Sentences with phrase «divine coercion»

There is no question but that this image of God as king poses serious difficulties for process theism, for it not only highlights elements of divine coercion but offers a coherent account of their presence.

There is only divine coercion, a divine sentence of death for the disobedient creature.

«The creation of this universe did not entail divine coercion.

If God would use coercive power if it were available, then there are, in principle, times when divine persuasion plus divine coercion would bring about more worthwhile results.

Almost all of their explicit discussions of divine coercion center on the question of whether God can coerce in the strong sense — i.e., whether God can totally divest another entity of all power of self - determination.

But divine coercion, God tells us, «whether limited or unlimited, is incompatible with divine perfection.»

Young believes that Whitehead's conception of god is supportive of liberation struggles because it takes contextualization seriously by making God responsive to actual conditions of the world without resort to divine coercion.

On the other hand, man too is active, but his activity is also in love; he responds freely to the love which is given him and in that response he knows that he is truly «being himself», for he was intended by his creation to be a responding lover and in no sense a marionette pulled by strings manipulated by God — certainly not the victim of the divine coercion.

If we understand creatio ex nihilo, the Incarnation, miracles, and the Last Judgment in orthodox ways, then these doctrines seem to require divine coercion..

Not exact matches

Not only is Basinger unable to make divine coercionb intelligible, he also appears to be wrong in implying that the traditional God does not exercise coercion in the strong sense of unilateral determination.

(Liberal religion refers to open and ongoing revelation, interconnected relationship grounded in love and never coercion, an understanding of our responsibility to assist the arc of the moral universe in bending toward justice, and our understanding that there are resources both human and divine that make it possible for us to do so.

Like effective and respectful therapy, persuasion brings about new wants and aims, but it does so, not by coercion or by frustrating desires, but by opening new possibilities, which is the result of divine «creativity.»

If we must use coercion, then let us know that we are doing so; let us admit honestly that insofar as this is done we are not obeying the perfect divine will; let us recognize that at best the use of such force is a pis - aller, not the entirely right thing.

If we assume, as we presently do, that the primary goal of both God and concerned humans is to maximize freedom (creativity) for the greatest number, it is the following query with which we must be concerned: Do continuous divine persuasion and occasional human coercion, in conjunction, better maximize freedom than would continuous divine persuasion alone?

On the other hand, if the answer is yes — that is, if divine persuasion alone does not maximize human freedom to the extent that such persuasion and divinely approved human coercion does — then it is difficult to see why the process God would not use coercive power if this were an option.

But if process theists really do believe that some coercion would not only be preferable but required at the divine level if it were possible, then it appears that they must also acknowledge that the God of process theism would coerce if this were an option.

Along with the insights of Charles Hartshorne, Whitehead's concept of persuasion (in contrast to coercion) has formed the basis for development of both divine and social images of power.

Since human coercion has absolutely no intrinsic value within a process system (in fact, is an intrinsic evil), it would appear that if divine persuasion is maximally effective alone, process theists should be pacifists.

But they must then give up the claim that coercion is morally «incompatible with divine perfection» and the claim that persuasion is always the «greatest of all powers and «the only power capable of worthwhile results.»

It firmly opposes those views which from its perspective imply certain kinds of coercion within divine power.

At the ontological level, the level of efficient causality, divine persuasion is not operative; «forbearance would mean non-existence...» But once humanity is created and God resolves to relate himself to humankind in terms of persuasion and not coercion, God «would have to be uncertain about a number of details of the future... and in some respects unable to accomplish his will at all.»

Conceived of on the model of tenderness rather than coercion, God «dwells in» and «relies upon» the workings of lower dimensions of cosmic emergence in order to realize the divine adventure toward intensity of feeling and enjoyment of beauty.

Thus intercessory prayer becomes, not a substitute for action in ourselves or a form of coercion upon God, but a channel to the widest divine - human co-operation.

Browning bases his study on Hartshorne's process theism, and it is appropriate to interpret his theory of the divine imposition of the laws of nature in terms of coercion.

But its power of coercion does not extend to the affairs of eternal life and it therefore must maintain and respect the right of the church, under the Word of God, to regulate preaching, the administration of the sacraments, absolution, excommunication, and the ordering of divine services.