Sentences with phrase «described appellant»

At trial, one of the psychologists who had worked with the family, described appellant's behavior as «parental alienation syndrome» simply as a way of describing her behavior.

«The court described appellant as «manipulative, paranoid, emotionally charged, and reclusive,» as harboring «delusional beliefs,» and as «well on her way to accomplishing total parental alienation between [respondent] and the children.»

«Although appellant argues that this case presents an issue of first impression because the family court relied on «parental alienation syndrome» as a factual basis for assuming jurisdiction, we believe that petitioner properly responds that the family court's factual findings are amply supported by the record and that the term «parental alienation syndrome» is merely a way of describing appellant's actions as they related to the circumstances of this case.

Not exact matches

The Court stayed a robbery conviction because the police systematically beat up the appellant («good cop - bad cop» strategy, described at paras. 10, 15, 23, & 27).

One, in her statement, described how the complainant disclosed to her the physical abuse she had suffered at the hand of the appellant, but at court gave evidence of further disclosures of sexual assaults.

While the Court of Appeal clearly rejected the Appellant's submission that the Motion Judge's comments raised a reasonable apprehension of bias in this case (describing the argument as «baseless» at para. 7), the Court of Appeal did not wholeheartedly endorse the approach taken by the Motions Judge either:

Justice Doherty described them, at para. 50: «The initial pat down search of the appellant, the second more intrusive search of his person beside the cruiser, and the very intrusive strip search at the police station all struck at the core of the appellant's most basic right to personal privacy.»

The Appellant was suspicious of what was described as the Crown's «leniency» towards the co-accused.

In this case, the Appellant tried very hard to have the Court of Appeal describe her as an employee.

The appellants referred to the testimony of expert witnesses and an independent eyewitness who described the accident as having been caused by Ms. Bradford, the cyclist.

Since Ms. Robinson could not precisely describe what she slipped on, from the Appellant's point of view it is difficult to determine whether Chopped Leaf's conduct actually fell below the standard of care (no pun intended).

However, at trial, the appellant provided an «insufficient factual underpinning» to ground compensation for loss of earning capacity; the Court of Appeal found this part of the claim failed because the judge found the appellant did not meet the burden described in the Perren decision — the trial judge simply did not accept the appellant's evidence of his limitations and anecdotal evidence from other witnesses did not shore up his testimony.

Following what the respondent, Mr. Grauer describes as a «very small» motor vehicle accident, the appellant, Mr. Zajaczkowski claims to have suffered an injury to his neck, back and shoulders.

The trial judge accurately described the risks assumed by appellants» counsel in proceeding with the trial in the face of an unresolved coverage issue.

By virtue of s. 24 (6) of the RSLA, once Intact gave the initial certificate to the appellant, the appellant was obliged, within three days of receiving the initial certificate, to release the article described therein to Intact unless, within that period, it filed a notice of objection with the court.