The third is a complex but typically erudite decision of Underhill P in the EAT on the question of the legality of pay protection schemes, but with the twist that this time it arose in
the context of age discrimination, not sex discrimination.
In
the context of age discrimination (with its unusual element of being able to justify direct discrimination) this arose in Pulham v Barking & Dagenham LBC [2010] IRLR 184, [2009] All ER (D) 221 (Dec) where the EAT took a rather cautious approach to it; they held that the tribunal had been right to hold that a pay protection scheme can be justified, even though prolonging the age differential, but remitted the matter for reconsideration of whether these facts actually did justify the protection.
Not exact matches
The Code prohibits
discrimination by a «person» against another «person» (the «complainant») on the basis
of various prohibited grounds, such as race, sex and
age in various social
contexts, such as provision
of services, housing and employment.
The general approach to such schemes was considered in Redcar & Cleveland BC v Bainbridge; Surtees v Middlesbrough BC [2008] IRLR 776, CA in the
context of equal pay and sex
discrimination but in the instant case the interesting variation was that the attack came on the basis
of age discrimination (where,
of course, one difference is that even direct
discrimination can be justified).
Article 6
of the Directive allows member states to provide that «differences
of treatment on grounds
of age shall not constitute
discrimination, if, within the
context of national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the means
of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary».