Sentences with phrase «decisis applies»

The per curiam exception to stare decisis applies, and Mariner was overruled to the extent it stands for that principle.

In Big Law, the principle of stare decisis applies far beyond legal precedent and well into business practice.

Not exact matches

Berger J.A. found that, when the liberty of the subject is involved, the doctrine of stare decisis is not as rigidly applied.

For some years it was thought that the exceptions to stare decisis had been stated comprehensively in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718 but the court overlooked the rule in Warner (1661) 1 Keb 66, previously applied by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.

Justice Manderscheid touches on this argument only at the very end of his judgment by (1) simply declaring that the Commissioner's decision not to follow these earlier interpretations was reasonable (at para 83); and (2) stating that in any event the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to administrative tribunals such that the Commission is entitled to completely depart from an earlier interpretation (at para 84).

The majority found this Court's decision in Rodriguez applied, by virtue of stare decisis, to conclusively decide the issues.

This legislation is then interpreted and applied through the judiciary during trials; these rulings will then be applied in future cases under the doctrine of stare decisis, another name for legal precedent.

Kovner argued that that approach contradicts what the Court said in Marks, is inconsistent with how the Court has applied Marks, and undermines the principle of stare decisis.

The practice is incompatible with a precedent - based legal system because it is inconsistent with the doctrine of stare decisis — when a court has decided a principle of law applicable to certain facts, it will apply that principle to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same.

Part II proceeds by discussing the nature of stare decisis: its central role in creating judge - made law and its costs and justifications, particularly as applied to secret opinions.

More broadly, we hope to have drawn much - needed attention to the problem of applying stare decisis in secret courts.

This Comment joins other work in arguing that the legitimacy of stare decisis depends upon widespread publication.4 The doctrine of stare decisis itself emerged only with the consistent and reliable publication of court opinions, 5 and legal processes that do not result in the issuance of publicly available opinions, such as settlements and arbitrations, generally lack stare decisis norms altogether.6 Although previous scholarship has discussed the proper role of stare decisis in the context of «unpublished» opinions, 7 which make up around eighty percent of all United States courts of appeals opinions8 (and are usually publicly available despite their name), 9 this Comment provides the first examination of the tenability of stare decisis as applied to truly secret opinions like those of the FISC.

To be sure, the rule of law justifications for stare decisis do not entirely disappear when applied to secret opinions: intelligence agencies do have a considerable reliance interest in FISA courts» opinions, and stare decisis does help guarantee that like cases are decided alike.

This final defense for stare decisis is severely weakened when applied to secret opinions.

The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply in the Netherlands, but this is not the same as saying that jurisprudentie (case law) is entirely without normative force.

The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply in France, but this is not the same as saying that jurisprudence (case law) is entirely without normative force.

Numerous commentators have bemoaned both the FISA courts» secretive nature and the content of specific legal interpretations revealed in their leaked opinions.2 But an overlooked yet fundamental problem with the FISA courts» work is that judge - made law can be generated only through stare decisis, 3 a doctrine that we argue is not justified when applied to secret opinions of the type the FISA courts produce.

In any event, once upon a time, even longer ago, a judge of the Ontario Superior Court (who later became a judge of the Ontario Court of Appeal) made the pointed and poignant observation that it «ignores reality» to expect that a trial judge will use technical principles of stare decisis to avoid applying what seems to be his or her own Court of Appeal's current thinking on some issue.

Accordingly, the Court applied the per incuriam exception to stare decisis and overruled Mariner to the extent it stands for that principle.