The pressure vessel head has been installed at one of the two high - temperature gas -
cooled reactor units that make up the demonstration HTR - PM plant under construction at Shidaowan in China's Shandong province.
Not exact matches
In fact, throughout the first week of the Fukushima crisis, emergency workers tried to figure out a way to open up a larger hole in the
Unit 2
reactor building, which had not suffered an explosion, to allow better access to inject
cooling water without creating the kind of spark that might cause another hydrogen blast.
And there is some somewhat alarming language that talks about, and I'll just quote «the IAEA tells us the earthquake triggered a power failure at the Fukushima Daiichi
unit 2 nuclear power plant, and then when a backup generator also failed, the
cooling system was unable to supply water to
cool the
reactor.
As NRC staff noted during the Fukushima emergency, when there was concern that the spent - fuel pool at
Unit 4 may have lost its
cooling water as well as been damaged by the
reactor building explosion, adding cold water to already hot fuel can create a problem in its own right.
In the 1980s this research was directed toward a fast
reactor (dubbed the advanced liquidmetal
reactor, or ALMR), with metallic fuel
cooled by a liquid metal, that was to be integrated with a high - temperature pyrometallurgical processing
unit for recycling and replenishing the fuel.
Jaczko, chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said his staff in Tokyo had been told by Japanese utility officials that
cooling water that normally covers spent fuel was nearly or totally gone from an uncovered concrete pool above
reactor Unit 4.
Flooding of critical equipment resulted in the extended loss of onsite power with the consequent loss of
reactor monitoring, control, and
cooling functions in multiple
units.
At about 4 A.M. local time, the main pumps feeding
cooling water into
Unit 2 failed and, due to confusion amidst the klaxon of alarms and flashing warning lights, the men operating the
reactor made the situation worse when they mistakenly thought there was too much water in the core and shut off emergency pumps, thereby reducing further the amount of coolant reaching the
reactor.
Unit 1
reactor was permanently shut down in October 1974 because the emergency core
cooling system did not meet regulatory requirements.
The
reactor units would be factory built, delivered on trucks and dropped into place — anywhere as they don't need water
cooling — for decades of hands free operation powering 350,000 houses per
unit.
In fact, certain of TEPCO's actions in the aftermath of the explosions have been confused and, some might opine, lacking discipline of purpose to the extent that expedient decisions have been made without proper forethought and judiciousness to avoid knock - on consequences: for example, the injection of seawater may have resulted in salt deposits sufficient to foul
cooling flows in the lower regions of the RPV [
reactor pressure vessel]; the liberation of hydrogen from seawater is more rampant than from freshwater and radiolysis of oxygen from the
cooling water could provide stoichiometric conditions and ignition with hydrogen in the absence of air in the containments; and the latest and most recent announcement to deploy a nitrogen purge to the
Unit 1
reactor seems yet another ill - explained and unjustified desperate measure».