Sentences with phrase «conception of an actuality»

Thus, it is the cognitive context that shapes Hartshorne's conception of actuality; hence, in the final analysis what anything (including the concrete) is, is what it is as an item of knowledge in the perfect knower.
The previous two chapters (3.1 and 3.2) have previously appeared here as «Aristotelian and Whiteheadian Conceptions of Actuality: I and II.»
«Aristotelian and Whiteheadian conceptions of Actuality
Both the «principle of relativity» (PR 22) and the «reformed subjectivist principle» (PR 167) indicate that any conception of an actuality apart from its interrelations with other actualities, or apart from its satisfaction of subjective aim, would be high abstraction.

Not exact matches

The Whiteheadian actuality, the occasion, represents a complete and thoroughgoing rejection of the substance - attribute conception, and is entirely relational in its essence.
But Whitehead goes decisively beyond every previous form of the Aristotelian conception of unity when he posits, at least as a genuine potentiality in every «actual entity,» what in the human person manifests itself as «spirit» in its full actuality.
If this intent is successfully realized, it will in part lend support to Hartshorne's claim that the dipolar conception of God is more compatible with religious experience than views which conceive God primarily in terms of the category of the absolute, or pure actuality, or being, etc..
Marx does not accept the Christian conception of the human being, which begins and ends with God, the source of all human actuality and potentiality.
Any such conception as knowledge, value, actuality, truth, goodness, or beauty could, by proper analysis, be shown to imply the others and the necessity of God's existence.
This conception is theoretically founded on the affirmation of the priority of actuality over potentiality, which applies, according to Aristotle, explicitly in a temporal sense to the members of species: There must always be an actual member of a species that precedes its potential successors.
First there is the distinction between specific conceptions of kinds of actualities whose existence is contingent, as is shown by their restricting the positive possibilities for other kinds, in contrast to conceptions so generic that they do not restrict the positive possibilities.
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