Sentences with phrase «conscious experience as»

As explained in chapter two, Hartshorne regards human conscious experience as our only reliable key to unlock the mysteries of reality.

When we take conscious experience as our basis for understanding what experience is, we think of receiving and responding to stimuli from the body and the environment, of emotion, purpose, and thought, of the significant organization of data and the influencing of action.

This distinction is between conscious experience as significantly organized and conscious experience lacking such organization.

But what is essential to conscious experience as such, for Aristotle, is subject immanently entertaining object.

Not exact matches

In my personal experience as an entrepreneur, focusing on finding a unique benefit, setting goals and being conscious of my perspective have proved helpful.

Currently he's bringing these divergent experiences together in order to help companies develop more conscious, purpose - driven business models; and to help investors build societal as well as financial value.

What she really should have told Oprah: As an atheist I have far more appreciation and awe of the world and beauty around us, because I can understand the immeasurable number of years to bring us to this moment and the rare privilege of being a conscious being at this moment to experience it.

Insofar as the experience of this self is unconscious, its immediacy and directness offer no exploitable advantage: one can hardly claim to be conscious of the essence of experience as exhibited immediately and directly in an experience of which one is not consciously aware.

Insofar as the experience of this self has been made conscious, it fails to provide the process thinker with the desired immediate and authoritative access to the essence of experience.

This contention is not defeated merely by a critic's facile claim not to be conscious of any such nonsensuous perception of one's own «self,» or of anything describable as experience mediating one's experiences of trees, dogs, and fire hydrants.

Just as there is a real difference between noticing something already within one's vision and bringing something new within one's visual experience, so there is a real difference between becoming conscious of something already within one's field of experience and introducing something new within the range of one's experience.

Theism explains everything we observe, argues Swinburne, including «the fact that there is a universe at all, that scientific laws operate within it, that it contains conscious animals and humans with very complex intricately organized bodies, that we have abundant opportunities for developing ourselves and the world, as well as the more particular data that humans report miracles and have religious experiences.»

I also believe that, in spite of Whitehead's reluctance to concede privileged status to human occasions of experience, the introduction of the wide range of conscious anticipation of the future which humanity represents in comparison to lesser types of existence also introduces justice as a characteristic of the specially human aim at harmonious beauty.

And it is conscious: that is, it does not stay below the threshold of consciousness and work there unknown to the soul (as, for instance, infant baptism is thought by some to do), but comes within the field of awareness where the man can «know» it as he knows any other fact of experience.

As the living person draws upon a wider bodily experience, so the conscious ego, if there should be one at a particular moment, draws upon a vast ocean of unconscious feeling which sustains it.

The within of things we experience as humans is richness of conscious experience.

Scattered widely throughout the history of mankind there have been «somewhat exceptional elements in our conscious experience... which may roughly be classed together as religious and moral intuitions.»

A decline of conscious attention, as in exhaustion, in which the figure - ground structure dissolves into a homogeneous field, illustrates that consciousness is derivative from a more complex experience, which I have located in the overwhelmingly nonconscious occasions in the «nonsocial» nexus.

Clergy and laity will then experience themselves first of all as brothers of the same religious mind and conviction which all have acquired through many sacrifices in a personal decision and in conscious opposition to the mentality of their surroundings.

At any given moment we are the «little birth and little death» that we are doing or undergoing, including as it does conscious and subconscious memories of the past and future.7 There is no separate person locked within the body to whom the experience belongs, no separate owner or possessor of the flow of experience.

If such an eventuality actually took place, experience «would... include in an undivided present the entire past history of the conscious person, not as instantaneity, not like a cluster of simultaneous parts, but as something continually present which would also be something continually moving» (CM 152).

As Ross points out, «Whitehead's examples of causal efficacy in conscious experience are a light flash and the agent's claim that «the flash made me blink» (PR 175).

, where Brightman explicitly rejects Kant's approach as non-empirical, and then characterizes his own method, using James» phrase, as «radical empiricism» which «will assume no source of information about the real, other than the experience of conscious persons» (23).

For him, our experience as we experience it is not given in God's conscious experience, it is known indirectly by God, albeit perfectly (since God's reasoning can not fail), and God wants it that way; «When God intuits me, I am not a part of him, but he wills that I should be other than himself, yet known by him.

Just as we find the various conscious states of our experience enter into the constitution of one another, so the units of becoming must be related in this way.

Although Sherburne is not entirely consistent he seems to identify the experience of the dominant occasion as exclusively focused, conscious experience.

Phenomenology, at least in its first practitioners and its early stages, was conceived as a conscious rejection of subjectivism and an attempt to recover, without abandoning inwardness, the experienced reality of external things and of the self as well.

In particular, the denial that epistemology is wholly prior to ontology; the denial that we can have an absolutely certain starting point; the idea that those elements of experience thought by most people to be primitive givens are in fact physiologically, personally, and socially constructed; the idea that all of our descriptions of our observations involve culturally conditioned interpretations; the idea that our interpretations, and the focus of our conscious attention, are conditioned by our purposes; the idea that the so - called scientific method does not guarantee neutral, purely objective, truths; and the idea that most of our ideas do not correspond to things beyond ourselves in any simple, straightforward way (for example, red as we see it does not exist in the «red brick» itself).

Our most fundamental conscious experience has generally been taken to be the perception of sensa, i.e., of relatively clear and distinct objects such as red, bitter, etc..

The source of the problem, as he sees it, is this set of assumptions: that those elements that are prior (clearest) in consciousness are genetically primitive, that sensory data are the most primitive data of experience, that the elements of experience most clearly expressed by language are the most primitive, and that conscious introspection is the best way to identify the most fundamental elements of experience.

They are «dimly conscious» in two senses: (1) as experiences, they do not normally rise to the stature of conscious centers competing for control of the organism, but they have appetitions and aversions in their own right so that it seems appropriate to label them «dimly conscious»; (2) they are perceived only dimly by the members of the regnant society, i.e., the regnant society has these particular occasions as dim, vaguely felt, negative «scars» on the data of what is clearly perceived in full consciousness.

By this distinction of two modes of passivity — of receiving forms - Aristotle sets off the world of conscious experience from the world of nature, but in such a way that not only the objects but the very workings of nature are included as part of what is felt.

I mean to assert that my conscious experience, the experience constitutive of me as a conscious ego, is the experience of the actual entities constitutive of the personally ordered regnant society which dominates my brain and my whole animal organism.

Though it has been done, it is philosophical stupidity to deny either that we experience spatially extended objects or that we experience ourselves as active conscious centers of feeling, experience, thought, intention, attention, volition, desire, emotion, satisfaction, etc..

And this precisely is the facet of the object that extends beyond conscious experience, for it is doubtless true of any arising entity that it must take, and perhaps even take in, the world as it finds it.

the belief on the existence of the devil was concieved by theologians of the past thousands of years, there was no other way of explaining the bad experiences of people in the past because we were not educated yet to the kind of what we have now, Why this happened because that was part of the learning process that God wants us to know, in pathrotheism, we are part of God, and He himself is evolving because He is the universe, We are now the conscious part of Him, our destiny in accordance to his will also be His destiny because it is His will.Although He prepared first all the material reality of the universe ahead of us, The experiences for us humans including the supernatural is just part of nirmal process for learning because its natural process, today we reach a point of not believing the practices of the past, but it does not mean its wrong, Just like a child, adults loved to tell mythical stories to them, because we knew children enjoys it as part of their learning process.

Whereas Aristotle, as we have seen, took the first factor to be peculiar to conscious experience and the second to be the more general factor lying at the base of consciousness, Whitehead took the subject - object structure as general and fundamental and interpreted causal efficacy in terms of it.

The stream of human conscious experience and creative activity (the human mind or soul) has one vitally important property in process thought that it does not have in Cartesian metaphysics: it is spatially (as well as temporally) extended.

The subject - object structure, as he himself indicates, stands out clearly only in the upper reaches of conscious experience.

In this, as Lincoln discovered in the tragic days of the Civil War, we find a level of experience which does the seemingly impossible of making us firm in the right, «as God gives us to see the right,» but also humble because we are conscious that «the Almighty has his own purposes.»

Propositions are such; in every experience, conscious or unconscious, they function as «lures proposed for feeling.»

I experience God only in terms of his primordial satisfaction, not in terms of his consequent experience, and hence not in terms of my past self as conscious in God.

«Individuality,» the I of I - It, becomes conscious of itself as the subject of experiencing and using.

In this book «conscious experience» will be used as inclusively as possible.

There is such a thing as «conscious experience» or «awareness.»

In personal existence, a center emerged in the conscious psyche that transcended such impersonal forces as passion and reason, which were operative therein, and experienced responsibility for their mutual relations.

But within the context of fully conscious existence, the divine as immediately experienced seemed to be almost necessarily pushed aside.

He thus becomes conscious of himself as one among the many individuals presented to each other through sense experience.

May I emphasize the fact that the elements and functions coming from the superconscious, such as aesthetic, ethical, religious experiences, intuition, inspiration, states of mystical conscious - ness, are factual, are real in the pragmatic sense... producing changes both in the inner and the outer world.

The belief that God acted became a part of the conscious, conceptual structure, but the action itself stood outside the sphere of conscious experience and was looked on as past and future rather than present.