Sentences with phrase «conceptual feelings»

The consequence of an actual occasion's failure to introduce novelty is that when the conceptual feelings are reintegrated with the physical feelings from which they were derived there is the preservation of the dominant types of inherited order.

I am loath to say that there are no conceptual feelings or that conceptual feelings feel nothing at all.

Whitehead's analysis of how this happens is in his doctrine of conceptual feelings.

Since these supplementary pure conceptual feelings only acquire temporality through their integration with physical feelings, no time elapses between the simple physical feeling of a particular actual occasion and its integration within the divine satisfaction.

Suchocki views God consequent nature as God's prehensions of the actual world and the connections of these prehensions with God's primordial conceptual feelings, such that the relevance of those conceptual feelings for that concrete situation can become manifest.

Whitehead introduces God's consequent nature for a number of reasons, one of them being that this integration of God's conceptual feelings with physical feelings makes propositions and consciousness as subjective form possible, and this makes it conceivable that God possesses consciousness.

For, (a) neither conceptual feelings nor those of causal efficacy are per se reflectively conscious judgments, and (b) perception in its most basic level of causal efficacy is both «form» (meaning) and «matter» (experiential data), and the «main characteristic» of these feelings is their «enormous emotional significance» (Al 276).

Thus, on his view, the phrase «conceptual prehension» is «entirely neutral, devoid of all suggestiveness» (PR 49), and clearly part of the suggestiveness that he wants to avoid is the identification of his notion of conceptual feelings with either, say, a Cartesian or Kantian model of judgmental, representational thinking.

The organic relation between physical and conceptual feelings, together with the autonomy of the latter, makes possible the sin of sensuality as well as that of pride.

The forms or the «bows» of conceptual feelings, as contrasted with the forms of physical feelings, possess an autonomy whereby novel conceptual reactions are possible.

Conceptual autonomy or increased abstractive capacity means, negatively, that the form of our conceptual feelings (the «how») is not completely deductible from what we physically feel by way of concrete events.

All processes (or processes of appropriation) exemplify two basic kinds of feelings: physical or bodily feelings and conceptual feelings (mentality).

He does report Whitehead's claim that pure conceptual feelings are not conscious and that God's primordial nature therefore is not conscious (CNT 163f.).

The concrescence proceeds by the mutual interplay of the physical feelings with the conceptual feelings derived in accordance with the subjective aim, whereby all are modified and shaped into a final synthesis.

This is a plausible position, one I previously held (Emergence 227), conceiving of God as a synthesis of purely conceptual feelings.

Once, after the consequent nature has been introduced, we read: «The «primordial nature» of God is the concrescence of a unity of conceptual feelings» Process 87f).

These propositions are again integrated and re-integrated with each other and with conceptual feelings, and yield other propositions.

First, in terms of their origin in the second phase of concrescence, ideas emerge as data of conceptual feelings — pried out of immanence in feelings of causal efficacy as the objects of feelings of conceptual reproduction and reversion.

«Conceptual actuality,» rather than «conceptual nature,» indicates that God's actuality as a whole is constituted solely Out of conceptual feelings.

In Whitehead's terms, an occasion may prehend the conceptual feelings of antecedent occasion, not only the physical feelings of those occasions.

That seems to mean that the conceptual feelings of an actual entity always derive from its physical and hybrid feelings.

The doctrine of conceptual feelings opens the way to its own share of interesting speculations.

His speculations about conceptual feelings lead him to an original and distinctive doctrine of God.

If God is an actual entity, then like all actual entities God should be di - polar, that is, God should have both conceptual feelings and physical ones.

The difference between this objective content and the content arising out of the integration of conformal feeling with supplemental conceptual feelings (the «mental pole») is felt as «appearance.»

Since God's conceptual feelings as derived from his primordial nature are inexhaustible, he has all the necessary resources to supplement his initial conformal feelings perfectly, thereby achieving a maximum harmonious intensity from any situation.

As the last sentence of our quotation indicates, the shift from initial conformal feelings to supplemental conceptual feelings marks a shift from reality to appearance.

This distinction between initial, physical, conformal feelings and supplemental, conceptual feelings can be significantly applied to the divine experience.

Since Whitehead says: «Every eternal object has entered into the conceptual feelings of God,» (Process and Reality, Corrected Edition, ed.

In simple terms, given Whitehead's fully developed system, if God is conscious, then he must have physical feelings as well as conceptual feelings.

(Religion in the Making, Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1960, 115) A clearer statement of the significance of the ordering to God as an actual entity is: «The conceptual feelings, which compose his primordial nature, exemplify in their subjective forms their mutual sensitivity and their subjective unity of subjective aim.

This subjective aim, in its successive modifications, remains the unifying factor governing the successive phases of inter-play between physical and conceptual feelings.

Griffin & Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978, 246) He adds, «There is autonomy in the formation of the subjective forms of conceptual feelings...» (Process and Reality, Corrected Edition, ed.

Secondly, conceptual feelings, apart from complex integration with physical feelings, are devoid of consciousness in their subjective forms.»

As primordial he is deficiently actual in two ways: a. his feelings are only conceptual and b. his conceptual feelings are devoid of consciousness.

There is secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the first phase of the mental pole.

Utilizing Category (iv) and God's conceptual feelings (how God feels the eternal objects), there is no reason to complicate the system with Category (v).

Destructuring contact3 (phase of conceptual feelings) involves the complete abstraction of the pure possibilities from the accepted given.

On first glance, it appears that eternal objects enter into concrescence only in the second phase, which Sherburne calls the phase of conceptual feelings (WA 49 - 54).

This continuuum appears to begin with physical feelings dominating the occasion's experience and may well exhibit a continuous increase in the role of conceptual feelings in the self's experience.

Owing to the disastrous confusion, more especially by Hume, of conceptual feelings with perceptual feelings, the truism that we can only conceive in terms of universals has been stretched to mean that we can only feel in terms of universals.

Yet complete reversal is not possible, because physical feelings can not be derived from conceptual feelings.

Yet conceptual feelings are always derivative from physical feelings.7 This principle is expressed in the fourth Categoreal Obligation: «From each physical feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual feeling whose datum is the eternal object determinant of the definiteness of the actual entity, or the nexus, physically felt» (PR 26 / 39f.).

Consciousness requires the complex integration of physical and conceptual feelings (PR 266f).

Sherburne distinguishes four phases in the concrescence of an actual entity — the phase of conformal feelings, the phase of conceptual feelings, the phase of simple comparative feelings, and the phase of complex comparative feelings (WA 56; see also KWPR 40).

Now it could be contended that eternal objects are actually involved in both physical feelings and conceptual feelings, although in a different manner.

A hybrid physical feeling is a feeling which objectifies the actual entity which forms its initial datum by means of one of this datum actual entity's conceptual feelings.

Nor is this contention weakened by Whitehead's statement that God's experience originates from conceptual feelings while the experience of finite occasions originates from physical feelings.

He may mean that in the initial aim each occasion objectifies God by one of God's pure conceptual feelings.

A hybrid physical feeling is the perception of an actual entity by means of that entity's projected conceptual feelings.