In other words, writes T.R. Goldman in Inside the Alito Memo, in the «Thornburgh case the government argued that Roe v. Wade's tenuous constitutional moorings make the principle of stare
decisis less than sacrosanct.»
«In the Thornburgh case the government argued that Roe v. Wade's tenuous constitutional moorings make the principle of stare
decisis less than sacrosanct.
Not exact matches
«A decision as flawed as we believe Roe v. Wade to be becomes a focus of instability,» the government wrote in its brief, «and thus is
less aptly sheltered by [the doctrine of stare
decisis] from criticism and abandonment.»
This cost of stare
decisis is heightened in the secret law context, because the incentive to invest extra effort in writing opinions is
less powerful without the promise, and constraints, of public scrutiny.32 The general principle, evidenced by the congressional testimony of Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, 33 is that publication induces judges to write more thorough, carefully reasoned opinions.
Moreover, doctrinal entrenchment is particularly problematic in the FISA courts, where secrecy and institutional context indicate that outside efforts at doctrinal reform are
less likely to be effective than they are with courts that publish their opinions.35 Unlike published opinions, secret opinions can not provoke the public into lobbying for a legislative override36 or judicial overruling37 — two important paths of legal reform.38 Perhaps to hedge against the risks of limited external oversight, FISA limits FISC and Court of Review judges to non-renewable, seven - year terms, 39 a provision suggesting that Congress envisioned a FISA court whose membership would be responsive to shifting factual circumstances and policy priorities.40 Stare
decisis, which requires judges to adhere to interpretations of law that they might otherwise reject as unjust or unpersuasive, constrains these judges» ability to adapt to such factual and policy shifts.