An international constitutionalism would be able to draw the conclusion from the increasing institutionalization of the international realm by applying principles known from
domestic constitutional law to the international system, resulting in a universal Kantian «state of law,» away from the «state of nature» or anarchy of international relations.
If the claim is justiciable and within the proper bounds of the court's role, the exercise by the Crown of its prerogative power is consistent with
domestic constitutional law.
As noted by Barbara Guastaferro, the assumption that the purpose of the clause is that of applying in exceptional cases of conflicts between EU law and
domestic constitutional law — in an attempt to narrow the scope of application of the supremacy doctrine — has to be challenged; while the potential for a use of the clause in governing the ordinary functioning of EU law should be, on the contrary, highlighted.
Does this relativize the primacy of EU law vis - à - vis
domestic constitutional law (see more in the post by Burchardt)?
She claimed that the «de facto point of reference is
domestic constitutional law and its understanding of the principle of legality».
Not exact matches
But in addition to codifying Roe v. Wade into state
law, passing an equal rights
constitutional amendment and passing the aforementioned ban on firearms for
domestic abusers, the agenda has some other noteworthy points.
Thus, from the perspective of the United Kingdom's
domestic legal order, the Treaties are an overriding source of
domestic law which are conditional on
constitutional approval; from the European Union's own perspective the Treaties are the fundamental «
constitutional charter» of the new and autonomous European legal order, and from the perspective of international
law the Treaties are the source of obligations in the international plane between the contracting Member States.
Instead, such a «major change to UK
constitutional arrangements [with the consequent changes in
domestic law rights for individuals] must be effected in the only way that the UK constitution recognises, namely by Parliamentary legislation.»
This could be argued to endorse the view expressed by the author on this blog in November that the «
constitutional requirements» clause in Article 50 (1) functions as the bridge between the
domestic legal order and the Union legal order, and thus the giving and potential revocation of notice under Article 50 (2) is purely a matter of
domestic law.
Therefore, through the recognition of the primacy of EU
law norms, but with the crucial qualification that such primacy is conditional on the
constitutional authorisation of the
domestic legal order in accordance with Parliamentary Sovereignty, the majority of the Supreme Court justices justify their claim that «we would not accept that the so - called fundamental rule of recognition (ie the fundamental rule by reference to which all other rules are validated) underlying UK
laws has been varied by the 1972 Act or would be varied by its repeal» [Paragraph 60].
The references that I will discuss in this section are: the potential recognition of the
constitutional and autonomous nature of the EU legal order; brief discussion of what legitimates the EU legislative process; the categorisation of rights deriving from EU
law; whether Article 50 TEU has been incorporated into
domestic law, and finally whether notice to withdraw from the Union once given under Article 50 (1) is revocable.
In such cases, EU
law has primacy as a matter of
domestic law... However, legislation which alters the
domestic constitutional status of EU institutions or of EU
law is not constrained by the need to be consistent with EU
law.
It will constitute as significant a
constitutional change as that which occurred when EU
law was first incorporated in
domestic law by the 1972 Act» (emphasis added).
In brief, the approach conceives of investment treaty arbitration as a form of public
law, and calls for tribunals to draw on comparative
domestic constitutional and administrative
law, as well as other regimes of international public
law such as WTO
law and human rights
law, to give content to the often vaguely - worded standards of typical investment treaties.
The fact that the [
domestic Constitutional Court] gave a ruling on the compatibility of the provisions of national
law... with the provisions of the [national] Constitution which the referring court regarded as constituting, in essence, the same regulatory parameters as [EU
law] has no bearing on the obligation, laid down in Article 267 TFEU, to refer questions concerning the interpretation of EU
law to the Court of Justice (C - 322 / 16, paras 21 & 23 - 25, references omitted and emphases added).
The supremacy principle is that when the
domestic law of a member state conflicts with EU
law, it is EU
law that takes priority: «From an EU
law perspective, the principle is an uncompromising one: the CJEU [Court of Justice] has confirmed that EU
law has priority over all forms of
domestic law, including provisions found in Member States» constitutions and in
constitutional bills of rights.»
If the matter refers to an area within the
domestic jurisdiction of States, there will be no need for a State to invoke its
constitutional law since all it needs to do is to invoke the absence of any rule of international
law regulating the topic.
It is widely expected that investor - State arbitration should fulfill a role similar to that of judicial review under
domestic administrative and
constitutional law, subjecting host State public authority to an understanding of the rule of
law that focuses chiefly on restrictions in the relations between public and private actors.
Certainly, one could argue that public
law adjudication requires a certain adjudicatory structure, such as the presence of an appeals mechanism and permanent courts with tenured judges; yet, this disregards that arbitration is not an infrequent mode of settling disputes between public
law bodies and private actors also at the purely
domestic level, and is obviously accepted under the
constitutional provisions of the legal systems involved.
It will explore the WTO's interaction with different sources of international
law, including regional trade agreements like the Transpacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as well as Bilateral Investment Treaties and analyze relevant U.S.
constitutional and statutory provisions concerning
domestic and foreign trade.
«Clarifying the Opacity of the Duty of Transparency» [2018] P.L. (forthcoming) «Public
Law in the Supreme Court 2015 - 2016» [2017] 22 J.R. 215 (with T. Cross) «Public
Law in the Supreme Court 2014 - 2015» [2016] 21 J.R. 1 (with T. Cross) «The Rule of
Law, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Veto» (2015) 131 L.Q.R. 548 «Public
Law in the Supreme Court 2013 - 2014» [2015] 20 J.R. 1 (with T. Cross) «The Veto in the Court of Appeal» (2014) 130 L.Q.R. 552 «Public
Law in the Supreme Court 2012 - 2013» [2014] 19 J.R. 9 (with T. Cross) «The Prince of Wales and a
Constitutional Aberration» (2014) 130 L.Q.R. 37 «Article 10 and a Right of Access to Information» [2013] P.L. 648 «The Discretion Afforded to Statutory Regulators in Public
Law» [2013] 18 J.R. 116 «Public
Law in the Supreme Court 2011 - 2012» [2012] 17 J.R. 330 (with T. Cross) «The Supreme Court Gives Its Reasons» (2012) 128 L.Q.R. 481 «Doing (Linguistic) Violence to Prevent (
Domestic) Violence?
Rather, we focus on two key and interlocking chapters that address the legal nature and
constitutional status of the new body of
domestic law — «retained EU
law» — that the Bill will create.
In the first place there are significant aspects of
domestic law (particularly
domestic constitutional and public
law) where mechanisms of enforcing judicial decisions are similarly lacking.
For example, national courts may apply stricter
domestic constitutional standards to restrain executive conduct and in so doing may ignore international
law.»
«While
law enforcement agencies should be able to utilize technology as a tool to help officers be safe and accomplish their missions, absent proper oversight and safeguards, the
domestic use of cell - site simulators may well infringe upon the
constitutional rights of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the right to free association,» the report said.
To elaborate, the majority opinion took great pains [see FR, pp. 75 - 76] to highlight the similarities between the Hellenic and the Italian legal order, while endorsing unconditionally the position adopted by the
Constitutional Court of Italy in its celebrated Sentenza 238/2014 (nullifying as unconstitutional a municipal
law binding
domestic courts to follow the ICJ's ruling in the Jurisdictional Immunities Case).