Sentences with phrase «court principle»

If the common law can evolve to address technological change, is the open court principle also open to such change?

This argument was rejected by the arbitrator on four alternate grounds, including that labour arbitration is not a private form of dispute resolution and the open court principle applied.

I have written about privacy and the open court principle before.

What is the proper balance between privacy and the open courts principle when it comes to providing access to the decisions of administrative tribunals?

Do we need to know the names of the parties — is that what the open courts principle is meant to achieve?

Here is a sampling of some other decisions that also touch on the open courts principle in the context of administrative tribunals:

In the case of a delusional litigant, the open court principle does not dissuade them from going to court.

As Charles Nesson eloquently puts it, tweeting and live - blogging can «facilitate [the] coveted ideal [of the open court principle] and allow the whispers, now made in the inner rooms of our public courthouses, to be proclaimed from the digital roof tops for all to hear.»

First and foremost, the Supreme Court has held that the open court principle fundamentally operates on the assumption that the reporting of legal information will be done in an accurate and fair manner.

Interpretation of the Dagenais / Mentuck test and application of the open court principle go to the heart of the case.

The applicant claimed that the FIPPA process was potentially lengthy and cumbersome, and posed as an obstacle to the open court principle due to its presumption of non-disclosure.

Although the media has a vital role in maintaining the open court principle by disseminating news of judicial hearings to the public and informing them of legal issues, the Charter does not give the media greater rights than those enjoyed by the public,

The open court principle upholds the Constitutional rights of freedom of expression and freedom of the press.

Another case which has recently been settled without being resolved on the merits (Waldman v. Thompson Reuteurs Canada Ltd. — discussed in my blog post here) raised the issue of whether the open courts principle effectively creates an implied public licence to use any materials submitted to the courts as part of court proceedings.

[18] The leading cases germane to the open court principle include Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, and Re Application to Proceed in Camera, 2007 SCC 43.

«There can be little doubt that the ban proposed by the Crown would have been highly intrusive of the open court principle in the present case,» Wedge said.

This particular speech from the Chief Justice is new to me, but it is excellent and it really captures well why we treat the open court principle as an immovable object as well as the tension between that principle and our privacy interests.

As Justice Morgan notes in his decision, the open courts principle applies not just to courts, but also to administrative tribunals, since the legitimacy of the proceedings before such tribunals requires similar transparency.

But have we also witnessed a narrowing of the open court principle and Parliament's intent concerning republication of the law in the absence of a full debate?

The defendant attempted to rely on the open court principle to demonstrate the right of non-parties to attend, which is enunciated subject to several exceptions under the Courts of Justice Act,

The CCLA argued that a publication ban is an improper substitute for a sealing order, when the banned information is already publicly available, and furthermore, is inconsistent with the open court principle and freedom of expression.

Yet, privacy must also tangle with the open court principle and particularly with the publication of personal information in court decisions published on the Internet.

As we have done with children, we need an open discussion on the appropriate recognition of the vulnerability of those with mental health issues and the right balance between that vulnerability and the open court principle.

Accordingly, the revolutionary nature of this information dissemination platform exposes both digital media's promises and problems in relation to the normative values that support the open court principle.

Consequently, while the fight may be waged between the normative value of the law's content and the discursive nature of its debate in the context of the open court principle, freedom of speech under section 2 (b) may be the ultimate trump card, particularly in circumstances where the courts have already brought digital media technologies into the fold.

This article examines the debate on the use of digital devices in the courtroom from the perspective of the «open court principle,» as articulated in both law and general jurisprudential theory.

In the context of the open court principle, reliance on live - blogging and Twitter as mechanisms for dissemination thus troublingly places the truth - seeking function of the open court principle in direct tension with its deliberative function.

It argues that using digital media as a platform to disseminate courtroom narratives has the potential to strengthen many of the open court principle's foundational values, including accessibility, judicial accountability, and freedom of speech.

Using digital media as a platform to disseminate courtroom narratives has the potential to strengthen many of the open court principle's foundational values, including accessibility, accountability of the judiciary, and freedom of speech.

The normative values underpinning the open court principle are complex, and deliberation on them is found in canonical Supreme Court of Canada case law, as well as in the writings of legal philosophers and critics such as Jeremy Bentham, Lon L. Fuller, and Jeremy Waldron.

Critics, in turn, have argued that this presumption is an indispensable element to the practical operation of the open court principle, insofar as it relieves judges, in the absence of countervailing evidence, of the onerous task of having to vet or screen the integrity of the press when presiding in full view of the media.

Accordingly, this article suggests that in deciding whether to integrate digital media use within the courtroom, the justice system must determine which of the democratic values that underpin the open court principle ought to be given decisive weight in modern society.

But the Court cautioned that non-publication orders should still not be too easily available as they involve «a significant intrusion upon the open court principle and must be justified by the party seeking it.»

An order that limits publication of certain information for a fixed time period, while permitting full access to the material or the relevant proceeding, has a less deleterious effect on the open court principle, and associated individual rights, than does an order that effectively locks the courtroom door to the media and the public.

You could argue that the pursuit of «practical obscurity» was always inconsistent with the open court principle, but, now lost, does that mean any hope of widespread protection of privacy for litigants has been lost with it?

I'll leave it to others to predict how the law will develop as courts interpret 2012 SCC 46 in future cases, but I agree that irrespective of the narrow facts supporting the ruling that we can expect to see it argued in just about every case where the open court principle and privacy interests collide.

The CJC has quite clearly placed the onus on judges to craft decisions that reveal as little personal information as possible, so that the open courts principle can be upheld without unduly airing people's «dirty laundry».