Significant for our purposes is his development of
dialectical logic, presupposing existing opposites that flow into each other, combine in a hierarchy, and participate both structurally and historically in a totality of reality that he called the Absolute.
This brings us to our second main question (II): In what way does Hegel's
dialectical logic provide an alternative scheme, and enable him to carry out the twofold project (A, B) which we have just sketched?
It is only to say that such dialectic as there is
no dialectical logic.
Functionality, and the extensional view of classes, afford modern logic a greatly increased flexibility not available to traditional logic, and throw a whole new light on both the problems we have isolated, and against which Hegel directed
his dialectical logic.
Let us begin by looking at certain aspects of Hegel's
dialectical logic and attempting to make some determinations as to its nature and genesis.
We began by isolating two problems in the logic and mathematics of Hegel's day which he attempted to deal with by means of
his dialectical logic.
We found in Hegel's
dialectical logic an imaginative attempt at a solution, but one still very much mired in the presuppositions of the logic he wished to replace.
We then tried to suggest that mathematical logic involved a more thoroughgoing critique of these presuppositions, and adduced the metaphysics of Whitehead as an example of a proposed solution conceived in terms of mathematical, rather than
dialectical logic.
But beyond the requirements of Whitehead's ontological principle, we can, even if we doubt the legitimacy of
dialectical logic, be sympathetic to the Hegelian view that God is in some sense a necessity for rational thought.
Not exact matches
Of paramount importance to the Hegelian perspective on this relation is the well - known distinction between understanding and reason as two levels of thinking, for involved in this distinction is the view that
logic, as it has been traditionally conceived, is merely a
logic of the understanding, and that reason, or speculative thinking, employs a higher, more inclusive
logic, one that is «
dialectical» in nature.
By identifying the
dialectical element that he recognizes in the process of concrescence with feeling rather than with
logic, Whitehead is able to preserve the integrity of
logic, and to avoid what I take to be the Hegelian dual fallacy of both overestimating the power of so - called «reason,» and at the same time encumbering
logic with psychological, epistemological, and metaphysical elements that have no proper place in it.
I will argue in what follows that these metaphysical characters do not necessarily follow upon the adoption of a
logic that is not
dialectical, i.e., modern mathematical
logic.
atheists are given a very significant role in this
dialectical process in the evolution towards Panthrotheism, the belief that God give to humanity the privilige or responsibilty of charting human history.since you are not indoctrinated to specific dogma and doctrines, your open mindedness enables you percieve a deeper understanding of reality, simple
logic but more profound scientific knowlege will lead you to God.religious humanism through science is your guiding spirit.
Unlike Samuel Beckett or Jorge Luis Borges, who provide a modernist critique of
dialectical hubris by parodying the infinite regress of its
logic while never going beyond that
logic themselves, Solzhenitsyn claims to have learned how to move beyond the absurdities born of an unbridled rationalism, since he, and the rest of his fellow zeks (prisoners), have suffered dialectic's most extreme miscalculation.
Hegel, who identified philosophy with
dialectical thinking, also believed that philosophy is identical with religion insofar as both must negate the Given: «For religion equally with philosophy refuses to recognize in finitude a veritable being, or something ultimate and absolute, or non-posited, uncreated, and eternal» (
Logic, Vol.
In reference to Hegel's use of dialectic, one should perhaps add that there should be no attempt to read a
dialectical movement onto the physical universe, or to install it as a special
logic.
Granting this, it also must be stressed that with Heraclitus
dialectical thinking would not be struggling to overcome the law of contradiction, because reality itself was polemos, eris, enantios.7 Altizer sees with Cassirer and Heidegger that Seinvergessenheit and the
logic - ization of logos came in after Heraclitus, but he insists on using a tainted dialectic which in effect assigns metaphysical primacy to post-Parmenidean concepts of contradiction.
In view of his supposed rejection of any static
logic of identity and contradiction, it is not without interest that Altizer can not acknowledge a
dialectical relationship that comes to terms with a coincidence of real opposites but only with such an understanding of dialectics as will lead to its own destruction by the annihilation of the polarity in a final, posthistorical, permanent identity.
Utilizing theoretical foundations and techniques from Dyadic Developmental Psychotherapy, Theraplay, Narrative Therapy, the Adult Attachment Interview, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy,
Dialectical Behavioral Therapy, Playful Parenting, Love and
Logic, relaxation exercises, guided imagery, imagery rescripting, along with therapeutic play and art work.
But let me discuss epistemology first, and then try to make a case for why a transformation of our thinking, or our
logic, is only one part — albeit an important part — of the
dialectical struggle for a democratic socialism.
Her work questions the
dialectical relations between construction and destruction implied in the same work
logic of construction processes.