Application of scientific rather than risk - based norms in
communicating climate change uncertainty has also made it easier for policy - makers and other actors to downplay relevant future climate risks (Stern et al 2016, Ebi et al 2016).
Download the report here, and check out our 12 principles for more effectively
communicating climate change uncertainty here.
Not exact matches
With the combination of (a) complexities =
uncertainties and (b) time lags and lengths of effects over decades and centuries,
climate -
change grasp and responsible response are really tough to
communicate.
The terminology that the IPCC uses — such as «virtually certain», «very likely», «likely» etcetera and the very careful definitions that are attached to them, are an excellent way of
communicating the
uncertainties around various aspects of
climate change, and are a significant improvement over the traditional way of discussing
uncertainties in the scientific literature.
It is extremely important to
communicate knowledge
uncertainty with respect to
climate change.
All are experts in their fields and have expertise relating to the role of
uncertainty in
climate change or how best to
communicate it.
Consequently, in many cases, alternative means of
communicating uncertainty about future
changes in
climate should be employed instead.
Adapting core principles of risk assessment to
climate: To date, the approach of
climate change assessments has primarily been rooted in
communicating relative scientific certainty and
uncertainty around anticipated
changes in the physical
climate system, along with some basic biophysical impacts that would seem to be generally implied by those
climate changes: based, for example, on general understanding of associations such as those between impacts and weather extremes.
The reasons for that are many: the timid language of scientific probabilities, which the climatologist James Hansen once called «scientific reticence» in a paper chastising scientists for editing their own observations so conscientiously that they failed to
communicate how dire the threat really was; the fact that the country is dominated by a group of technocrats who believe any problem can be solved and an opposing culture that doesn't even see warming as a problem worth addressing; the way that
climate denialism has made scientists even more cautious in offering speculative warnings; the simple speed of
change and, also, its slowness, such that we are only seeing effects now of warming from decades past; our
uncertainty about
uncertainty, which the
climate writer Naomi Oreskes in particular has suggested stops us from preparing as though anything worse than a median outcome were even possible; the way we assume
climate change will hit hardest elsewhere, not everywhere; the smallness (two degrees) and largeness (1.8 trillion tons) and abstractness (400 parts per million) of the numbers; the discomfort of considering a problem that is very difficult, if not impossible, to solve; the altogether incomprehensible scale of that problem, which amounts to the prospect of our own annihilation; simple fear.
«although most
climate scientists think that
uncertainties about
climate change should be made clearer in public they do not actively
communicate this to journalists»
A representative survey of 123 German
climate scientists (42 %) finds that although most
climate scientists think that
uncertainties about
climate change should be made clearer in public they do not actively
communicate this to journalists.