Sentences with phrase «decisis binds»

The principle of stare decisis binds courts tighter than mere precedent.

Not exact matches

In a short judgment (concerned with the extent to which courts were bound by Privy Council decisions) Lord Neuberger said: «In a common law system, where the law is in some areas made, and the law is in virtually all areas developed, by judges, the doctrine of precedent, or as it is sometimes known stare decisis, is fundamental.

If a similar dispute has been resolved in the past, the court is usually bound to follow the reasoning used in the prior decision (a principle known as stare decisis).

Stare decisis is Latin for «to stand by a decision» and legally translates into the doctrine that says courts are bound by previous decisions, or precedents, particularly when a case has been decided by a higher court.

He explains, «I have suggested that weighting the number of decisions of a federal court of appeals by the number of citations to those decisions by other courts of appeals, which is to say courts not bound as a matter of stare decisis to follow the cited court's decisions, yields a meaningful measure of judicial output.»

«If we obtain leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, they aren't bound by their earlier decision,» she tells Legal Feeds, adding she and her colleagues didn't believe stare decisis should determine the outcome since they raised different arguments from those in Rodriguez.

Stare decisis doesn't actually directly stop a judge from entering a decision that goes against binding precedent.

Traditionally, administrative tribunals such as the AER have not considered themselves bound by their own prior decisions as courts are (stare decisis).

But what it means in practice is that the only reason today that Article III judges must defer to the D.C. Court of Appeals on questions of D.C. law is because the D.C. Circuit itself has said so — and so stare decisis, and not the Rules of Decision Act or principles of federalism — carries all the weight (and would not bind federal courts outside of the D.C. Circuit in diversity cases in which choice - of - law rules compel application of D.C. substantive law).

Because the theoretical justifications for stare decisis depend largely on publication, the FISA courts should publish any opinion that they consider binding precedent.

Stare decisis is also defended on the ground that it increases the «perceived integrity of the judicial process» by promoting the appearance of the rule of law.52 When courts cavalierly overrule their own precedent, they may reduce the public's confidence in the view that judges are constrained by the principles of law they espouse.53 However, granting binding precedential value to secret opinions fails to promote the appearance of the rule of law, precisely because these opinions are secret.

Taken together, the analysis in this Comment suggests that the justifications most commonly offered in defense of stare decisis — rule of law, appearance of the rule of law, and deference to legislative authority — do not support affording binding precedential value to secret opinions of the kind sometimes issued by the FISA courts.61

Simply put, judicial opinions «make law» when judges are bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to follow these opinions» reasoning in later cases.

Stare decisis's most prominent cost is binding judges to interpretations of law that they find unpersuasive, raising the fundamental question of when and why such a restraint on judges» decision - making autonomy is justified.30 In an ideal world, stare decisis would insulate valid principles of law from arbitrary and unprincipled revision without entrenching «bad» precedent against further review.31 In reality, stare decisis hinders defection from both appealing and unappealing precedent.

As we have demonstrated in this Part, the FISA courts currently generate at least some amount of formally binding precedent that they are under no legal obligation to publish.26 In Part II, we take up the task of determining whether the justifications for the doctrine of stare decisis support affording secret opinions of this type binding precedential force.

See Orin Kerr, Hints and Questions About the Secret Fourth Amendment Rulings of the FISA Court, Volokh Conspiracy (July 7, 2013, 1:37 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/07/07/hints-and-questions-about-the-secret-fourth-amendment-rulings-of-the-fisa-court [http://perma.cc/YLH4-8Q8Y](«It's just the FISC following the FIS Court of Review to which it is bound under principles of vertical stare decisis.»).

Within primary sources, you also consider whether a prior definition is binding on the court (i.e., the court has to follow it) or whether it is merely persuasive authority (that the court can choose to follow, but is not required to follow based on precedent — sometimes call Stare Decisis).

In both cases, Twitter would only be part of the story as it carries the news forward, and the story takes root in many, many other places and with it, the influence of the judgment can go beyond the bounds that follow from strict application of stare decisis.

This may result in more appellate decisions, such that abuse / comity may give way to standard stare decisis principles (with lower court judges simply following binding legal findings from the FCA).

We teach first - year law students about the differences between binding and persuasive authority as a key concept of horizontal stare decisis, but no one ever suggests that persuasive precedent is not precedent that is being used in the legal analysis.