Thus, it is the cognitive context that shapes Hartshorne's
conception of actuality; hence, in the final analysis what anything (including the concrete) is, is what it is as an item of knowledge in the perfect knower.
The previous two chapters (3.1 and 3.2) have previously appeared here as «Aristotelian and Whiteheadian
Conceptions of Actuality: I and II.»
«Aristotelian and Whiteheadian
conceptions of Actuality.»
Both the «principle of relativity» (PR 22) and the «reformed subjectivist principle» (PR 167) indicate that
any conception of an actuality apart from its interrelations with other actualities, or apart from its satisfaction of subjective aim, would be high abstraction.
Not exact matches
The Whiteheadian
actuality, the occasion, represents a complete and thoroughgoing rejection
of the substance - attribute
conception, and is entirely relational in its essence.
But Whitehead goes decisively beyond every previous form
of the Aristotelian
conception of unity when he posits, at least as a genuine potentiality in every «actual entity,» what in the human person manifests itself as «spirit» in its full
actuality.
If this intent is successfully realized, it will in part lend support to Hartshorne's claim that the dipolar
conception of God is more compatible with religious experience than views which conceive God primarily in terms
of the category
of the absolute, or pure
actuality, or being, etc..
Marx does not accept the Christian
conception of the human being, which begins and ends with God, the source
of all human
actuality and potentiality.
Any such
conception as knowledge, value,
actuality, truth, goodness, or beauty could, by proper analysis, be shown to imply the others and the necessity
of God's existence.
This
conception is theoretically founded on the affirmation
of the priority
of actuality over potentiality, which applies, according to Aristotle, explicitly in a temporal sense to the members
of species: There must always be an actual member
of a species that precedes its potential successors.
First there is the distinction between specific
conceptions of kinds
of actualities whose existence is contingent, as is shown by their restricting the positive possibilities for other kinds, in contrast to
conceptions so generic that they do not restrict the positive possibilities.