Niebuhr's antipathy toward any form of inherited sin reflected his fear that it would mitigate responsibility; hence he writes: «the theory of an inherited second nature is as clearly destructive of the idea of responsibility for sin as rationalistic and
dualistic theories which attribute human evil to the inertia of nature» (NDM 262).
Yet for us this epistemological dimension of the redemption is not from the supposedly «incurably» dualistic nature of human knowing but from stubbornly
dualistic theories of human knowing which over the millennia of their influence have whittled away wonder.
It is our duty to critique
the dualistic theory and oppose the practices that follow from it.
Not exact matches
The misplaced concreteness of mind language and body language and the impossibility of interaction between domains whose very definitions preclude causal relations, become clear in the teeth of all the
theories and institutions based on a
dualistic ontology, e.g., psychiatry versus neurology versus psychoanalysis versus a holistic view of humanity.
If evolution is a fact and if the most basic meaning of evolution is that the complex forms of life emerge from the simple, how can the
dualistic forms of evolutionary
theory account for the emergence of the human mind from inert lifeless matter, the animate from the inanimate?
But with his
theory of monads Leibniz stands in the
dualistic line of Descartes inasmuch as he contrasts the monadic, subsistent soul not with a single body but rather with a multiplicity of equally subsistent monads.
This
theory of prehension means the overcoming of the
dualistic notion that there are some concrete facts which are merely public and others which are merely private.
Along with
dualistic mythology several developments in scientific thought since the seventeenth century have contributed to the exorcism of mind from nature: first, there is the cosmography of classical (Newtonian) physics picturing our world as composed of inanimate, unconscious bits of «matter» needing only the brute laws of inertia to explain their action; second, the Darwinian
theory of evolution with its emphasis on chance, waste and the apparent «impersonality» of natural selection; third, the laws of thermodynamics (and particularly the second law) with the allied cosmological interpretation that our universe is running out of energy available to sustain life, evolution and human consciousness; fourth, the geological and astronomical disclosure of enormous tracts of apparently lifeless space and matter in the universe; fifth, the recent suggestions that life may be reducible to an inanimate chemical basis; and, finally, perhaps most shocking of all, the suspicion that mind may be explained exhaustively in terms of mindless brain chemistry.
This distinction between what we might call contingent (polarity) and radical (
dualistic) field
theories is important if Gestalt is to find a rapprochement with the rest of psychology.
While Gestalt thinking about field
theory has a tremendous amount to offer other psychological disciplines in softening their overly
dualistic / objectivist / mechanistic perspectives, if it goes too far, it will fail to find «common ground», simply argue for one «side» of a duality over another, and stay on the outside, looking in with mutual judgment and rejection.