Sentences with phrase «dominant occasion of»

The panexperientialist version of physicalism does justice to this fact by portraying the mind in each moment (that is, each dominant occasion of experience) as having both a physical pole, which is constituted by the causal influences from the physical environment, and a mental pole, which entertains ideal possibilities, including logical, ethical, and aesthetic norms.

To understand what is peculiar to the Buddhist structure of existence, it was necessary to concentrate attention on the relation of each dominant occasion of human experience to the predecessor and successor occasion together with which it constituted a soul.

We have to do with a much more complex operation of the dominant occasion of experience, an operation of interpretation and organization rather than simply of passive reception and transmission.

Thus even for the dominant occasion of experience, unconsciousness is the basic mode of its being.

The dominant occasion of experience is related not only to the other occasions jointly constituting the physical organism, such as the entities making up the brain, but also to past dominant occasions of experience in the same organism.

Ontologically speaking, the dominant occasion of experience is not different from the other occasions of experience with which it jointly constitutes the psychophysical animal organism.

Whitehead's system is able to encompass the results, however: while the actual occasions constituting the central nervous system of bees are certainly of a lower degree of complexity than that of mammals, a bee brain contains thousands of interactive neurons, so that there is no a priori reason why the dominant occasion of the bee may not be capable of complex experiences in situations relevant to the bees» survival.

Introspective self - consciousness involves causal objectification by the dominant occasion of some of the unimaginably large number of concreta making up the human mind / brain, including what can be called the subordinate nonconscious living persons responsible for our habitual behavior, that is, sub-personalities (RHNB 148f).

However, much of its functioning does not require consciousness and not all dominant occasions of experience participate in consciousness at all.

Also in the case of animals, it is often best to speak of dominant occasions of experience to refer to that entity which in man is organized as soul.

Nevertheless, a clear difference exists, and it is possible to formulate the distinctive role and structure of the dominant occasions of experience in the two cases in the categories worked out in the preceding chapter.

To whatever extent in primitive men or young children dominant occasions of experience are determined more by new stimuli received through the body than by continuity with past dominant occasions, the requisite identity through time is lacking.

One way of distinguishing among souls is according to the significance to the individual dominant occasions of their serial connectedness with each other.

If the dominant occasion in my body began to «remember» the past dominant occasions of another body and to fail to remember its own, my definition would require that it be regarded as a continuation of the other person.

The dominant occasions of the animal, on the other hand, have serial or personal order of the kind definitive of enduring objects, thereby maintaining a high degree of continuity through time.

The panexperientialist version of physicalism can affirm this belief because its «physical entities» are phyk4 - riseatd entities, and because there are various levels of such entities, one level of which is that of the dominant occasions of experience constituting the human mind.

Not exact matches

Equivalently, then, that successor presiding occasion prehends the mentality of its predecessor (s) in the dominant subsociety, not directly through spatial contiguity, but through the patterns of activity already present both in the brain as its immediate environment and in the entire organism as its overall field of activity.

One might counterargue, to be sure, that the unity of the cell is manifestly more than what a nonsocial nexus of living occasions can provide; only a personally ordered society of dominant occasions can «do the job.»

For, even here where a set of dominant occasions is clearly operative, the agency of the structured society is a genuinely collective agency, not just the agency of its dominant subsociety.

To sum up, then, Wolf's article is important because it represents a «halfway house» between the traditional conception of a society as an aggregate of actual occasions with the dominant occasion providing the unity for the group and my own contention that every society, whether it contains a presiding occasion or not, possesses an objective unity in virtue of the dynamic interrelatedness of its constituent occasions from moment to moment.

This is his own model of societies as a «nested hierarchy,» but without the further qualification that the dominant occasion somehow acts as the field or interstitial space for the subordinate occasions.

In making this connection, he is implicitly following Hartshorne and others in thinking that the unity of a structured society is the unity provided by its dominant occasion.

But it would allow Whiteheadians to affirm the unitary reality of atoms and molecules simply as democratically organized societies of occasions rather than as mini-organisms requiring a dominant subsociety of occasions for their ontological cohesiveness.

Hence, while the presiding occasion contributes more to the unity of the society than any of the subordinate occasions, the objective unity of the society is still provided by all of the occasions acting in concert, not by the dominant occasion alone.

For, while Hartshorne allowed for the reality of structured societies and only specified that their unity as compound individuals was effected through the presence and activity of a dominant personally ordered subsociety, Ford equivalently wants to eliminate the reality of structured societies altogether, at least insofar as they function as compound individuals rather than as simple aggregates of occasions.

In the case of microbes which feed on humans, a society with limited potential for intensity of experience may achieve a measure of endurance by destroying societies of occasions which form the necessary environment for dominant human occasions of greater potential intensity of experience.

To be specific, a human being or higher - order animal organism is an ongoing subject of experience in and through its dominant subsociety of occasions; but the coordination therewith required to sustain the flow of consciousness can only be achieved through the collaboration and coordination of millions of sub-fields of activity, subordinate layers of social order, within the organism.

Only the series of dominant occasions known as the soul is a separate society, i.e., a set of personally ordered occasions which provide continuity in time for the patterns already generated in large part by nexus of living occasions within the field of activity proper to the brain.

Therein he proposed that the dominant occasion constituting the soul at any given moment must prehend and coordinate within its own concrescence the data available to all the members of its supporting nonsocial nexus.

My disagreement with Wolf, then, is not with the use of field - imagery as such to describe a structured society, but rather with the identification of the field with the dominant occasion.

Here Wolf is simply following the lead of those Whiteheadians who, consciously or unconsciously, ascribe the unity of a structured society to the dominant occasion within the society.

In both situations, we are supposing that the dominant thread of occasions has become a thread of the «nonsocial» nexus which is experiencing heightened intensity of feeling.

The dominant occasion would have too burdensome a job if it alone were responsible for the integration of bodily experience.

The normal interplay of habit and novelty, which we have explained in terms of the relation between the dominant occasion and the supportive occasions, is disturbed.

The entertainment of a stimulus within a grouping of occasions furnishes a dim background which may in its turn be vivified by a dominant occasion.

The question of whether the dominant thread of occasions controls the body can not be answered by a simple yes or no.

Further, the transmission within the body is one which introduces increased emphasis from occasion to occasion as the experience rises to the level of the final percipient, which we maintain need not be a member of the dominant nexus.

Although these may be the dominant parts of the world of the new occasion of experience, they do not exhaust it.

The «movement» of the dominant occasion is its fixing of attention upon particular threads of occasions which are enjoying some satisfactions successively.

This is clear when Cobb argues against Sherburne that even the visual field would have to be organized by the dominant occasion: «Probably we must be held to see different parts of the visual field successively, perhaps one color at a time» (PS 3:28).

Empirically, we find that behavior does not become random in the absence of a dominant occasion, but merely loses its novel character and becomes ritualized.

Focussing of attention is possible because the dominant occasion is able to stage its own contrasts among other threads of inheritance.

Both Cobb and Sherburne try to unify human experience within the dominant thread of occasions, but our supposition is that the unity of many bodily experiences occurs within threads of nondominant occasions within the supposedly nonsocial nexus.

This answers Cobb's objection to the Hermes - quality of the dominant occasion, as it supposedly races around the brain.

Our interpretation of the statement that «Life is a passage from physical order to pure mental originality» (PR 164) is that the initiatives within the dominant nexus of occasions are canalized in the supportive nexus by way of threads of inheritance, so that personal mentality may combine originality of response with an adequate order upon which it depends.

The individuality of enjoyment in the momentarily dominant occasion is a shaping of the various activities of a mental environment into an esthetic pattern.

Inevitably, the orthodox expressions of Christianity abandoned an eschatological ground, and no doubt the radical Christian's recovery of an apocalyptic faith and vision was in part occasioned by his own estrangement from the dominant and established forms of the Christian tradition.

Here order appears as a state of affairs in which the supportive structured society is adapted to prevailing circumstances such that the dominant ideal of its personal strand of mental occasions is least frustrated by the actual world of its environment.

The mental pole of complex presiding occasions permits great individual initiative to be expressed with unrivalled intensity, originality, and depth, all because their dominant strands are nestled in a structured subservient hierarchy of societies.

Consequently whenever one actual occasion is earlier than another — and they both are members of these dominant societies — there is a space - time distance between them.