American
constitutional law doctrine looks unfavourably on delegations of law - making authority to private entities.
Unless the SCC strikes down the applicable Criminal Code provision in Carter, the Bill is vulnerable to
the constitutional law doctrine of federal paramountcy.
The above arguments are based upon
the constitutional law doctrine of «structural argumentation» (see: Robin M. Elliott, «References, Structural Argumentation and the Organizing Principles of Canada's Constitution» (2000), 80 Canadian Bar Review 67, and decisions such as the, Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, [1985] S.C.J. No. 36, the, Reference Re Secession of Québec, [1999] S.C.J. No. 4, [1998] 2 SCR 217, and the, Reference re Remuneration of Judges, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, to argue that the need for access to the rule of law, and to constitutional rights and freedoms, dictate that law societies in Canada can not enforce a monopoly over the provision of legal services that enables their members to charge fees of whatever size they see fit.
Not exact matches
These
doctrines are standard parts of Canadian
constitutional law and there is no reason to think that they are not equally applicable to a
law that relies for its validity on s 92A (2).
A friend who has been teaching a course on
constitutional law for a couple of decades and has achieved a national reputation confided recently that he plans to stop teaching the course; there just isn't any integrity to the subject, and it becomes almost a degrading experience to have to teach, say, equal protection
doctrine and pretend that the Court's decisions are the product of any sort of coherent thinking.
And when it comes to immunizing such «choices» from legal restriction or even private remonstration, the Court's liberals can be counted upon to flip on the switch of what Justice Antonin Scalia, writing in dissent, describes as «the ad hoc nullification machine that [is] set in motion to push aside whatever
doctrines of
constitutional law stand in the way of the highly favored practice of abortion.»
This political
doctrine, of course, is not «
law» (unlike the
constitutional separation of church and state, which is).
• Article 95.2, that points the competence of the High Court to unify
doctrine, the
Constitutional court clarifies that this competence doesn't limit the possibility to be regulated for the Organic
Law about Power of Attorney to regulate that in every historic moment the jurisdictional function is up to the High Court, and therefore what is pointed in the autonomy statute is not qualification.
Hence, the lack of supporting
constitutional text, principles of federalism, and the
doctrine of stare decisis (which lends stability to the
law by encouraging courts to stand by their prior decisions) all militate against the creation of a federal
constitutional right to education or to supposedly equal school funding.
Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust
Doctrine: Natural
Law and
Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 741 (2012).
I believe that thanks to the national
constitutional doctrines on the «conditional» primacy of EU
law (on the «conditional supremacy» of EU
law in the UK, see the post by Garner on this blog) as well as to the corresponding EU provisions — the
constitutional identity clause in Article 4 (2) TEU and the authorisation to apply higher national standards of fundamental rights in Article 53 CFR — national
constitutional or apex courts can provide necessary checks and balances on the ECJ enormous judicial power.
As Justice Stratas put it to the attendees, should Canada ever be gripped by some form of threat or disorder, leading the government to abridge the civil liberties of many Canadians, do we want the judge deciding the constitutionality of the government's action to be able to turn to a body of
constitutional law «based on fundamental principles, consistently applied over decades» — in other words, «settled legal
doctrine» — or do we want the judge deciding the issue based upon «her or his own worldview?»
This, of course, bears a marked similarity to the famous «Solange»
doctrine of the German
Constitutional Court, which details the national highest court's acceptance of EU
law conditional upon its compatibility with the substantive provisions of the German Basic L
law conditional upon its compatibility with the substantive provisions of the German Basic
LawLaw.
The equal footing
doctrine, also known as equality of the states, is the principle in United States
constitutional law that all states admitted to the Union under the Constitution since 1789 enter on equal footing with the 13 states already in the Union at that time.
In the past, the Italian
Constitutional Court made clear that supra - national law should not prevail without any limitation, and that the application of international obligations could not have the effect to breach the fundamental principles of the constitutional order or the fundamental rights of the individuals (this is called the «counter-limit doctrine», developed for example in the «Granital case», Sentenza n. 170,
Constitutional Court made clear that supra - national
law should not prevail without any limitation, and that the application of international obligations could not have the effect to breach the fundamental principles of the
constitutional order or the fundamental rights of the individuals (this is called the «counter-limit doctrine», developed for example in the «Granital case», Sentenza n. 170,
constitutional order or the fundamental rights of the individuals (this is called the «counter-limit
doctrine», developed for example in the «Granital case», Sentenza n. 170, 5 June 1984).
I'm not a lawyer (
constitutional law or otherwise), but my understanding of the reasoning behind Smith v. Maryland (full text) and the subsequent «third - party
doctrine» was that:
Although neither statute nor case
law clearly articulates that the lawyer's monopoly over the provision of legal services depends upon the legal profession's performing all legal services covered by that monopoly at reasonable cost, I argue that such relationship is dictated by
constitutional doctrine because:
Author, «The Entire Controversy
Doctrine in 1997: Driving in the Wrong Direction,» Seton Hall
Constitutional Law Journal, Winter 1997
In Canada, under the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, parliament or a provincial legislature has the authority to repeal or modify any principles set out in case
law provided that it does so in accordance with
constitutional limitations: G. Gall, The Canadian Legal System, 4th ed.
Mr. Sirota concedes that judges must be bound by rules, but it seems to me that if judges are being tasked with correcting «democratic process failures» to ensure that the
law does not become «divorced from reality», they will, at times, be forced to interpret the Constitution in a manner that is not consistent with the
constitutional text or
doctrine.
The Court signalled in Canadian Western Bank v Alberta, 2007 SCC 22 (CanLII), that generally the use of the
doctrine should be minimized since it is redolent of more rigid approaches to
constitutional law that favour «watertight compartments» rather than the more modern cooperative federalism approach.
Her writing focuses primarily on
constitutional law and procedures and
doctrines of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court.
The «Persons» case became the basis in Canadian
constitutional law for the living tree
doctrine.
As noted by Barbara Guastaferro, the assumption that the purpose of the clause is that of applying in exceptional cases of conflicts between EU
law and domestic
constitutional law — in an attempt to narrow the scope of application of the supremacy
doctrine — has to be challenged; while the potential for a use of the clause in governing the ordinary functioning of EU
law should be, on the contrary, highlighted.
In Canada the creative tension between the rule of
law and democracy —
constitutional principles recognised by the Supreme Court of Canada [1]-- provides a crucible in which judicial review
doctrine is formed.
An unsophisticate search for
law AND Canada OR Canadian turns up a good bunch of interesting material, starting with Marc Ribeiro's 2005 book, Limiting Arbitrary Power: The Vagueness Doctrine in Canadian Constitutional Law (Vancouver: UBC Press), ISBN 0774810513, with an index that might be usef
law AND Canada OR Canadian turns up a good bunch of interesting material, starting with Marc Ribeiro's 2005 book, Limiting Arbitrary Power: The Vagueness
Doctrine in Canadian
Constitutional Law (Vancouver: UBC Press), ISBN 0774810513, with an index that might be usef
Law (Vancouver: UBC Press), ISBN 0774810513, with an index that might be useful.
By overturning the Second Circuit's ruling (and disavowing the overly broad «comity
doctrine» cited by that court), the Supreme Court would reaffirm the general duty of federal courts to apply federal
law as written, consistent with the
constitutional separation of powers.
Unfortunately, it raises some
constitutional questions around preemption (the
doctrine that federal
law invalidates state
law when they are in conflict) and federal due process (which generally protects the right to take cases to court or make demands when they're sent in good faith).