain actual occasion, God is that unity of feelings which result from the integration of his primordial nature with his prehensions of the past actual world of that actual occasion.8

This atomization can not be determined exclusively by the influence of the occasions in its own past, for occasions which have already arrived at their respective satisfachons are not able to legislate what specific bo, mds finally inform the loci or regions of succeeding occasions.

This allows, in turn, the composition of the subjective aim of the concrescing occasion at its own self - actualization being determined finally by its own modification or shaping of the various possibilities granted it through the aims at fulfillment for it of all the actual occasions in its past (CNT 96).

Elsewhere Cobb is careful to specify that both God and man are best characterized as living persons consisting respectively of societies of actual occasions (CNT 188, 192).1 In the present context, consequently, it is clear that we are to understand God to be present in man in the same manner in which one actual occasion is present within another and that this presence concerns the aims at the fulfillment of a concrescing occasion in a living person by the occasions or «prehended data» in its past.

The great problems of history with which we must come to terms tend to appear to us not as members of a chain organically tied to the past and growing into the future, but as cataclysmic interruptions of the normalcy of peace and harmony, occasioned by evil men and evil institutions.