Sentences with phrase «error as the trial judge»

Not exact matches

The judge presiding over the stop - and - frisk trial in NYC has left little question as to her opinion on the practice, criticizing the NYPD's «high error rate.»

As you drive, the points at which these tracks converge could see you heading off onto a different section of track, and without a mini-map in the corner this makes judging braking points and setting up racing lines near impossible with trial and error.

In any event, and much more fundamentally and as discussed above, the trial judge's assessment of this point is based on an error — a failure to understand or consider the nature of the Zurich policy.

In its decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal noted the trial judge «made many errors» stating the original interpretation did not take into consideration that a two - step process involving consultation by both the province and the federal government is unnecessary, as the treaty right is protected.

(6) the necessary but unknown qualities of time and trial - and - error effort to solve such problems, conflict with fulfilling the incentives for becoming a bencher, e.g., becoming a judge or obtaining other government appoints, or formally establishing the fact of one's success and popularity, and giving back to the profession the benefit of one's years of experience, and being re-elected as a bencher;

The appeal was allowed as the trial judge made an error by failing to provide jury with a proper summary of the evidence, having referred frequently to the claimant's «entitlement» to compensation, without adequate emphasis on the question of legal causation.

As a result of this error on the part of the trial judge, the Court of Appeal has overturned Mr. Hall's conviction and ordered that he have a new trial.

Although Markman assigned claim construction to the trial judge, it did not expressly state whether factual findings subsumed in that issue are subject to de novo review (as normally would be the case for legal rulings) or to review for «clear error» (as normally would apply to judicial fact findings).

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made an error of law by ignoring the legal doctrine that an agreement that is signed in counterparts forms a binding agreement as demonstrated in Foley v R., [2000] 4 CTC 2016 (TCC).1

It was therefore an error for the trial judge to effectively treat the contract as repudiated, and conclude that the limitation period started running, in September 1994.

In the New Hampshire case, the Supreme Court found no error because the blogger's posts were not shared with his fellow jurors and because he assured the trial judge that he had followed his instructions once the jury was seated, as Molly McDonough reported in October in the ABA Journal eReport.

The law in British Columbia is however clear, unless it could be said that, on the evidence properly adduced, it was not open to him to conclude as he did without making what is said to be a palpable and overriding error, the Court of Appeal can not interfere with the decision of a trial judge.

Additionally, if a trial judge rules this evidence admissible and you're convicted it is possible it could be construed as harmless error on appeal.

He did note that if the appellant had possessed greater familiarity with court procedure, that could have led to a different result, but this was not seen as an error attributable to the trial judge:

The appellant husband argued that (1) the trial judge erred in how he ordered the equalization payment to be paid; and (2) this error led the trial judge to make a further error with respect to his costs award, as it resulted in the trial judge failing to properly assess the reasonableness of the appellant husband's offers to settle.

As the appellant, if you believe a judge misapplied the law or legal precedent, improperly excluded favorable evidence or testimony, improperly admitted damaging evidence or testimony, allowed procedural errors to go forward at trial, or made other errors during the process of your case, I will examine the facts and provide you with an objective legal opinion before proceeding with the appeal.

We have evolved from Mallios v. La Reine, [1978] Q.J. no 380, there Greenberg, J. of the Quebec Superior Court was considering whether the trial judge was in error in taking judicial notice of the fact that Montreal Harbour was in Canadian waters south of the sixtieth parallel of north latitude: 12 «Judicial Notice» is the act by which a Court, in conducting a trial or framing its decision, will of its own motion, and without production of evidence, recognize the existence and truth of certain facts having a bearing on the controversy, which are universally regarded as established by common notoriety; that is, facts which can not reasonably be the subject of a controversy.

... 11 Finally, Green J. (as he then was), in the case of R. v. King [1993] N.J. No. 218 (NLSCTD) appears to have focused on the issue of the «intention of the trial judge» and on the nature of the error in question.

As such, the Court found the trial judge was correct to use the «comparative blameworthiness» approach and Contributory Negligence Act and «any omissions the trial judge might have made in his reasons — absent proof that he had actually forgotten, ignored or misconceived the evidence at trial — does not constitute palpable and overriding error» (para. 55).

There was certainly nothing unreasonable about trial counsel's alleged failure to call corroborating evidence on these issues when the proposed evidence did not relate to material issues but only to facts the trial judge accepted... In the result, we did not find any error in the reasoning of the trial judge and also find that trial counsel did not act unreasonably by deciding not to call corroborating evidence on the issues of his relationship with Ms. Peters and physical condition as the evidence on these matters had already been accepted by the trial judge (at paras. 11 - 12).

As a result, a true value of # 330,000 was arrived at by the trial Judge, well within the 15 % margin of error he found to be applicable to this particular valuation (the only point on which the Claimant's expert evidence was favoured).

The husband, self - represented on appeal, argued that the trial judge made various errors such as ordering child support in favor of the wife despite her never suffering an economic disadvantage from the marriage -LRB-...?).

As Ms. Label argued, it was a contradiction in terms, and legal error, for the trial judge to state that M will be damaged by continuing in her mother's custody, but to order that she remain in exactly that situation.

Where a trial judge is mistaken as to the substance of material parts of the evidence and those errors play an essential part in the reasoning process resulting in a conviction then, in my view, the accused's conviction is not based exclusively on the evidence and is not a «true» verdict.

On the other hand, where the path taken by the trial judge through confused or conflicting evidence is not at all apparent, or there are difficult issues of law that need to be confronted but which the trial judge has circumnavigated without explanation, or where (as here) there are conflicting theories for why the trial judge might have decided as he or she did, at least some of which would clearly constitute reversible error, the appeal court may in some circumstances consider itself unable to give effect to the statutory right of appeal.

He said at para. 31: «The evidence demonstrated it is more likely than not that even if the appellant had lived up to the standard of care, the respondent would have lost her leg» and at para. 36: «In view of the evidence I have reviewed, and in view of the respondent's concession that there was no evidence to suggest that it was more than likely a better outcome would have followed had the appellant acted with care, the trial judge's finding reveals either a misapprehension as to the law or a palpable and overriding error on the facts.»

In my view, the judiciary should strive to have such a court reporting system implemented in trial courts as such a system would ensure that the trial judge had a command of the evidence during trial and had a text transcript of the evidence when preparing his / her reasons for judgment which would reduce factual errors which lead to expensive appeals and in some cases re-trials.

MacKenzie J.A., for the majority of the B.C.C.A., concluded (at para. 148): «It is my view that if [the trial judge] erred in not attributing to the Crown responsibility for the five months» delay arising from the direct indictment,... such error does not upset the overall result, as I have found that other factors weigh more heavily on the other side of the balance.»

The Court decided the trial judge had carefully weighed the evidence as a whole, including the statistical evidence, the evidence specific to the Plaintiff, and the three expert opinions, all of which involved some speculation and held that she made no palpable and overriding error in finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish causation on a balance of probabilities:

In Reflections on Judging, Judge Posner retorts that «no one should be so naïve as to believe that the determination of facts by the familiar adversary process at trial is proof against error.»

Read as a whole, the trial judge's reasons do not disclose any palpable and overriding error respecting her approach.

Although the trial judge erred in concluding Midland could recover its loss as the beneficiary of a fiduciary duty Roberts owed to Magellan, the court saw no error in the trial judge's finding that Midland suffered a loss of US$ 8.27 million as a direct result of Roberts» failure to disclose material information at the Magellan February Board meeting.

These authorities are not to be taken as meaning that the findings of fact made at trial are immutable, but rather that they are not to be reversed unless it can be established that the learned trial judge made some palpable and overriding error which affected his assessment of the facts.

Trial counsel did an admirable job in this case marshalling evidence and responding to Canada's section 1 arguments, but unfortunately as appellants» counsel, we weren't able to convince the Court that an error had been made in the trial judge's section 1 analTrial counsel did an admirable job in this case marshalling evidence and responding to Canada's section 1 arguments, but unfortunately as appellants» counsel, we weren't able to convince the Court that an error had been made in the trial judge's section 1 analtrial judge's section 1 analysis.

The trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding that the appellant fell below the requisite standard of care for a general surgeon as at the relevant time.

The Court of Appeal held that there was no error in the trial judge's consideration of Mr. Richer's status as an experienced bus driver in respect of an elevated standard of care.

This situation was largely the creation of the appellants and the Court saw no error on the part of the trial judge in ruling as she did.

[Appeal of trial court's change of custody granted: To change custody on four factors alone, as enunciated by the trial judge, and give less than equal weight to the love, affection and emotional ties the son had for and to his mother, her husband and her other children was found to be an error in law.]»