Sentences with phrase «deprivation of liberty at»

No party argued that the local authority could give consent to T's deprivation of liberty at the Unit and there was no dispute between the parties that, in the event that the care plan was approved and the care order was made, a declaration authorising the deprivation of T's liberty would be required.

Not exact matches

In considering whether the threshold had been crossed, Lord Hope observed: «If the difference between a restriction of liberty and a deprivation of liberty was to be measured merely by the duration of the restriction, it would be hard to regard what happened in this case as anything other than a deprivation of liberty» (at [17]-RRB-.

In delivering his opinion in the House of Lords in Austin, Lord Hope noted there is a distinction «between conditions to which a person may be subjected which are a restriction on his movement and those which amount to a deprivation of his liberty» (at [15]-RRB-.

This criticism can not be levelled at Mr Justice Mostyn who ruled in November on whether the caring arrangement for Katherine, a woman who lacked the mental capacity to make decisions for herself, amounted to a deprivation of her liberty (Rochdale MBC v KW [2014] EWCOP 45, [2014] All ER (D) 200 (Nov)-RRB-.

I also speak at conferences and seminars on issues pertaining to the Care Act 2014, and safeguarding vulnerable people and deprivation of liberty.

Yogi Amin, partner and national head of public law at Irwin Mitchell, then spoke about recent developments in health and social care law, including the Care Act, deprivation of liberty cases in the Court of Protection and end of life cases.

In the absence of such a declaration, T's continued placement at X unit would be unlawful and in breach of article 5 ECHR and due to the need for the restrictions and those being in T's best interests, the deprivation of liberty was authorised under the inherent jurisdiction.

It was agreed that P's care at the residential unit, objectively, amounted to a deprivation of his liberty.

In McGuffie, Justice Doherty also relied upon the power imbalance rationale that was emphasized by Chief Justice McLachlin in R v Suberu, [2009] 2 SCR 460, where she and Justice Louise Charron wrote jointly, at para. 40: ``... [T] he purpose of s. 10 (b) is to ensure that individuals know of their right to counsel, and have access to it, in situations where they suffer a significant deprivation of liberty due to state coercion which leaves them vulnerable to the exercise of state power and in a position of legal jeopardy.

Consequently, taking into account the outcome of the judgment pointed in para 57 clearly stating that «the answer to the question referred is that Article 26 (1) of Framework Decision 2002/584 must be interpreted as meaning that measures such as a nine - hour night - time curfew, in conjunction with the monitoring of the person concerned by means of an electronic tag, an obligation to report to a police station at fixed times on a daily basis or several times a week, and a ban on applying for foreign travel documents, does not, in principle, have regard towards the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of all those measures; it is restrictive as to give rise to a deprivation of liberty comparable to that arising from imprisonment and thus to be classified as «detention» within the meaning of that provision, which it is nevertheless for the referring court to ascertain».

Law Commissioner Nicolas Paines QC said: «The Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards were designed at a time when considerably fewer people were considered deprived of their liberty.

On the other hand, a client - focused approach only protects against loss of commitment where the client's life, liberty or security of the person is at risk of deprivation.

Consequently, the professionals must or should at least raise an issue to be discussed and decided if the electronic tag, an obligation to stay at the specified address, reporting to the police station and the absolute prohibition for switching off their mobile, should not be considered as a limitation or deprivation of liberty.

At Moore Blatch we represent and support individuals, their relatives or carers who are concerned that a deprivation of liberty has occurred without all appropriate authorisations in place.

Actions aimed at the incitement of national, racial, or religious enmity, abasement of human dignity, and also propaganda of the exceptionality, superiority, or inferiority of individuals by reason of their attitude to religion, national, or racial affiliation, if these acts have been committed in public or with the use of mass media, shall be punishable by a fine in the amount of 500 to 800 minimum wages, or in the amount of the wage or salary, or any other income of the convicted person for a period of five to eight months, or by restraint of liberty for a term of up to three years, or by deprivation of liberty for a term of two to four years.

In the latter case, the trial judge found «that it is possible for there to be a deprivation of liberty without false imprisonment and vice versa» (per Sir Anthony Clarke, MR at [88]-RRB-.

Although, at the moment, MCA 2005 may not be used to deprive such people of liberty (s 6 (5)-RRB-, the deprivation of liberty safeguards (DoLS) will change that.