«4 Ford calls this Whitehead's «First Metaphysical Synthesis» and says that it is continuous with Whitehead's
earlier philosophy of nature.5 But when Whitehead adds the concept of «temporal atomicity» (elementary events can not be subdivided into subevents which are fully actual), this provokes a»... subjectivism of actual occasions open to the real influence of possibility,» and»... generates an unexpected role for God as the antecedent limitation of this possibility.
In Einstein's theory we also have a concept of matter completely different from that of
the earlier philosophy of nature.
We have noted that in
the earlier philosophy of nature the concepts of matter and body were equivalent.
No such limitation of simultaneity as a physically relevant relation exists in
his earlier philosophy of nature.12 In addition, Whitehead appends a note to this statement which has an oddly apologetic tone, especially when one reads the note (as I think one must) as explaining how the statement above is compatible with Einsteinian assumptions: «This principle lies on the surface of the fundamental Einsteinian formula for the physical continuum (PR 61 / 96).
In
his earlier philosophy of nature, and in the original Lowell Lectures, Whitehead conceived of actual events as being divisible into smaller events ad infinitum.
1He has also written a specific technical study of Whitehead's
earlier philosophy of nature: «The Location of the Physical Objects,» Philosophy, 4 (1929), 64 - 75.
Originally being was Whitehead's inclusive category for every event considered in
the earlier philosophy of nature.
Her own sympathies, at least with respect to causation, focus upon Whitehead's
early philosophy of nature: «I now find myself distanced from his later writings, but increasingly sympathetic to the middle ones [e.g. SMW], especially as he was working towards a generalized notion of «organism,» and when his «passage of nature» could be seen not as one datum after another, but as a pattern - forming and pattern - sustaining process which could support a dynamic view of a causation underlying more restricted kinds» (CE vii).
Not exact matches
The
early Christians were Jewish in their conception
of the interior
nature of man and they never became anything else until they fell under the influence
of Greek
philosophy.
His doctrine
of eternal objects in both his
earlier and later
philosophy can be understood as a description
of the ontological
nature of pure logic and mathematics (EWP 14 - 28).
A critical examination
of the scholastic
philosophy of nature may well give the impression that in its
earlier history it often inevitably and
of necessity took for granted certain processes
of change as indisputable facts.
Whitehead's «method
of extensive abstraction» is used not only in his
early writings in the
philosophy of natural science but also in his later, more metaphysical, writings to abstract from the complexity
of the relations which comprise the datum
of sense - perception and to isolate by a conceptual analysis those relations which express a uniform metric structure, that is, to «exhibit» a basis
of uniformity in
nature.21 It is the sense in which this uniformity is «required» that is the crucial point for further investigation.
Morgan had
earlier complained (EEV) about Whitehead's treatment
of mind in CN as wholly distinct from
nature, and objected to Whitehead's
earlier claim that the study
of their relations constitutes metaphysics rather than
philosophy of science.
Note, third, that the limited standpoint
of the
earlier works on the
philosophy of nature — The Principles of Natural Knowledge, The Concept of Nature, and The Principle of Relativity — is to be embodied in the more comprehensive standpoint of the later works on metaph
nature — The Principles
of Natural Knowledge, The Concept
of Nature, and The Principle of Relativity — is to be embodied in the more comprehensive standpoint of the later works on metaph
Nature, and The Principle
of Relativity — is to be embodied in the more comprehensive standpoint
of the later works on metaphysics.
Earlier, and until about two centuries ago, there had been a main field
of inquiry known as philosophia naturalis, the
philosophy of nature.
It should be emphasized, what is sometimes liable to be overlooked, that Whitehead's recovery
of the problematic
of the
philosophy of nature would not have been possible without his having gone back extensively to
earlier philosophy, especially Greek and that
of the seventeenth century.
He can in this way realign
philosophy with contemporary scientific theory, while at the same time providing the latter with a «ground» in immediate experience which had been lacking in traditional empiricism, modeled as that was on corpuscular theories
of nature.8 In his
early work, Whitehead employs Bradley's antiatomism within a classically empiricist framework; redefined as a continuum, sensation still plays its conventional role as a theory
of «presentation» (EPNK 60), the given foundation
of the reflective process.9
As a contemporary commentator noted as
early as 1865, Mill's anti-Hamiltonian view
of feeling as a neutral stuff prior to the correlation
of Ego and Non-Ego, and his confession that the continuity
of feeling, though as real as the sequence, was a «final inexplicability» 4 — both positions impelled British
philosophy in the direction
of some kind
of original unity.5 To this end, Bradley will conflate the «feeling»
of Hegel and
of Mill in order to transform it from a psychological into a metaphysical category that can accomplish the reconciliation
of nature and spirit.
Early education, by contrast, remains mired in
philosophy, in broad theories
of the
nature of child development, and in practices that spring from appeals to authority and official pronouncements
of professional guilds, rather than to research.