Sentences with phrase «epochal theory»

For example, Hartshorne is full committed to Whitehead's epochal theory of time, which entails that human experience consists in a succession of momentary experiences.

I am in essential agreement with professor Sipfle on this point, but prefer to say that Bergson has a quasi-epochal theory of the duration of matter, to distinguish it from the epochal theory of Process and Reality with its absolutely distinct units of becoming.

On this point cf. also David A. Sipfle «Henri Bergson and the Epochal Theory of Time» in Bergson and the Evolution of Physics, ed.

I think it is the chief source of confusion concerning the epochal theory of becoming.

However, the epochal theory of time disposes of this foundation of spatial extensiveness, and hence this distinguishing characteristic of durations is likewise lost.15

11 I follow Ford in his argument that the epochal theory of time was a discovery Whitehead made subsequent to his delivery of the Lowell Lectures.

The classic example is the insertion of the «Epochal Theory of Time» in Science and the Modern World, forcing the eventual transformation of what, in that book, had initially been a Spinozistic approach to creativity as the one, undifferentiated underlying activity (with «events» of varied temporal duration as the «modes» of this underlying process) toward the Leibnizian monadology of actual entities (each a kind of time - quantum) that finally appeared subsequently in Process and Reality.

However, Science and the Modern World also introduces the epochal theory of time, which stands as a great modification of Whitehead's event ontology.

According to the epochal theory, time is not some absolute container within which actual entities become; rather, time is an abstraction from the succession of actual entities.

1 See David Sipfle, «On the Intelligibility of the Epochal Theory of Time,» The Monist, 53, 1969, p. 509; Robert Palter, Whitehead's Philosophy of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 7.

The issue of extensive abstraction is also tied up in the epochal theory of occasions, which was discussed earlier in this essay».

In MP, however, I have preserved some echoes of the epochal theory in the notion of act - temporality.

Process philosophers must either become Cartesians and reject the doctrine of the spaciness of mind, or find an effective way of reinterpreting the epochal theory to permit longer - lasting conscious occasions, or they must reject the doctrine of the external imperceptibility of mind.

Whitehead's epochal theory of time circumvents this problem in a manner that is quite convincing: «there is a becoming of continuity, but no continuity of becoming» (PR 35/53).

This brilliant speculation of James's is a necessary consequence of the epochal theory of time.

This later theory of James's bears close resemblance to the epochal theory of time offered by Whitehead in Process and Reality.

This notion seems to allude to an epochal theory of time.

This misconception, which has ever since flourished unquestioned among Whiteheadian philosophers, proved a powerful factor, I think, in Whitehead's ultimate adoption of an atomic or epochal theory of becoming.

This point of the knower's being the knowledge while not being aware of itself is central to the epochal theory of time, and the theory of prehension.

Whitehead advocated an» «epochal theory of time»» in Process and Reality (68).

I shall argue that Whitehead did in fact badly misinterpret Aristotle's concept of substance, as Eslick claimed, and I shall suggest that, far from amounting to an inconsequential error in historical exegesis, this misconception was a strong influence in turning Whitehead's metaphysics in the direction of an epochal theory of becoming.

I have discussed (in Section V) a principle that is implicit in Whitehead's epochal theory of time: the principle that every act of becoming is such that there is another act of becoming that is immediately later.

Temporalism is coherent with the epochal theory

Because of the epochal theory of time, this coalescence of the universe into a new unity is not temporally extensive.

We must not be confused by Whitehead's atomistic language as some of his disciples apparently are; the so - called «epochal theory of time» is atomistic only in name.

Not exact matches

The assumption of an anisotropy of time, along with the «momentariness» of change in spite of the epochal nature of moments, aligns the theory with microgenetic concepts.

1 The first two alternatives alluded to in Ford's title are (1) John Cobb's theory of epochal becoming to the exclusion of real genetic successiveness (with which the present paper is in general sympathy), and (2) Edward Pols's claim that Whitehead's theory of genetic successiveness is inconsistent with the theory of epochal becoming.

2 This seems more adequate and convincing than Whitehead's theory of a biological organism's being a society of epochal subjects, where ongoing integrity, physical or personal, is the task of many actualities, not of an enduring, self - constituting subject.

The theory of epochal time states that the genesis of an actual occasion does not take place in physical (clock) time; it creates a quantum of physical time: in every act of becoming there is the becoming of something with temporal extension; but that act itself is not extensive, in the sense that it is divisible into earlier and later acts of becoming which correspond to the extensive divisibility of what has become» (PR 69/107).

Since none of the alternatives is satisfactory one might consider abandoning the theory of epochal time altogether.

This question presupposes Whitehead's theory of epochal time, which has many difficult problems.

Epochal becoming thus presupposes for its own possibility self - creation, which is precisely what we should expect for Whitehead's theories of epochal becoming and creativity to cohere with one aEpochal becoming thus presupposes for its own possibility self - creation, which is precisely what we should expect for Whitehead's theories of epochal becoming and creativity to cohere with one aepochal becoming and creativity to cohere with one another.

Whitehead wants to circumvent this idea with his «epochal» theory of time, according to which an actual entity exists only as long as the timespan of the becoming that constitutes it (PR 308 / 469f).

As an Oxford and Cambridge - educated man, Hawking must know that he is competing against the epochal grand unification theories in Dante's Divine Comedy and Milton's Paradise Lost.

But it makes sense for Whitehead to shift from a theory of epochal time to one of epochal becoming in order to formulate a rule by which his earlier theory might be excluded.

The theory of epochal time was formulated to avoid this logical inconsistency.

So if the new theory is right, and the oceans were separated much earlier — then what triggered all of those epochal events?