Sentences with phrase «discriminatory purpose in»

Not exact matches

In its decision, the 9th Circuit cited a previous case establishing that «circumstantial evidence of intent, including... statements by decisionmakers, may be considered in evaluating whether a governmental action was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.&raquIn its decision, the 9th Circuit cited a previous case establishing that «circumstantial evidence of intent, including... statements by decisionmakers, may be considered in evaluating whether a governmental action was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.&raquin evaluating whether a governmental action was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.»

Discriminatory purpose, as defined in Bray, implies that the agent selects or reaffirms a particular course of action in part «because of» and not merely «in spite of» its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.

First, because most employees in the US are «at will», meaning, we can be fired at any time for any reason long as it's not discriminatory, we work long hours, are afraid of taking time away from work longer than a week, and certainly not for child care purposes.

In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that there is no constitutional right to education, so disparities in funding are not unconstitutional; in Davis, the court ruled that policies adopted without a discriminatory purpose but that have a discriminatory effect are not unconstitutionaIn Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that there is no constitutional right to education, so disparities in funding are not unconstitutional; in Davis, the court ruled that policies adopted without a discriminatory purpose but that have a discriminatory effect are not unconstitutionain funding are not unconstitutional; in Davis, the court ruled that policies adopted without a discriminatory purpose but that have a discriminatory effect are not unconstitutionain Davis, the court ruled that policies adopted without a discriminatory purpose but that have a discriminatory effect are not unconstitutional.

-- For purposes of paragraph (2)(C), in determining whether a first or subsequent violation has occurred, a determination in a single action, by judgment or settlement, that the covered entity has engaged in more than one discriminatory act shall be counted as a single violation.

You will not, and will not allow or authorize others to, use the Services or the Sites to take any actions that: (i) infringe on any third party's copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret or other proprietary rights or rights of publicity or privacy; (ii) violate any applicable law, statute, ordinance or regulation (including those regarding export control); (iii) are defamatory, trade libelous, threatening, harassing, invasive of privacy, stalking, harassment, abusive, tortuous, hateful, discriminatory based on race, ethnicity, gender, sex or disability, pornographic or obscene; (iv) interfere with or disrupt any services or equipment with the intent of causing an excessive or disproportionate load on the Animal League or its licensors or suppliers» infrastructure; (v) involve knowingly distributing viruses, Trojan horses, worms, or other similar harmful or deleterious programming routines; (vi) involve the preparation and / or distribution of «junk mail», «spam», «chain letters», «pyramid schemes» or other deceptive online marketing practices or any unsolicited bulk email or unsolicited commercial email or otherwise in a manner that violate the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act (CAN - SPAM Act of 2003); (vii) would encourage conduct that could constitute a criminal offense, give rise to civil liability or otherwise violate any applicable local, state, federal or international laws, rules or regulations; (viii) involve the unauthorized entry to any machine accessible via the Services or interfere with the Sites or any servers or networks connected to the Sites or disobey any requirements, procedures, policies or regulations of networks connected to the Sites, or attempt to breach the security of or disrupt Internet communications on the Sites (including without limitation accessing data to which you are not the intended recipient or logging into a server or account for which you are not expressly authorized); (ix) impersonate any person or entity, including, without limitation, one of the Animal League's or other's officers or employees, or falsely state or otherwise misrepresent your affiliation with a person or entity; (x) forge headers or otherwise manipulate identifiers in order to disguise the origin of any information transmitted through the Sites; (xi) collect or store personal data about other Animal League members, Site users or attempt to gain access to other Animal League members information, or otherwise mine information about Animal League members, Site users, or the Sites; (xii) execute any form of network monitoring or run a network analyzer or packet sniffer or other technology to intercept, decode, mine or display any packets used to communicate between the Sites» servers or any data not intended for you; (xiii) attempt to circumvent authentication or security of any content, host, network or account («cracking») on or from the Sites; or (xiv) are contrary to the Animal League's public image, goodwill, reputation or mission or otherwise not in furtherance of the Animal Leagues stated purposes.

The test to determine discriminatory conduct, in this case direct age discrimination, is set out in reg 3 of the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1031)(which is now repealed and set out in s 13 (1) and (2) of the Equality Act 2010): «For the purposes of these Regulations, a person («A») discriminates against another person («B») if, on the grounds of B's age, A treats B less favourably than he treats or would treat other persons,... and A can not show the treatment or, as the case may be, provision, criterion or practice to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.»

The starting point is PM v United Kingdom (App no 6638/03)[2005] ECHR 504; where it was held that, for Art 14 purposes «a difference in treatment between persons in analogous or relevantly similar positions is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification».

Although the issue of gender was not an equal protection claim in Loomis, the court wrote of Compas: «If the inclusion of gender promotes accuracy, it serves the interests of institutions and defendants, rather than a discriminatory purpose.»

Because the Court had found that the confirmatory exams were prima facie discriminatory, it turned to the SCC's well - established Meiorin test (which effectively looks at why a purpose or standard was implanted and whether reasonable accommodation of an individual was possible in the circumstances) to see if the breach was reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances.

To amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and to modify the operation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, to clarify that a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice that is unlawful under such Acts occurs each time compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, and for other purposes.

The bill's stated purpose is «to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to clarify that a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice that is unlawful under such Acts occurs each time compensation is paid pursuant to the discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, and for other purposes.»

Section 2 of the CHRA provides that the purpose of the CHRA is to «extend the laws in Canada to give effect... to the principle that all individuals should have an opportunity equal with other individuals to make for themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have and to have their needs accommodated, consistent with their duties and obligations as members of society, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability or conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered.»

appropriate under the Constitution where, as in this case, special racial impact, but no discriminatory purpose, is claimed.

In Canada (Attorney General) v. Bodnar, the employer sought judicial review of a decision of the Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board (Board) in which the Board held that the inclusion of disability - related absences and absences taken for the purposes of family caregiver leave in an attendance management policy was discriminatorIn Canada (Attorney General) v. Bodnar, the employer sought judicial review of a decision of the Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board (Board) in which the Board held that the inclusion of disability - related absences and absences taken for the purposes of family caregiver leave in an attendance management policy was discriminatorin which the Board held that the inclusion of disability - related absences and absences taken for the purposes of family caregiver leave in an attendance management policy was discriminatorin an attendance management policy was discriminatory.

For practical purposes, a breach may arise: (i) if a state may makes discriminatory legislative reforms which adversely affect the international investment; or (ii) if a state arbitrarily or capriciously denies tax exemptions to international investors in respect of revenues or profits generated by their investment; or (iii) if a state discriminates against an international investor by refusing to grant or renew permits; or (iv) if a state expropriates investment assets without due and proper compensation paid to the investor etc..

Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose.

«Facebook's use and abuse of user data for discriminatory purposes needs to stop,» Lisa Rice, president and CEO of NFHA, said in a statement.

Whether the use of credit checks for employment purposes is discriminatory to certain job applicants — which ESR also named Trend # 1 in its Third Annual Top Ten Trends in the Background Screening Industry for 2010 — is a question that will be asked as long as employers run credit checks on job applicants with money troubles.