There was a history of difficulties and hostility between
the convicted appellant and the deceased.
He then
convicted the appellant.
«Instead of carefully reviewing the evidence in the case in order to determine whether or not the Crown had, in fact, established that the appellant possessed the specific intent of wilfulness required by s. 173 (1) of the Criminal Code, the trial judge erroneously
convicted the appellant based upon a perceived (but non-existent) legal presumption that the necessary wilfulness was established by the fact that his acts of masturbation were in fact witnessed by another,» he wrote.
Second, the appellant argues that the trial judge failed to provide legally adequate Reasons for Judgment in dismissing the appellant's Charter motion and in
convicting the appellant on the «over 80» charge, by failing to reconcile the conflicting testimony of the two police officers who testified as to the appellant's indicia of impairment.
Not exact matches
The
appellant in IH (Eritrea)[2009] UKAIT 00012 was caught by s 72 because he had been
convicted of an offence in a category deemed to be particularly serious irrespective of the sentence (sexual assault).
The central issue for the Court of Appeal was whether the
appellant had been rightly
convicted of the MDA 1971, s 23 (4)(a) offence.
[2] The
appellant, Ali Hassan Saeed, was
convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm and unlawful touching for a sexual purpose.
Charter of Rights: The
appellant was
convicted of operating a vehicle contrary to a prohibition order.
The
Appellant was thereafter
convicted and sentenced to death by hanging.
Noting that Boychyn made the comments before proceeding to trial,
convicting Jagtoo of speeding, and fining him $ 259, Beninger ruled there was «an appearance that bias may have been exhibited towards the
appellant.»
On the facts of Hamilton, the
appellant had therefore been rightly
convicted.
In Michael Ashad Khan the
appellant had been
convicted of three counts of failing to disclose property s 351 (3)(a) Insolvency Act 1986.
«The consequence of this is that the basis upon which the
appellants were
convicted is shown to have been unsound,» he added.
The
appellant, Brendan David Aucoin, was
convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after a pat - down search during the course of the roadside detention.
The
appellant was
convicted of disorderly behaviour in the District Court.
In that case, the
appellant had been
convicted of offensive behaviour under s 4 (1)(a) of the Summary Offences Act 1981, the same section under which Brooker had also been charged.
In turn, the Court of Appeal hears new evidence offered by the
appellant and considers whether, if a jury had heard it, the individual would have been
convicted.
Feb. 21 — Saskatchewan — Olotu v. R. Criminal law: The
appellant was
convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm.
The
appellant, Aras Ahmed - Kadir, had been
convicted of four offences involving unlicensed handgun possession and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
In criminal appeals the
appellant is usually the
convicted person seeking to change or overturn the result below.
In its 78 - page decision, the appeal court said that the combination of verdicts «presents an unusual, if not unique, result... In effect, the
appellant has been
convicted of attempting to murder the very same person he was found to have justifiably fatally shot just 5.5 seconds earlier.»
Appellants were
convicted, and each was fined five dollars and costs.
The Court decided that «[i] n
convicting [the
appellant] of unprofessional conduct... the Discipline Committee ran afoul s. 26 (10) of the Act», which requires the Committee to notify a person if the evidence shows that the person may be guilty of a charge other than that specified in the Formal Complaint (at para. 53).
In R v Porter [2008] All ER (D) 249 (May), the
appellant had been
convicted of failing to ensure the health and safety of persons not in his employment, contrary to s 3 (1) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.
It was reasonable for the school disciplinary panel to have concluded that the
appellant's non-disclosure of her friendship with a man
convicted of making indecent images of children not only amounted to a breach of duty, but also merited her dismissal.
The conduct of the police, and specifically Constable Greenwood, ensured that he would not receive that advice until after the police were done with the
appellant and had the evidence they needed to
convict him.»
Appellant, manager of a motion picture theater, was
convicted under a state obscenity law of possessing and exhibiting an allegedly obscene film, and the State Supreme Court upheld the conviction.
Synopsis: The
appellant was
convicted of 16 counts of firearms and drug related offences following a trial by judge and jury.
Synopsis: The
Appellant was
convicted of multiple counts of fraud - related offences which arose out of a debit / credit card PIN pad fraud scheme.
The
appellants were
convicted and fined of # 75,000, # 100,000 and # 75,000 respectively, all with costs orders.
The case concerned two
appellants who had been
convicted of serious offences on the basis of evidence which they did not have the opportunity to fully challenge in court (hearsay).
In R v McGuire (1985) 81 Cr App R 323, the
appellant had been
convicted of arson after a trial in which the judge had admitted evidence of a scientific officer's report on the fire.
The
Appellant, Mr. Marakah (M), was
convicted of several offences including trafficking firearms.
The
appellant had been
convicted of murder in 2003.
In both cases, the
appellants had been
convicted of conspiracy to launder money contrary to the Criminal Law Act 1977 (CLA 1977), s 1 (1).
In R v Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 256, [2007] All ER (D) 412 (Mar) the
appellant had been
convicted of rape.
The
appellant's submissions were rejected by the Court of Appeal, which certified the following point of law of general public importance as involved in its decision for consideration by the House of Lords, namely, is it permissible for a defendant to be
convicted where a conviction is based solely or to a decisive extent upon the testimony of one or more anonymous witnesses?
[1] The
Appellant Augustine was
convicted of failing to appear, contrary to s. 145 of the Criminal Code.
The
appellant had also been
convicted of other serious criminal offences including manslaughter, arising from incidents taking place at about the same time.
The
appellant was
convicted in his absence in Albania, a category 2 territory, and the secretary of state for the Home Department ordered the
appellant's extradition.