Whitehead sees
the cogito as the paragon of clear and distinct ideas, involving a fusion if not identity of knower and known.
First, the concept of
the cogito as mediated by a universe of signs.
On the other hand, we must raise the question: Can we borrow the prereflective cogito without bringing
the cogito as such along with it?
My description of the prereflective
cogito as the sole form of consciousness in satisfaction is, consequently, at odds with the Sartrean scheme.
Not exact matches
But, even in the fundamental thinkers of high modernity, hints can be found that knowledge requires God: Descartes uses God in the Meditations in order to escape from the interiority where the
cogito has stranded him; Kant uses God
as a postulate of pure practical reason in order to hold on to the possibility of morality.
The prereflective
cogito (nonthetic self - awareness) is involved
as a necessary structure in both consciousness
as mere revealing intuition (prereflective positional consciousness of the world) and consciousness
as knowledge (reflective positional consciousness of the past self).
Here,
cogito and credo are antithetical acts: modern or «objective» knowledge is not religiously neutral,
as so many theologians have imagined; rather, it is grounded in a dialectical negation of faith.
Descartes himself acknowledged that his
cogito ergo sum is already fundamental in Augustine's philosophy (letter to Colvius, 14 November, 1640), and he believed that his philosophy was the first to demonstrate the philosophical truth of the doctrine of transubstantiation, and could go so far
as to claim that scholastic philosophy would have been rejected
as clashing with faith if his philosophy had been known first (letter to Mersenne, 31 March, 1641) Indeed, nothing is more revolutionary in modern philosophy than its dissolution of the scholastic distinction between natural theology and revealed theology.
The earlier phenomenology stressed the lived - body (le corps propre)
as against the objective body studied in the sciences, and a body - consciousness
as opposed to a non-corporeal Cartesian
cogito.
We can briefly reconstruct
as follows one prominent argument which brings Merleau - Ponty to this new notion of the
cogito and which will thus bring us to the question of personal identity.
This has two unfortunate results: it makes the regnant society, or
as we would perhaps more loosely say, «the mind,» into an «ego» — in which case the self becomes less a «lived - body» than a Cartesian
cogito — and it gives the presiding occasion of the regnant society the impossible, or at least, improbable, job of coordinating all bodily data all the time, pre-reflectively and reflectively, into an organizational unity.
This power to exist, the «project towards the world that we are» (PP 405), constitutes my most immediate awareness of myself
as a «tacit
cogito» which is brought to expression and explicit awareness through language.
It is a system of motor powers for exploring and making sense of the world, and
as such, the
cogito becomes more an «I can» than an «I think.»
Among Descartes» many contributions (he was a brilliant mathematician and scientist
as well), the «
cogito» (
as philosophers call it) remains his most significant contribution to the history of ideas.
It is first spoken by René Descartes
as «ego
cogito, ergo sum» — «I think, therefore I am», but it is a fallacy because he mixed up being with physical processes.
I can start with
cogito ergo sum, and get to my position with no assumptions (unless you refer to the Peano Postulates
as assumptions, which is barely arguable).