The category of administrative decision - maker in the case — whether it be cabinet, a minister, or perhaps an adjudicative tribunal — is obviously of some relevance but we should not be making absolute assertions based thereon.
Not exact matches
Categories alone would be insufficient to account for the varied nature
of administrative decision - makers.
It should be noted that the Court has, slowly but surely, narrowed both
of these
categories into nothingness (see Doré, where the Court decided that the constitutional determinations
of administrative decision - makers are entitled to deference).
[11] The best way, in my view, for the courts to perform their constitutional role in our democratic system
of reviewing
administrative decisions is for the courts to eschew the standard
of review
categories altogether, and instead to focus on the factors that might lead to deference in any given case.
But the Supreme Court's other
decisions make it clear that courts must defer to an
administrative tribunal's interpretation
of law, except on legal questions considered «
of central importance for the legal system» (a
category that notably includes constitutional questions).
So we've suffered through categorizations into jurisdictional error and non-jurisdictional error, legislative,
administrative, quasi-judicial and judicial
decisions,
categories of correctness, reasonableness and patent unreasonableness and, now,
categories of correctness and reasonableness.