Sentences with phrase «distinction between nature»

The relation between a more culturalistic and naturalistic orientation of developmental science is sketched by referring to the fact that the distinction between nature and culture is drawn within culture, by stating some philosophical problems like the emergence of thought and the problem of developmental change.

The important point is distinction between nature, purpose, function of goods / services and distinction between quality, features of the goods / services.

The following quotation from his writings shows that he rejected this latter form of epistemology that had resurfaced in the twentieth century under the guise of Transcendental Thomism, because he was acutely aware that this path led at least to a blurring of the distinction between nature and grace if not to pantheism: «What we must not do -LSB-...] is to relate God as «ground of being» to the very inner substance and core of the soul as in some way... a part or aspect of the creature's being.»

Given that St. Thomas» theological project is both materially and intentionally open ended, and given that the Magisterium recognises that philosophy must take adequate account of the advances of modern science, if one could demonstrate that the perspective proposed by Holloway and now by Faith movement and magazine fulfilled all of the criteria mentioned above - i.e. it is a unified vision of the Catholic faith that gives due place to the role of human reason without blurring the distinction between nature and grace and one that presents our revealed faith uncompromisingly and in its entirety - one could justifiably claim that the Faith vision is totally coherent with, if not the total content of St. Thomas» theology, then most certainly the aims and intentionsset out in Aeterni Patris.

In doing so they tended to posit some sort of intuition of God's nature - which in Catholic theology is a work of grace - as the foundation for certainty in our knowledge of every day reality and so blurred the distinction between nature and grace.

For orthodox thought, there could be no distinction between nature and history; both were under the control of the one God: Yahweh was god of history and of nature.

The distinction between nature and grace ceases to exist (p145).

As with man, in Jesus» sense, there can be no distinction between his nature and his actions which are the result of his nature, but the actual essence of man is present in action, likewise God is present where He is active.

I find MacIntyre's implied distinction between nature and grace a serious problem, but it is understandable, given his commitment to maintain a strong distinction between philosophy and theology.

Idealism recognizes the presence of evil in history, but it makes a distinction between nature and reason and attributes evil to the body.16 Idealism is complacent about the perils of the freedom of the human spirit, convinced that spirit and rationality are identical and that rationality controls freedom.

In Christian history, reflection on Jesus of Nazareth led to a distinction between nature and person.

Whitehead, it seems to me, denies any ontological distinction between nature and history.

I put forward the proposition that the distinction between NATURE and HISTORY doesn't address the challenges we face in the era of biotechnology.

Are not our distinctions between nature and history shortsighted anti of limited validity when seen in this cosmic perspective?

Here, in fact, we may be in the presence of one of the most necessary of all Devils: the Ecumenical Unifier, champion of all efforts to remove invidious distinctions between nature and nurture, body and spirit, interdiction and impulse, time and eternity, individual and community, male and female, Hell and Heaven — and ultimately, of course, between man and God.

Not exact matches

This is the distinction between LEAPS and more traditional security options — the long - dated nature of LEAPS.

It offers an oppor - tunity to study systematically the interaction of several copyright issues: including the rights (or lack thereof) of exclusive licensees as plaintiffs in parallel import situations, the distinction between exclusive licensees and assignees, the nature of works of authorship, the characteristics of copy - right infringement, the status of copyrightable works when used as trade - marked logos, the limits (if any) of concurrent copyright and trade - mark protection, and even the distinction between trade - mark, copyright, and patent as autonomous yet related legal regimes.

God can not possess that attribute unless the fundamental nature of reality itself is such that it permits a consistent distinction between that which is a person, and that which is not.

If for the distinction between psychology and physiology we substitute that between history and nature, his critique brings out clearly what I would agree is the deepest theoretical gulf between Whitehead and Heidegger.

Many passages were added in the wake of his discovery that God, the primordial actual entity, also has a temporal side to his being, requiring the distinction between the primordial and the consequent natures.

The productions of the electronic media, by their nature, evade such distinctions as those between documentary and feature films.

The distinction between the two natures of God does not depend upon any of the intricacies of Whitehead's metaphysics as developed in Process and Reality and may well antedate it.

Yet, crucially, his system does not blur the distinctions between matter and spirit, nature and grace, God and the world.

Of paramount importance to the Hegelian perspective on this relation is the well - known distinction between understanding and reason as two levels of thinking, for involved in this distinction is the view that logic, as it has been traditionally conceived, is merely a logic of the understanding, and that reason, or speculative thinking, employs a higher, more inclusive logic, one that is «dialectical» in nature.

I will also try to establish, or at least render plausible, the view that while the distinction between a logic of reason and a logic of the understanding may have been one that was necessary and legitimate for Hegel to maintain, it has, given developments in modern logic, as well as changes in the modern view of the nature of metaphysical thinking, become obsolescent.

For Whitehead, given his implicit rejection of the Hegelian distinction between a logic of the understanding and a logic of reason, and given his conception of the nature of the metaphysical argument, God is not, and can not be the inevitable culmination of such a logical progression.

There remained now no canon, except again personal opinion, by which to redefine the very nature of inspiration, let alone to distinguish between the substance of doctrine and its mode of presentation — a distinction they had never been willing to admit before in any case.

This rejection of nature is manifest in the now orthodox distinction between sex, which is «merely biological,» and gender, defined as a construct either of oppressive social norms or of the free, self - defining subject — one often finds protagonists of this revolution oscillating back and forth between those polar extremes.

Thus Holloway is able to preserve the essential distinction between matter and spirit, body and soul, yet maintain the unity of the nature and personality of Man.

Is the Whiteheadian distinction between the primordial and the consequent natures of God a purely metaphysical distinction which has no genuine or truly christological ground?

we are born with a nature of sin, that which is unlike God, hence, Jesus tells Nicodemus, «You must be born again», even going so far as to make a distinction between that which is flesh and that which is spirit.

Even so, Schleiermacher surrendered very little, and his own consciousness's appropriation of God's being, «in relation to us» of course, included and emphasized the traditional attributes of omnipotence, eternity, omnipresence, and omniscience.5 And for him, «immutability» is already contained within the notion of God's eternity.6 Causality within the entire system of nature can be exhaustively accounted for by God's causal activity.7 Following the lead of Aquinas, Schleiermacher declared that there is no distinction between potential and actual in God.8

From the standpoint of Whitehead's final theory, as interpreted in terms of Hartshorne's distinction between God's abstract nature and concrete totality, it is quite natural to interpret the last sentence as Griffin does: «The passage does not say that God as a whole must be unchanging; it only says that God's nature must remain self - consistent» (PS 15:200).

Are distinctions between the three «natures» then useless?

Then, of course, there is also the distinction between an action done with the purpose of killing someone, like a lethal injection, and a decision to let nature take its course without using the extraordinary means of modern medicine that are available to forestall the inevitable.

Indeed he went to great lengths, grappled with the formidable problem of the nature of light, made incredibly subtle distinctions between various types of change, all to explain the fact that in sight consciousness is consciousness of an object, pure and simple, apart from any feelings of bodily involvement.

On the face of it Santayana rejects all three of these departures from the tradition, since (1) he makes no very explicit move from a continuant to an event ontology, (2) regards the inherent nature of an object as a matter of the individual eternal essence which it actualizes and (3) regards the distinction between matter and form as at least a virtually inevitable way of expressing the obscure manner in which one state of things takes over from another (see RB 278 - 284).

1 The distinction between essential and conditional features derives from a discussion by Paul Weiss in Nature and Man (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1948), pp. 39ff.

Already in The Idea of Nature, he made a distinction between Whitehead's realism and that of the analytic philosophy.23 In An Autobiography, he radicalizes that distinction, interpreting Whitehead's realism as contradictory to the realistic epistemology of the neo - positivists.24 Hence, he concludes that Whitehead's cosmology is in fact constructed on an anti-realistic principle (EM 176).

The real distinction between some philosophical ideas, which are nonbiblical in their implications, and the scriptural picture is exactly what I urged above: that between history read in terms of nature and nature read in terms of history.

The quantitative aspect of intensity, whereby pattern is the primitive feature of existents, receives elaboration in regard to perception by Alexander and Bergson, in a manner that may certainly have influenced Whitehead, inspiring him at the same time to devise a revisionist scheme in which unnecessary distinctions between quantitative and qualitative patterns could be maintained by a firmer metaphysical grasp of the nature of intensity per se (particularly its ontological rescuability from infection by the notion of measurable extensive quanta).24

They show themselves unbelievers in their misunderstanding of the nature of his power and of the distinction between his public and private ministry.

Another error of «biblical theologians» is that of making too sharp a distinction between history and nature.

We believe, teach, and confess that there is a distinction between man's nature and original sin.

And since the distinction within God is one of reason only (God's two natures are not correlative), and in keeping with the ontological principle, there is no metaphysical interval between God's two natures.

In other words, reference is made to the distinction between the concrete states of God and the abstract changeless nature which is inevitably exemplified in each of those states.

A key to this problem lies in the distinction between the primordial nature of God and God as an actual entity.

To that extent the distinction between right and wrong decision is identical with that between nature and decision.

The basic conviction was that of a legitimate distinction between sacred and secular: between things which by nature and circumstance belonged to God and through which he might be known, on the one hand, and those which belonged to the world and tended, therefore, to separate a man from God on the other.

There is therefore no distinction made between the physical nature in man and the spiritual, through which the lower physical nature receives its law and form.