James Turner Johnson has expressed the same concerns in a different way, arguing that satisfying
the classic ad bellum or war - decision criterion of «right intention» includes the commitment to securing a just peace after the conclusion of combat.
Not exact matches
As I have argued in these pages and elsewhere, the «presumption,» by detaching the just war way of thinking from its proper political context» the right use of sovereign public authority toward the end of tranquillitas ordinis, or peace» tends to invert the structure of
classic just war analysis and turn it into a thin casuistry, giving priority consideration to necessarily contingent in bello judgments (proportionality of means, discrimination or noncombatant immunity) over what were always understood to be the prior
ad bellum questions («prior» in that, inter alia, we can have a greater degree of moral clarity about them).
Second, the logic of the
classic just war tradition is reversed, so that within the jus
ad bellum several recently invented prudential criteria are employed as if they were the most important, with correspondingly diminished attention to the fundamental deontological criteria, those described as «necessary» by Aquinas.
Whether one deems this cluster of questions the third part of an expanded just war tradition or an extension of «right intention,» one of the
classic deontological
ad bellum criteria, this is obviously an area in which considerable criticism of the Iraq War has been focused» whether the issue at hand involves the scandals at Abu Ghraib prison, interrogation methods, de-Baathification policies, counterinsurgency strategies and tactics, or the provisions of the new Iraqi constitution with respect to religious freedom and the role of Islamic law in post-Saddam Iraq.