But that's not the way
current teacher retirement systems are designed.
Even if they do not adopt wholesale change, there are four steps states could take to immediately improve
current teacher retirement systems.
Not exact matches
The proposal, subject to state lawmakers» approval, would also raise
teacher retirement ages for new hires and eliminate a $ 12,000 yearly payment received by many
current police and fire department retirees.
New York (CNNMoney)- Illinois lawmakers approved a landmark pension reform package Tuesday that would cut
retirement benefits for
teachers, nurses and other retired and
current state workers.
Primary and secondary school faculties are aging; by 2008, 48 % of the
current teaching force will be eligible for
retirement, leaving openings for new
teachers.
Although Pennsylvania recently made changes to its
retirement plan for new
teachers, for illustrative purposes I'm going to show the system for
current teachers.
Current teacher pension plans are neither improving the workforce nor providing
teachers with adequate
retirement savings.
So while it may be tempting to blame
teacher turnover on
current education policies, demographics and rising
retirement rates offer a more plausible explanation.
The folks at TeacherPensions.org are concerned that our
current system of
teacher pensions leaves too many
teachers without adequate funds for
retirement.
Under
current pension systems, a
teacher switching to a different career after five years leaves with virtually nothing in
retirement savings.
The CB plan simply distributes
retirement compensation more evenly across
teachers» careers — increasing
retirement compensation for younger
teachers, reducing the
current large experience premium, and eliminating the penalty imposed on those who teach beyond the standard, arbitrary
retirement age.
Deferred
retirement benefits make up a large portion of
teachers» total compensation, especially later in their careers; yet standard analyses typically consider only the link between
teachers»
current pay and experience.
Alternative
retirement models, such as cash balance (CB) plans, would allow
teachers to earn a secure
retirement benefit over the course of their career while also reducing the large late - career experience premium most
current plans exhibit.
In previous work, we demonstrated that because most
teachers are somewhat risk averse and likely will not work under a single
retirement plan for their entire careers, entering
teachers should strongly prefer earning
retirement benefits more evenly than they do under
current backloaded plans.
Because the
current backloaded system provides greater
retirement compensation for older
teachers by decreasing the
retirement compensation of younger
teachers, paying a large premium for experience may not be the most equitable way to compensate
teachers.
If we do some back - of - the - envelope math and average the state's and the Ingersoll estimates together, it means that 85,000
current Illinois
teachers will leave the profession in the next ten years with little
retirement savings to show for their experience.
Given the idiosyncratic incentives embedded in its
current retirement plan — and because it imposes mobility costs on mobile
teachers — the state should at least offer a defined contribution (DC) plan as a choice for its employees.
Thankfully, mandatory
retirement laws do not exist anymore, but
current pension systems do subtly encourage older
teachers to retire.
The
current pension structure «pushes»
teachers out of the system by decreasing pension wealth for every additional year a
teacher chooses to stay in the classroom beyond normal
retirement.
There is no evidence, however, that Nevada provides
teachers with clear information about how their contributions are being used, including the extent to which
current employer contributions are being used to subsidize the
retirement benefits of
teachers under other tiers.
Hohman said the proposal now being debated in Lansing would protect the
retirements of
current teachers, give tomorrow's school employees more control over their own financial futures and eventually return billions of dollars to other educational uses.
Mandatory
retirement laws do not exist anymore, but
current pension systems do subtly encourage older
teachers to retire.
However, on average,
teachers were willing to pay just 20 cents of their
current compensation for a dollar of future
retirement benefits; hence, these
teachers preferred
current wages over pension wealth by a factor of five - to - one.
Unlike the
current system, which features large financial incentives for
teachers to retire precisely at a pre-determined age (New York City
teachers who begin at age 25 currently hit peak pension wealth at age 63), the new system would offer
teachers a smooth wealth accrual that would allow them to time their
retirement decisions as they saw fit.
Implementing these school choice programs would take years, and much of the reduction in the public
teacher force would be handled through attrition (the
retirement of
current teacher's and not replacing them).
While there are only a few winners and a much larger pool of losers in the
current system, a smooth accrual model would allow more
teachers to gain secure,
retirement benefits from the onset of their careers.
Jettison their
current approach to
retirement benefits in which
teachers accrue relatively meager benefits through much of their careers, and then abruptly become eligible for much more as they near
retirement age.
Current retirement systems don't serve the majority of
teachers, setting all - or - nothing service requirements of five or 10 years and offering minimal benefits during the first 20 years of service.
The report discusses not only the inadequate
retirement savings of young
teachers who leave the system, but also mid - and late - career employees who are penalized by the structure of the
current system.
Maryland, however, does not provide
teachers with clear information about how their contributions are being used, including the extent to which
current employer contributions are being used to subsidize the
retirement benefits of
teachers under other tiers as well as how benefits are distributed across
teachers of different cohorts and
teachers with different career lengths.
This paper considers targeted incentive policies designed to retain experienced high - need
teachers, of
retirement age, as instruments to extend
current teachers» careers.
If the
current growth in
retirement spending continues, Illinois will soon become a state that spends more on
teacher -
retirement costs than on classroom teaching.
The cash balance would guarantee all
teachers a pre-determined rate of return — 5 percent in this example — and provide a steady accrual of
retirement benefits rather than the
current back - loaded system.
We found that, in too many states,
current retirement systems are designed in ways that systematically disadvantage large groups of
teachers and impair the ability of schools to recruit, hire, retain, and compensate high - quality
teachers.
Even though, as my colleagues have pointed out, pensions are not an effective way for the majority of today's
teachers to save for
retirement, that isn't an acceptable reason to retreat on existing pension obligations that
current teachers rely on and need in their
retirement.
My question is with my background as a
teacher prior to my
retirement, the 2 years that I didn't work due to my disability and having $ 0 payment during the same 2 years and with my
current return to work situation, my payment is still $ 0, does all / any of this time count towards the 10 years?