Sentences with phrase «chambers judge»

«The reviewing chambers judge concluded that «the only reasonable conclusion on the evidence is that the grievor lied about being sick» and that termination was the only reasonable outcome.

[58] The learned chambers judge held that the process followed by the District Manager offended the rules of procedural fairness in four respects: he fettered his discretion by applying government policy... -LSB-.]

[2] The British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal and a Supreme Court chambers judge on judicial review decided that for the purposes of human rights legislation, a partnership may be treated as a separate legal entity from its partners and as the employer of a partner, with the result that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear a complaint by a partner of discrimination in his employment.

In a recent BC decision a BC Chambers Judge took prompt action to enrol the family and the child in a Vancouver based parent and child reunification program.

Holding and Bielik are not ready for a few more years and I don't think Wenger rates Chambers judging by last season.

In BC, chambers judges addressing judicial reviews have a power to transfer such proceedings to the trial list (BC Civil Rules 16 - 1 (18) and 22 - 1 (7)(d)-RRB-.

The Court of Queen's Bench chambers judge (Justice R.P. Belzil) decided he should consider whether a new interim injunction should issue, and he concluded that it should (Unifor, ABCA 2018 at para 5).

CCD has intervened in this appeal because of a concern that the comparator group analysis adopted by the learned Chambers Judge has the potential to undermine the right of all persons with disabilities to accommodation in a variety of settings.

[98] The chambers judge found that the Registrar had given too much weight to the terms of the CFA and, at least implicitly, that she had failed to give sufficient weight to the integrity of the profession.

It found that the Appellant had not identified any basis upon which it could be said that the judge misapprehended the evidence, and accepted as reasonable the chambers judge's conclusion that the absence of recent occurrences of disruptive behaviour was due to the injunction itself.

The chambers judge went on to find that Syncrude was entitled to claim damages for the loss of Mr. Hammond's services.

The chambers judge's choice of $ 5,000,000 does in my view strike a reasonable balance, and I would not disturb it.

[77] In summary, if and to the extent that the chambers judge intended to approve a departure from Commonwealth No. 2 or to suggest that a registrar under ss.

The task for the chambers judge, from whom this appeal is taken, was to decide whether the Registrar had erred in failing to consider or to give sufficient weight to all relevant factors...

The Appellant's former activities had interfered with court staff performing their functions, and the chambers judge granted the application for a permanent injunction on the basis that it was necessary to protect the public interest.

But the S.C.C. upheld the chambers judge's finding that the scheme as it was constituted from September 2010 to June 2012 violated the s. 8 rights of drivers subject to a roadside breath demand who subsequently registered a «fail»; not saved by s. 1.

The chambers judge found that s. 626.1 applied, and that for this reason the benefits paid to Mr. Hammond were deductible from any damages he received.

But the chambers judge was here an appellate court, and he was not determining the proper fee anew or in so doing, adopting a «top - down» or «bottom up» approach.

The chambers judge reviewed the Appellant's history with registry and court staff, and concluded that there was ample evidence to support the allegations in the statement of claim.

The chambers judge's decision not to lift the injunction based on this conclusion was discretionary and entitled to deference.

Over the years, HOOPP Realty's claim against Clark Builders went to a chambers judge twice, to the Court of Appeal of Alberta twice and to the Supreme Court of Canada on a leave to appeal application, which was denied.

[53] The chambers judge erred in finding that the dominant purpose of the internal investigation was in contemplation of litigation and therefore every document «created and / or collected» during the investigation is clothed with legal privilege.

In BDO Canada Limited v Dorais, the Chambers judge had applied the reasoning in Principal Group and subsequent authorities to conclude that the Trustee would merely be «stepping into the shoes» of the individual plaintiffs to pursue their causes of action.

On appeal, the majority of the Court (Justices Elizabeth McFadyen and Peter Martin) agreed with the chambers judge and upheld the disputed provisions.

Initially, the Chambers judge ordered the the mother to have full child custody of the children and the children were to have supervised parenting time with the father on the weekends.

Interestingly, the chambers judge recognized that the employer may have intended to limit the employee's entitlements to the statutory minimum but he refused to give effect to that intention.

The Court agreed with the chambers judge that the termination clause did not clearly restrict the applicable notice period to the statutory minimum set out in the Act.

While the chambers judge found that Holm's notice entitlement was limited to s. 2 (2) above, the requirement that the notice period be «in accordance with the provincial legislation» did not set the statutory minimum notice period as a ceiling.

The Scotts contend that in leaving this issue unresolved, the chambers judge effectively placed upon them the onus of proving that the Bradwells were not entitled to equitable relief.

The chambers judge disagreed [2006 ABQB 757].

In para. 9 of the chambers judge's reasons (quoted above at para. 13) he said that it was not possible to determine who was at fault for the various confrontations and altercations which occurred between the parties.

The contra preferentum principle, commonly applied in the interpretation of employment agreements, supported the chambers judge's interpretation of the agreement.

AGAT Laboratories Ltd. («AGAT») appealed a chambers judge's interpretation of its employment agreement with the plaintiff, Michael John Holm («Holm»).

In upholding the initial ruling, the Court took a deferential approach and found that there was no palpable and overriding error in the chambers judge's interpretation of the termination clause.

AGAT argued that the chambers judge had erred in holding that the employment agreement did not contain sufficiently restrictive language to limit Holm's claim to the minimum notice requirements set out in Alberta's Employment Standards Code (the «Act «-RRB-.

Rather, the chambers judge held that any ambiguity in the contract's language should be interpreted in the employee's favour since the employer had drafted the language.

[12] I agree that this is a close case, but in my view the chambers judge made a decision that was open to him on the record before him.

the Chambers Judge erred in finding the Chief Commissioner acted reasonably in dismissing his complaint.

In other words, was the Chambers Judge correct in finding the Chief Commissioner's decision was to be assessed on a reasonableness standard?

Since the Chambers Judge's order «would seem to prevent the Province from pursuing all enforcement remedies against [the Respondent], regardless of whether they relate to a specific court proceeding», the Court of Appeal agreed the order inappropriately restrained the lawful conduct of a government official and was, therefore, in the nature of an injunction against the Crown.

The chambers judge's limit of $ 5,000 a year for sports - related expenses was appropriate.

Since, for the Court of Appeal, the Chambers Judge chose the appropriate standard of review, the only remaining question was whether or not the standard was applied correctly.

For present purposes, the Court of Appeal referred to the language contained at s. 26 (3) of the Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000 C.A. - 25.5 and «wealth of authority» supporting the proposition, as pointed out by the Chambers Judge below, that the decision of the Chief Commissioner is one of fact and mixed fact and law attracting a reasonableness test.

the Chambers Judge erred in excluding affidavits tendered by the appellant and in refusing to allow the appellant to cross-examine a number of Hospital staff.

The chambers judge held that, «[139]... the infringement issue as framed by the petitioners can not be determined in this proceeding», based on facts relevant to infringement extending «beyond the Project and the decision to issue the Certificate,» and in particular, the reduction in areas in which Treaty 8 First Nations can exercise their rights.

The mother appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal arguing the chambers judge misapprehended or disregarded relevant evidence, and misdirected herself on the law with respect to s. 7 expenses.

The Court of Appeal determines the Chambers Judge's order is in the nature of an injunction because it broadly prohibits the Province from taking steps to enforce an assessment, including enforcement steps outside of court.