Sentences with phrase «decisis at»

A reversal would make all that talk of stare decisis at Roberts and Alito hearings look like a sham.»

Not exact matches

One who sent us frequent reports was David Maizenberg of Decisis, who tells us that one meets good people at a blogging conference:

The risk is that diversity of opinion, so vital to the healthy development of the law, may be relegated to the occasional murmur, particularly so if the very same judges who sit on a majority of sentence appeals insist on inflexible adherence to horizontal stare decisis and maintain that their judgments, being «first at bat», must be followed by their colleagues.

Justice Manderscheid touches on this argument only at the very end of his judgment by (1) simply declaring that the Commissioner's decision not to follow these earlier interpretations was reasonable (at para 83); and (2) stating that in any event the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to administrative tribunals such that the Commission is entitled to completely depart from an earlier interpretation (at para 84).

We know our Latin maxims, the difference between legislation and regulation, understand the peculiar hierarchy of stare decisis, and know what line to stand in to file a claim at the courthouse.

For the second question, Justice Sullivan ruled that a party may rely on the Sahaluk I decision during the suspended declaration of invalidity as stare decisis but may not invoke its remedial effect until the suspension lapses (at para 38).

For example, the discussion of stare decisis, replete with analysis of various «factors» from prior decisions, is at the end of the day a value choice.

(d) The relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to stare decisis, beyond workability — the precedent's antiquity, the reliance interests at stake, and whether the decision was well reasoned — counsel in favor of abandoning Austin, which itself contravened the precedents of Buckley and Bellotti.

Consequently, doctrinal entrenchment, by undermining FISA's statutory design and cramping efforts at reform from within, further exacerbates the costs of stare decisis in the FISA context.

Moreover, doctrinal entrenchment is particularly problematic in the FISA courts, where secrecy and institutional context indicate that outside efforts at doctrinal reform are less likely to be effective than they are with courts that publish their opinions.35 Unlike published opinions, secret opinions can not provoke the public into lobbying for a legislative override36 or judicial overruling37 — two important paths of legal reform.38 Perhaps to hedge against the risks of limited external oversight, FISA limits FISC and Court of Review judges to non-renewable, seven - year terms, 39 a provision suggesting that Congress envisioned a FISA court whose membership would be responsive to shifting factual circumstances and policy priorities.40 Stare decisis, which requires judges to adhere to interpretations of law that they might otherwise reject as unjust or unpersuasive, constrains these judges» ability to adapt to such factual and policy shifts.

As we have demonstrated in this Part, the FISA courts currently generate at least some amount of formally binding precedent that they are under no legal obligation to publish.26 In Part II, we take up the task of determining whether the justifications for the doctrine of stare decisis support affording secret opinions of this type binding precedential force.

See Dragich, supra note 4, at 770 - 75; Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 3 Am.

See, e.g., Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 57 - 58 (1921)(«Stare decisis is at least the everyday working rule of our law... [A judge makes law through issuing opinions because] in fashioning [the law for the parties to a case], he will be fashioning it for others.»).

See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)(«The doctrine of stare decisis... is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior decisions.»).

If I could claim to have fully considered the sum of your collective contributions concerning stare decisis as emphasizing the need for judges at first instance to be fully informed of the applicable law and to follow it, then I would have expanded my speculative musings to suggest that notoriety of a lower court decision is what gives it the potential to muscle its way into gaining equal consideration alongside authoritative higher court rulings when the issue before the court is novel.

Stare Decisis isn't going away, but at what point does the standing of the issuing court or even the legal accuracy of the judge's ruling in McKay become moot?