Sentences with phrase «certissima esse»

A full «conviction of sin» (esse: essence, being) comes by, I can only say, immaculate conception & amazing grace: a feeling I could never construct out of my own imagination or experience.
The esse nce of that philosophy is that there is nothing existing except what we can touch, see or sense in some ph ysical form.
God isn't the «highest being» but, rather, the sheer act of «to be» itself (Aquinas put is as «ipsum esse subsistens»).
The «Conviction of «Sin»» (I.E. esse: «essence,» «being») an immaculate concept flying in on the wings of a dove, say: certainly nothing one would conjure up without the help of Goedel's Theorem, might as well ask Joe Fish to define wet let alone conceive of dry: it makes no common sense.
A monumental conviction of sin (es esse: essence, being).
For what it's worth (worthless to Fishon I'm sure) the word «sin» etymologically comes from I.E es, esse: meaning «essence,» «being,» Makes the notion original sin both redundant and powerful Essence.
But a power that could produce and deal with an immaterial thing like a concept must itself be immaterial according to the axiom «to act follows to be» (agere sequitur esse).
In this it functions very much like the Thomistic God, which as infinite esse communicates to each actuality its own esse or act of being.2
Being or esse is neither a static property nor a general term for what is real in every sense of real.
A theological school can be for congregations» bene esse, even though it is not of their esse.
It may be that the relation of congregation to a theological school is like the relation some Anglicans say obtains between the churches and a bishop: Churches do not need a bishop for their being (esse) but they do need a bishop for their well - being (bene esse).
I shall argue below that while a theological school is not of the esse of congregations, it is of congregations» bene esse.
If one focuses on the fact that the power of being (esse) of things ultimately comes from God, one can lose the being of the world in an acosmic pantheism.
In this sense, officeholding and ordination do not belong to the esse (essence) of the church (as explicit in Catholic and Orthodox traditions and implicit in many Protestant ones) but rather to the more practical bene esse (well - being) of the church.
Any subsistent being with an operation which is in this way not essentially bodily has an esse which is independent of the body.
The extreme principal of immanence is a denial that being transcends consciousness, a radical departure from esse as the act of being, i.e. actus essendi.
The word «being,» as noun designates some substance; the word «to be» — or esse — is a verb because it designates an act.
[11] «Esse or «to be,» is something else and much harder to grasp because it lies more deeply hidden in the metaphysical structure of reality.
Put differently, whatsoever really exists, in whatsoever way it does exist, has and must have God, ipsum esse per se subsistens, for its cause — but in a radical way that extends even to its mode of being, its very mutability, its possibility for otherness, interaction, frustration, and fulfillment.
Since in the Aristotelian - Thomistic understanding there are no uninstantiated essences, then real knowledge presupposes the underlying esse of all that is.
He is as much God as Father and Son, and He too is «of the same substance» («unius substantiae, unius quoque esse naturae» Toledo XI 675 AD - DS 527).
Since God is one and only, his essentia and his esse must be given at one stroke.
Praeter caeter autem, memoriae nostrae pro summa regula est infigendum, ea quae nobis a Deo revelata sunt, ut omnium certissima esse credenda; et quamvis forte lumen rationis, quam maxime clarum et evidens.
aliud quid nobis suggerere videretur, soli tamen auctoritati divinae potius quam proprio nostro judicio fidem esse adhibendam.»
«Memores tamen, ut jam dictum est, huic lumini naturali tamdiu tantum esse credendum, quamdiu nihil contrarium a Deo ipso revelatur....
Aquinas clarified the doctrine by identifying God, the First Mover, with infinite Existence (Esse) and then distinguishing essences («what something is», the equivalent of nature - substance) from existence in created realities.
He would argue ab esse ad posse.
They also point to the «coming to be» of esse, given by God (as I will argue) and expressed through the concrescing actual entity's engagement in creativity - characterization.
Thus, both at the level of creativity - esse and at the level of creativity - characterization, it follows that God, as the source of creativity, could not originate from the physical pole.
First, creativity is tied to the «one and the many» in ways not true of Thomas» esse.
In particular, it will require me to avoid the conclusion that because God is the source of the creature's creativity, of the creature's esse, that God is somehow identical with that creature or with its «being» or that the creature is somehow identical with God, with some aspect of God, or with some aspect of God's «being.»
My revision of the doctrine of creativity therefore shows how God, in granting creativity - esse to that creature, thereby establishes a freedom so deeply rooted that even God, when acting as one agent among other agents at the level of creativity - characterization, can not wholly eliminate it.
In that case, we would need to raise the question of its esse, of its being - here.
And yet this divine esse is good because it not only makes ordinary goodness to be really good but because it also makes ordinary evil to be really evil in a real world with real consequences.
Thus God, and not creativity - esse as such, causes the new actual entity to emerge as a concrescence.
From my point of view, at the level of creativity - esse, if God transcends the distinction between actuality and potentiality, then God must also transcend the distinction between finitude and infinitude.
Thus, while creativity - esse may account for the transition from the past «many» to the new «one,» it is God's gift of a subjective aim that organizes the past world into the actual world of the new entity.
We may call this creativity - esse (or creativity» as matter and as esse).
Thus, without the radical novelty of creativity - esse, the creatures production of new characterizations would remain purely abstract and hypothetical, unrelated to any event in the world.
But rooted in esse, the creatures novelties are real, and have real consequences.
Thus creativity - esse points to the togetherness of «before» and «after» in the concrescence, not as a mere theory», but as the depth and power of concrete existence.
Lacking creativity - characterization and, especially, creativity - esse, they can not function as real agents, and, thus, they can not establish the new actual entity with its own creativity
And so God's role as the source of creativity - esse wears well with God's role as the ultimate source of all characterizations, of all eternal objects.
Without esse, the entire process is just a possible arrangement of possible characteristics, and not an activity in a real, concrete world.
That gift of esse also establishes that entity as a subject, having its own interiority and its own subjectivity.
Second, since creativity requires form (eternal objects) before it can function as the esse, as the being - here of any actual entity; the primordial nature also functions as creativity's «first limitation.
Because God is an everlasting concrescence, God's creativity, either as esse or as characterization, never converts into objective - case creativity.
In summary, the implementation of creativity - esse in creativity - characterization allows the concrescence to alter the status of a form from that of a pure potential to an actual determinant of fact.
And I accept this so long as we remember that, as the source of creativity - esse, God is the only creator.
I have argued that there is only one creativity As a result, creativity - esse can never be divorced from creativity - characterization.
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