I think you're exactly right that the impacts of highlighting geoengineering demonstrate the validity to
cultural cognition as an explanation of human psychology.
Not exact matches
Yale Law study, entitled «Identity - protective
Cognition Thesis» (ICT),» treats
cultural conflict
as disabling the faculties that members of the public use to make sense of decision relevant science.
She also served
as a
cultural affairs policy researcher through a partnership with the Houston Mayor's Office and is a former member of a Rice University research team that focused on memory and
cognition in relation to learning.
What you take
as conscious «framing,» to me is much deeper than that (see Kahan et al's «
cultural cognition» work; think about McKibben and Monbiot's reactions to Fukushima
as another example).
As I stressed, what social scientists call «
cultural cognition» is only one factor shaping perceptions of phenomena revealed by science.
Among many issues, «
cultural cognition,»
as Yale's Dan Kahan and others have shown, means your
cultural identity matters more than an objective assessment of «facts.»
His august title there is Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology at Yale Law School, but my favorite incarnation of Kahan is
as the driving force behind the
Cultural Cognition Project, which has shown empirically that powerful predispositions shape how we select and react to information.
On this view,
cultural cognition can be seen
as injecting a biasing form of endogeneity into a process roughly akin to Bayesian updating.
My point was that, if we accept this basic story (it's too simple, even
as an account of how
cultural cognition works; but that's in the nature of «models» & should give us pause only when the simplification detracts from rather than enhances our ability to predict and manage the dynamics of the phenomenon in question), then there's no reason to view the valences of the
cultural meanings attached to crediting climate change risk
as fixed or immutable.
And I would offer a similar criticism of that
as well,
as IMO, you neither ground that form of analogizing in a scientific manner;
as I have told you, I think that your inclusion and exclusion criteria selection process is quite arbitrary, and I don't think that it is coincidence that it confirms your distinction of a group you belong to («skeptics») from a group you criticize («realists») in ways that (1) reaffirm a superiority in the group you belong to and, (2) I consider to be superficial and not meaningful
as compared to the vastly more important underlying similarities (e.g., the tendency toward identity protective behavior, motivated reasoning,
cultural cognition, confirmation bias, emotively - influenced reasoning, etc.)...
I will say this; I little no doubt that just
as is true of everyone else, including you, Dan's work is influenced by
cultural cognition, or other manifestations of motivated reasoning (I think I have seen evidence of confirmation bias, for example).
Anyway, I'm psyched to learn that Fox sees our methods and framework
as relevant to the market - related phenomena he writes on — not only because it's cool to think that
cultural cognition can shed light on those things but also because I really loved his Myth of the Rational Market.
Wouldn't that be inconsistent with the premise of
cultural cognition - that people will filter (or disregard) any evidence so
as to maintain their polarized perspective?
One recent study, published by Yale Law School's
Cultural Cognition Project, found that conservatives become less skeptical about global warming if they first read articles suggesting nuclear energy or geoengineering
as solutions.
If you get information from outside the echo chamber you will just interpret that information in such a way
as to confirm biases.the
cultural cognition project provides plenty of supporting evidence of this.
A shift in the sample
as a whole towards the answer of those with the high science comprehension scores is also predicted by my theory and
cultural cognition.
The talk (particularly toward the end) describes a «two channel communication strategy»
as a device for counteracting the distorting effect of
cultural cognition.
For people on the political right (e.g., more politically conservative), perception of scientific consensus decreases, just
as cultural cognition predicts.
The central idea of
cultural cognition is that attitudes and opinions that people adopt are
as strongly influenced by their
cultural values and identities
as they are by objective fact.
The dynamics of
cultural cognition are most convincingly explained, I believe,
as specific manifestations of the general contribution that
cultural affinity makes to the reliable, every - day exercise of the ability of individuals to discern what is collectively known.
Interesting
as these and other topics are in and for themselves, the
Cultural Cognition Project hopes to be instrumental in improving the U.S. socio - political arena:
Affective biases in attention and
cognition may serve
as likely candidate information processing mechanisms involved in the storage and transmission of
cultural values of individualism and collectivism.