Sentences with phrase «classical theism as»

I am encouraged by his acceptance of a substantial part of my criticism of classical theism as found in Aquinas; however, he sides with Aquinas and against me on some issues.

Not exact matches

As it happens, the Times Literary Supplement gave the book to the philosopher Anthony Kenny to review, perhaps because he could never be accused of any parti pris in this debate, since he has in the past leveled his own severe criticisms against classical Christian theism for relying on an «outdated Aristotelian cosmology.»

Whatever orthodox believers may think of Kenny's journey over these decades from classical theism to something vaguer, he is at least an equal - opportunity basher: For his aversion to absolutism can equally well be employed against the New Atheists, who affect an apodictic absolutism in their argumentation that makes them as impregnable to counterevidence as anything found in a creationist textbook.

In this sense the above argument can be interpreted as an argument for the coherence of classical theism.

For him, classical theism, as found in the scholastics and in modern philosophy down to Kant, was neither biblical nor intelligently modern.

In one popular study of the problem of God today, John A. T. Robinson questions the relevance of a theism that would think of God as a heavenly, completely perfect person who resides above the world and mankind.4 The same issue is raised by Harvey Cox, who writes: The willingness of the classical philosophers to allow the God of the Bible to be blurred into Plato's Idea of the Good or Aristotle's Prime Mover was fatal.

Indeed, the very topics we neglected in the eighties have become the standard ingredients in the current renaissance of classical theism, where God is established as the ultimate reality.

Hartshorne's analysis in Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes is defective insofar as it recognizes only three possibilities — the two identified by classical theism and the third which is Whitehead's doctrine of the objective immortality of the past.

(1) Unlike classical theism, black theology has never conceived of divine perfection in such a way as to entail that God is wholly immutable.

(5) Classical theism errs in conceiving of «immortality as a career after death» (OOTM 4).

Hartshorne attributes this consistent violation of the principle of dual transcendence to the fact that classical theism has placed too much faith in Greek philosophy, and to a Western prejudice according to which absolute independence along with the power to the cause of events is regarded as a superior attribute while relativity and the capacity to be an effect is mistakenly regarded as an inferior attribute.»

The primary difference between the process concept of God as creator - preserver of the world and that of classical theism is that the former insists God ought not be conceived as aloof to and unaffected by what happens in the world.

It is the doctrine of panentheism (all in God) as distinct from classical theism (Birch 1990).

Instead of rejecting every idea of an active and acting God when she rejects classical theism, Sölle might profit from approaching empirically the working of grace as Wieman did.

Whereas classical theism had described God as wholly other than the world and classical pantheism had identified God and the world, in Hartshorne's view God includes the world while transcending it.

In this scheme the quantifiers «all,» «some,» and «none» are combined with the ideas of «absolute perfection,» «relative perfection,» and «imperfection'to produce seven different conceptions of deity which are conveniently grouped into three broad types of theism: classical theism, within which God is conceived as absolutely perfect in all respects and in no way surpassable; atheistic views, in which there is no being which is in any respect perfect or unsurpassable; and the «new theism,» in which God is in some respects perfect and unsurpassable by others but is surpassable by himself.

Today, it is defended as the foundation of classical theism and thus the sine qua non of the Christo - Platonic synthesis.

So weighty was this tradition that any suggestion that the divine might be other than how classical theism conceived it to be was treated as a changing of the subject.

I portrayed them, correctly I think, as remaining obsessed — albeit negatively — with the classical god of metaphysical theism, while I was talking about Someone Else, the mysterious and elusive Other of the prophets and Jesus, who — like Jacques Brel — was very much alive although living in unexpected quarters.

In all cases, however, to accept such statements as true is to challenge the full autonomy of science and history within their own proper spheres; and it is this challenge to a genuinely secular outlook, rather than any particular statement in itself, which makes classical theism so widely unacceptable to contemporary men.

We can say as a general answer to the above criticisms that what they are actually objecting to is the God of classical theism, the God who is other - worldly, timeless, the God who makes paper plates.

Why such «short shrift» (Ed's description) as calling classical theism «puzzling»?

Thus it is not accidental that classical theism insists on a concept of God with no real relation to the world, even when this is interpreted as an affirmation of divine transcendence.

As usually presented, then, even by its more sophisticated spokesmen, classical theism requires acceptance of statements about the world, about its origin or end or the happenings within it, which men today are willing to accept, if at all, only with the backing and warrants of science or history.

Part of our answer will have to be that, even as Ed presents it, classical theism really is puzzling.

I should now be willing to suggest that it is a willingness to take the axiological feature as ultimately determinative for the attribution of divinity that characterizes all modern forms of so - called ethical theism and distinguishes them from the classical tradition.

Classical theism in effect sees a single problem: it is as true to say that God transcends the world, as that God is immanent in the world.

Classical theism sees all true spiritual pilgrimage as a purely interior movement.

With respect to the question of divine power, as we saw in the last chapter, classical theism came to accept the model of efficient causation.

Besides the view of the relation of science and religion as contrasted activities (classical theism), Barbour (1966 p. 115) identifies two others.

My contention, however, is that attempts such as Farrer's and Morris's to take up a third position between classical theism, on the one hand, and neoclassical theism, on the other, quite fail to carry conviction.

As Hasker emphasizes, his free will version of traditional theism differs from the classical version, held by Augustine, Thomas, Luther, and Calvin, precisely on this point — that this classical version held that all of our feelings, thoughts, and actions are in reality wholly determined by God, so that we have freedom only in a compatibilist sense — or, otherwise stated, that our feeling of freedom is an illusion.

More recently, 3 however, I have advocated reserving the term «classical theism» for the version of traditional theism affirmed by classical theologians such as Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas, according to which God is timeless, immutable, and impassible in all respects — a doctrine that implies that creaturely freedom must be denied or affirmed at most in a Pickwickian, compatibilist sense.

Defenders of classical theism often implicitly use the latter criterion, claiming they have defended their God's failure to prevent horrendous evils by simply pointing out that there might be some reason, knowable only by God, as to why it was good not to intervene.15 I would say, in any case, that it need not be «clear» in a strong sense of the term.

For twenty - five centuries of Western philosophy and theology, apart from Judaism, only two forms of philosophical theism were widely known: what I call classical theism and classical pantheism, the latter best known as Stoicism (until Spinoza); the former was chiefly Islamic or Christian, except for some among the Jews.

But the giving of the divine Name as portrayed in Scripture implies the doctrines of classical theism.

No Christian, or religious Jew either, could take this way of removing the contradiction that in the long run ruined the intercultural reputation of classical theism, Christian or Islamic (as in Al Gazalli).