Sentences with phrase «corpuscular societies»

Felt points out that Whitehead makes a clear distinction between single actual entities and corpuscular societies (PR 112), and since composite entities, such as the Castle Rock, fall in the latter category, they must be excluded from the former.

We have to understand interstices as part of the plenum, not empty, but full, perhaps in between corpuscular societies.

These entities are very different in kind from the corpuscular societies as a whole and, Whitehead is convinced, have much more kinship to the actual occasions of human experience.

They are corpuscular societies, and such freedom as can in any sense be attributed to them is, in fact, the property of the individual entities of which they are composed.

These individuals turn out to be societies of actual occasions, usually corpuscular societies of special importance in relation to human purposes.

It is these enduring objects and the corpuscular societies composed of them that are subject to investigation through our sense organs and through instruments.

Bodies of this sort, analyzable into enduring objects, Whitehead calls «corpuscular societies.»

The rewards and penalties are produced by manipulation of corpuscular societies and structured societies so as to change the strength of beauty (very roughly, the measure of pleasure or pain) experienced by the person who is being coerced.

Hence, what is principally carried forward from moment to moment both by the regnant personally ordered society and by all the subordinate corpuscular societies is a collective feeling of interrelatedness together with the common element of form for the structured society as a whole.

He speaks of animal bodies as corpuscular societies, whereas he speaks of molecules, quite directly, as enduring objects.

While the general position seems more reminiscent of the «organic mechanism» of Science and the Modern World, Russell's discussion of minds and the entities of physics bears an interesting resemblance to the more technical Whiteheadian discussion of personally ordered societies and corpuscular societies of actual occasions in Process and Reality.

Corpuscular societies consisting of low — level occasions, such as rocks and billiard balls, display little originality, thereby providing ideal instances of efficient causality for mechanistic science.

Corpuscular societies populated with low - grade occasions show little originality.

A human person is an example of such a personal order, and one could extend this image to include larger and more complex corpuscular societies, such as ethnic groups, geographical communities, or subcultures.

When a society of societies are bound together by a common element, the result is a corpuscular society, or personal order.

(b) What about living occasions, something closely related to the «empty space, and vulnerable to the foregoing objections to it, since «life is a characteristic of «empty space» and not of space «occupied» by any corpuscular society» (PR 105/161)?

Griffin & Sherburne, New York: The Free Press, 1978, 35) This discussion is very important to Whitehead's concept of man because in a later discussion he denies that the inorganic occasions of the human body form a corpuscular society.

The inertness and passivity of the stick or stone as a corpuscular society gives us no grounds for positing a similar inertness or passivity on the part of the protonic and electronic occasions of which the society is composed.

There is an infinite variety of degrees of order among which the two instances of the enduring object and the corpuscular society stand out with a certain simple clarity.

If life involves a nexus in the interstitial space of a corpuscular society, then is God without life?

We later learn that «Life lurks in the interstices of each living cell, and in the interstices of the brain» (PR 105f); and «life is a characteristic of «empty space» and not of space «occupied» by any corpuscular society» (PR 105).

Not exact matches

There is a limit to how far it will be useful to pursue the niceties of «structured» versus «corpuscular» versus «personal societies,» but it will help to recall the context in which Whitehead observes (not unlike Earley) that there can be many ways in which Nature coordinates these societies such that they can persist over time.

Whitehead says, «A society may be more or less corpuscular, according to the relative importance of the defining characteristics of the various enduring objects compared to that of the defining characteristic of the whole corpuscular nexus.»

For what we experience primordially are not particles but rather occasions of experience bound together serially into enduring objects, particles, corpuscular «societies» or personal «societies.»

According to the predominance of one or the other type of occasion, the society will be more or less corpuscular.