(III) We may acknowledge material entities as real but dismiss the idea of mental
entities as an abstraction.
Not exact matches
First, there is space - time itself which is denoted
as an
abstraction and is denied the status of a self - sufficient
entity (SMW 96).
Consequently,
as an
abstraction rather than an actual
entity, creativity must be quite other than any being or existent.
The passage seems to say that the ultimate metaphysical reality that underlies and expresses itself in every concrete occurrence of actuality or value «envisages» possibilities both in pure
abstraction and in their relevance for actual
entities,
as well
as «envisaging» the actual
entities themselves.
We often say that space and time are composed of points and instants; these should be defined
as systematic
abstractions from empirical facts instead of being accepted
as volumeless or durationless
entities.
A proposition differs from an eternal object insofar
as the latter refers to actuality with abstract generality, and the former refers to actuality with incomplete
abstraction from determinate actual
entities.
In employing it he goes so far
as to demand that in the end, «no
entity can be conceived in complete
abstraction from the system of the universe, and that it is the business of speculative philosophy to exhibit this truth» (PR 5).
And, since laws of nature are
abstractions from environmental order, the inference provides a context for inferring predictions about
entities in the environment E
as well.
Accordingly, this «category of conceptual valuation» states that, e.g., after having a feeling of the green feeling in a previous actual
entity, the present subject will in the second phase of its experience feel green qua green, i.e.,
as a pure possibility, in
abstraction from its ingression in the actual world.
In the latter book it is explicitly recognized that the primordial nature of God is an
abstraction from God
as actual
entity, (PR 50.)
As a result, Whitehead concludes that objectification is an
abstraction that does not objectify the actual
entity in its entirety (S 25).
The answer to that question would be Yes if and only if all universals, including normative ones, are real only in actual
entities,
as abstractions from their whole concreteness.
It would be high
abstraction to inquire whether a certain thing is or is not properly regarded
as an actual
entity, apart from consideration of the interaction of that
entity with others.
It is important to distinguish actual
entities as thus objectified from mere
abstractions,» although Ogden is correct that much of the concreteness of the past actual
entity is «abstracted» from.
Further, there is direct continuity between what is said of God in Science and the Modern World and what is said of the primordial nature of God in Process and Reality.5 In the latter book it is explicitly recognized that the primordial nature of God is an
abstraction from God
as actual
entity, 6 yet most of the references to God in that book are references to this
abstraction.
But its positive strength is (1) to provide an understanding of God's identity
as an individual through
abstractions alone («This does not imply that God is a merely abstract
entity, but only that what makes God God and no other individual is abstract «15), and (2) more specifically, to identify God
as the sole individual with strictly universal functions, defined with relation to actuality
as such and with respect to possibility
as such.
The emphasis on formal elements of shape and rhythm
as independent
entities, along with the fragmentation of forms, creates a tendency towards
abstraction.
An idea of «Frankenstein Painting» (in response to discussions about «Zombie Paintings» over the past few years) include forms of
abstraction that attempt to spark life and animate the canvas
as its own
entity.