Of course, if you're from the «law and... blank» stream, you may be of the view that
corrective justice theories are bunk, and working from that stream could get you to your view that the difference is one of degree.
Not exact matches
In these cases, the goals of tort law and the underlying
theory of
corrective justice require that the defendant not be permitted to escape liability by pointing the finger at another wrongdoer.
[21]... To allow recovery where the injury was the result of neutral factors would neither further the goals of compensation, fairness and deterrence, nor comport with the
theory of
corrective justice that underlies the law of negligence.
From the point of view of this class — a class I'll just call «lawyers» — it's too clear for argument that (i) law has things to do so that some instrumentalist
theory has to be adopted; (ii) few things are simple, so that no single
theory will work in every case, whether it's «wealth maximization», «
corrective justice», «contract as promise», compensation or deterrence; and (iii) the demands of practice, the solicitor's need to create relations which will be projected into the (uncertain) future and to control the risks his or her client faces, the barrister's need to conduct litigation at a price the parties can afford and in the context of the adversary system, powerfully limit the consideration that a lawyer can give to
theory.
Another way to ask the question is: what did the Court mean by «neutral factors» in para. 21 of Clements: «To allow recovery where the injury was the result of neutral factors would neither further the goals of compensation, fairness and deterrence, nor comport with the
theory of
corrective justice that underlies the law of negligence.»
To allow recovery where the injury was the result of neutral factors would neither further the goals of compensation, fairness and deterrence, nor comport with the
theory of
corrective justice that underlies the law of negligence.