Sentences with phrase «entities physical feelings»

Hence, we must attribute to God not only the conceptual ordering of the eternal objects by virtue of which he lures the occasions of the world toward order and value; we must attribute to him as to all other actual entities physical feelings as well.

The reason we can not explain life in terms of enduring entities is that in ordinary enduring entities the physical feeling of each member is reenacted in its successors.

Not exact matches

Showcasing your store as a physical entity gives customers a sense of comfort buying from a business that feels real.

Received through a hybrid physical feeling of God, it serves as an ideal for the concrescing actual entity in its self - development.

For nexus come into being when actual entities have simple physical feelings of one another.

Concretely, then, the integration of simple physical feelings into a complex transmuted feeling provides for the various actual entities of the nexus being felt as separate entities requiring each other.

In summary, my view is that a nexus is composed of actual entities that are interrelated by their simple physical feelings of one another.

However this problematic question is answered, there can not be a simple physical feeling of a future actual entity.

Let me rephrase this essential point in the language of the fourteenth category of explanation: A set of mutually contemporaneous actual entities does not have a «unity of the relatedness constituted by their prehensions [i.e., simple physical feelings] of each other» (Process 24).

The sense of the world as a unified whole is not constituted by a separate physical feeling in addition to the causal and transmuted feelings whose data are either single actual entities or a nexus of individuals.

Because Whitehead himself usually explains this operation by way of a common eternal object which is illustrated in all the actual entities of the nexus, the significance of a transmuted feeling as a feeling of physical community in the actual world is often overlooked.

According to the fourteenth category of explanation, a nexus is a multiplicity of actual entities in the unity of the relatedness constituted by their simple physical feelings of one another.

The main claim illustrated by the B - A-C nexus is that two actual entities in a nexus may be interrelated indirectly by means of simple physical feelings.

To review, a nexus is constituted by actual entities that are interrelated by their simple physical feelings of one another.

But the conceptual characterization of community is an extension of the concrete experience of physical community, just as the common eternal object used to characterize the nexus is derived from the physical feeling of entities - requiring - each - other.

The first phase of concrescence involves a «multiplicity of simple physical feelings» of antecedent actual entities (Whitehead, Process 236).

Let us assume that there are two durations that satisfy the following three conditions: (1) One is later than the other; (2) they do not have members in common; and (3) the set containing all of the actual entities from both durations is a nexal set.20 In that nexal set, there are chains of actual entities, linked together by simple physical feelings, that span the entire universe.

The initial physical feelings of an arising actual entity, Whitehead tells us, are conformal feelings.

Hence he thinks Whitehead could only justify his belief that there are hybrid feelings of noncontiguous entities by showing some very fundamental difference between hybrid and physical feelings.

«A [simple physical] feeling belonging to this special case has as its datum only one actual entity, and this actual entity is objectified by one of its feelings» (PR 245).

From each physical feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual feeling whose datum is the eternal object exemplified in the definiteness of the actual entity, or of the nexus, physically felt.

Since Whitehead follows science in disallowing physical feelings of noncontiguous entities, he should deny such hybrid feelings as well.

Consider his description of «the actual world of any actual entity as a nexus whose objectification constitutes the complete unity of objective datum for the physical feeling of that actual entity» (PR 230D).

God is the chief actual entity, yet by his reversal of the ordering of physical to conceptual feeling, he maintains a necessary, systematic contrast to all finite actual occasions.

Pure physical feelings objectify the entities felt by their physical feelings, whereas hybrid physical feelings objectify by conceptual or impure feelings.

A hybrid physical feeling is the perception of an actual entity by means of that entity's projected conceptual feelings.

A hybrid physical feeling is a feeling which objectifies the actual entity which forms its initial datum by means of one of this datum actual entity's conceptual feelings.

Thus, a simple physical feeling is a special kind of feeling, and, as such, it can have a single actual entity as its «initial datum».

The next thing we should notice about the first subphase of the initial phase of concrescence is that Whitehead holds that all actual entities in the actual world of a new occasion have to be felt by some simple physical feeling (PR 41 / 66, 239/366).

This definiteness is transmitted to the new actual entity in the second phase of concrescence, when the new actual entity lifts the eternal objects out of their physical feelings so that it can valuate them up or down.

Christian focuses his attention on the simplest case in which one actual entity prehends only one other actual entity in its immediate past by a simple physical feeling.

But things are different in the case of actual entities: «An actual entity in the actual world of a subject must enter into the concrescence of that subject by some simple causal [i.e., physical] feeling, however vague, trivial, and submerged» (PR 239 / 366; italics in text).

Yet conceptual feelings are always derivative from physical feelings.7 This principle is expressed in the fourth Categoreal Obligation: «From each physical feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual feeling whose datum is the eternal object determinant of the definiteness of the actual entity, or the nexus, physically felt» (PR 26 / 39f.).

The important thing to notice at this point is that Whitehead claims that a simple physical feeling has as its initial datum another single actual entity.

In the case of a simple physical feeling X belonging to a new actual entity A, the feeling Y by which X objectifies the past actual entity B is called the «objective datum» of X. Whitehead describes this second subphase in the following passage:

So far, my analysis of objectification has proceeded in terms of actual entities, simple physical feelings, subjective aims, and negative prehensions.

If God is an actual entity, then like all actual entities God should be di - polar, that is, God should have both conceptual feelings and physical ones.

It is these physical feelings that make us so sure that there is a real physical world, composed first of our own bodies and then of other physical entities that act upon us.

A «physical» feeling is simply a feeling whose datum is another actual entity.

That seems to mean that the conceptual feelings of an actual entity always derive from its physical and hybrid feelings.

All the entities will be positively felt in some way, some by simple physical feelings, others by hybrid physical feelings.

The concrescing entity has physical feelings of past actual entities.

The increased intensity of feeling of the «subjective aim,» and accordingly «importance,» does not mean, however, that «intellectual feelings» can operate apart from physical entities manifesting «physical purposes» (PR 273).

It therefore holds true here, as well as in the above definition of knowledge, that the «conceptually» felt realm of possibility of the «actual entity» is wider than its «physical» reality.

The postmodern ecological worldview does not propose that all things are or have minds, but that all concrete physical things are themselves feeling entities or are composed of feeling entities.

Physical prehensions relate the emerging entity to the actual occasions of the immediate past that are within its scope and enable it to «feel» them.

Since this past occasion is an entity other than the becoming one, this is another physical feeling by the new occasion.

As for the first type, every actual entity (not just those of God) must prehend all the determination made by God just prior to the initiation of that moment of experience: All influences are causal, either as pure physical or hybrid physical feelings (see Section 6).

These entities include God, All the entities will be positively felt in some way, some by simple physical feelings, others by hybrid physical feelings.