Sentences with phrase «enduring objects»

Since the presiding occasion of the regnant society «wanders from part to part of the brain, dissociated from the physical material atoms» (PR 167), the other enduring objects which constitute it as an «inter-section» must be historic routes of occasions within the «nonsocial» nexus which supports the regnant society.

These subordinate, nondominant, and nonconscious (not explicitly reflective) enduring objects ease the job of the presiding occasion of the regnant society in integrating bodily experience and are called by Gallagher subordinate «living persons.

Whitehead states that «in an animal body the presiding occasion if there be one, is the final node, or intersection, of a complex structure of many enduring objects» (PR 166f) and that an enduring object is «formed by the inheritance from presiding occasion to presiding occasion» (PR 167).

These provide for order and predictability, but the occasions in non-living enduring objects can not achieve much value or intensity.

The high - grade organisms we study in biological evolution contain many subordinate enduring objects; molecules and cells, for example, comprise the environment for atoms and electrons in our bodies.

Thus interstellar «empty space» is «empty» for us because it is deficient in such enduring objects.

However, unlike ordinary enduring objects the succession is not primarily a matter of repetition of qualities in one occasion after another through long stretches of time.

This is because the subjective aim of such an occasion is so nearly limited to repeating the physical patterns which we can detect; in other words, if we pay attention only to the physical characteristics of these enduring objects, we are not missing anything very significant.

Ordinary objects of our experience, such as rocks and tables, are composed of many strands of enduring objects; and the story of planetary evolution focuses on the careers of incredibly complex organisms which may be analyzed into societies with sub-societies of many kinds.

There are the occasions in living enduring objects («living nexus»), enjoying a degree of conceptual novelty

Now we must recognize that we do not have much to do with individual enduring objects either.

The molecule is typical of enduring objects in the extreme similarity of the successive occasions that make it up.

But in the molecular occasions, as in occasions composing enduring objects generally, novelty is and must be trivial.

A society may be composed of many actual occasions of which some are and some are not organized into enduring objects.

Furthermore, enduring objects vary as to the importance of their defining characteristics and the decisiveness of their inheritance from previous members of the enduring object in question.

It is these enduring objects and the corpuscular societies composed of them that are subject to investigation through our sense organs and through instruments.

Bodies of this sort, analyzable into enduring objects, Whitehead calls «corpuscular societies.»

The cell as a whole, then, combines the stability of the enduring objects and the life of the primarily mental, and therefore not physically detectable, occasions within it.

He describes it vaguely as the life, or the mind of certain enduring objects; in man it is the experience of his own uniqueness.

In the case of «interest,» it is the limited, and therefore limiting, universe of societies as «enduring objects.»

Even in the case of «enduring objects» which are characterized only by «survival» through repetition, the process is an act of conformity by the «members» and not one imposed upon them.

First, we will examine systematically how «importance» is realized in the unity of «enduring objects.»

In regard to the living cell, he does refer to the series of living occasions as «regnant,» and to the molecular enduring objects as «subservient» (PR 157).

He does this with his idea of two basic ways in which enduring objects can be organized into macroscopic societies.

For what we experience primordially are not particles but rather occasions of experience bound together serially into enduring objects, particles, corpuscular «societies» or personal «societies.»

And he does say that atoms and molecules are «organisms» of a higher type than electrons (ibid) Furthermore, he refers to molecules as enduring objects, and he speaks of molecular as well as of electronic and protonic actual occasions (PR 114, 123, 124, 139, 141).

Hence, adversions promote the stability of enduring objects.

However, Whitehead does not believe there is any evidence for simple repetition based upon strict conformation from occasion to occasion, even in low - grade enduring objects (PR 285).

The vibration and rhythm of these enduring objects is explained by the category of reversion, which is in turn explained in terms of Whitehead's aesthetic principles.

«Things,» or «enduring objects,» are multiplicities built up by an additive pattern and consisting in neighboring individual occasions that succeed one another by repeating the same structural pattern.

The dominant occasions of the animal, on the other hand, have serial or personal order of the kind definitive of enduring objects, thereby maintaining a high degree of continuity through time.

He speaks of animal bodies as corpuscular societies, whereas he speaks of molecules, quite directly, as enduring objects.

In the case of humans, and presumably of the higher animals as well, these dominant occasions are so ordered as to constitute enduring objects.

In these quotations, the enduring objects and enduring persons are what we have called, in dependence on other passages in White - head's writing, living persons and souls.

Furthermore, he conceived of all space as occupied and considered what we regard as empty space simply as space in which the occasions are not organized into enduring objects.

Just as among enduring objects the uniting characteristic may be more or less important, so also with living persons or souls.

(PR 50 - 51) But the enduring objects composed of dominant occasions, that is, souls, are extremely different from other enduring objects, such as the molecule that has been our example heretofore.

Among the most important of these are enduring objects.

Thus far we have considered, as our chief examples of enduring objects, molecules (PR 124 - 125, 151.)

are as enduring objects.

He wrote, «We — as enduring objects with personal order — objectify the occasions of our own past with peculiar completeness in our immediate present.»

So we discern in the organic series a transcendent formative activity of creation weaving patterns of objects upon events, and an immanent energizing activity underlying events, and binding their succession into the unity of series and process upon which enduring objects may be patterned.

The existence of the most elementary social structures and the sciences of psychology and ethology suggest strongly that living occasions may indeed exhibit the structure of enduring objects that have personal order.

Whitehead says, «A society may be more or less corpuscular, according to the relative importance of the defining characteristics of the various enduring objects compared to that of the defining characteristic of the whole corpuscular nexus.»

However, in microcosm, the internal relations taking place between the two enduring objects occur between subject and object.

It is possible to speak about inter-subjective relations between enduring objects — each enduring object may be thought of as a subject in relation to another enduring object which is a subject.

This passage clearly does not say or imply that electrons and protons are enduring objects.

Again, it is the examples Whitehead uses which seem to be the source of Cobb's confusion: «membership» does not refer to subordinate enduring objects «such as the life of an electron or of a man.»

It also says that electrons and protons are societies, but it gives no indication as to whether they are spatially thick, structured societies (my view) or enduring objects (Cobb's view) except where Whitehead speculates about the dimly discerned «yet more ultimate actual entities — this could be taken to imply that electrons and protons are complex, made up of distinct types of subordinate entities, and this would support my claim that electrons and protons are structured societies.

Whitehead does not identify molecules, electrons and protons as enduring objects; he, rather, explicitly identifies them as structured societies, and I have defended with arguments and citations the pretty obvious point that a structured society can not be an enduring object.