Sentences with phrase «essence of eternal»

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Kraus explains this as part of the relational essence of an eternal object which includes «the indefinite plurality of relations which constitute the status of the eternal object in the realm of possibility» (ME 34).

Although Schmidt derives his view from the SMW chapter «Abstraction,» he evidently finds the basis for his observation in statements Whitehead made about the relational essence of eternal objects, and this buttresses my own conclusions.

I point out, however, that even Christian does not fully explicate Whitehead's doctrine of the relational essence of eternal objects as is attempted in this paper, for he chooses to focus on the internal relatedness involved in objectification rather than the internal relatedness that also obtains between eternal objects themselves.

Obviously, «realizable» here means something other than «ideally realizable,» which need only involve the individual essence of an eternal object.

Further, the essence of an eternal object is merely the eternal object considered as adding its own unique contribution to each actual occasion.

The relational essence of an eternal object specifies a particular how relationship.

He does not argue, but merely asserts that the relational essence of an eternal object A refers to «a set of extensive relations which give it [A] a status in this abstract system» and «to logico - mathematical relationships» akin to eternal objects of the objective species in Process and Reality (PW 77/79).

The «relational essence of an eternal object, Whitehead tells us,

Again, the very essence of eternal salvation is completely by - passed for a discussion on «warm and fuzzy» family ties.

Not exact matches

But in terms of their individual essences only a selection of eternal objects ingresses into each actual occasion.

As Whitehead says in Science and the Modern World (p. 160), «Since the relationships of A [an eternal object] to other eternal objects stand determinately in the essence of A, it follows that they are internal relations.»

Like the Leibnizian monad, the occasion is individuated by its individual essence, its particular perspective; but unlike the Leibnizian monad this essence is not predicated of the occasion as a substantial substratum, but enters into the inner constitution of the occasion as «a vector transmission of emotional feeling» or, in the language of physics, «the transmission of a form of energy» from past occasions via the eternal objects that communicate the emotional form and make possible the subsequent reenactment by the prehending occasion (PR 315 / 479f.).

Although the simple eternal object defines a class of particulars that as values of the variable are that definite shade of green, and although these individuals are externally related, the simple eternal object itself is internally related to the higher grade object, in that it partially constitutes its essence.

Our Churches, with common consent, do teach that the decree of the Council of Nicaea concerning the Unity of the Divine Essence and concerning the Three Persons, is true and to be believed without any doubting; that is to say, there is one Divine Essence which is called and which is God: eternal, without body, without parts, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the Maker and Preserver of all things, visible and invisible; and yet there are three Persons, of the same essence and power, who also are coeternal, the Father, the Son, and the HolyEssence and concerning the Three Persons, is true and to be believed without any doubting; that is to say, there is one Divine Essence which is called and which is God: eternal, without body, without parts, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the Maker and Preserver of all things, visible and invisible; and yet there are three Persons, of the same essence and power, who also are coeternal, the Father, the Son, and the HolyEssence which is called and which is God: eternal, without body, without parts, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the Maker and Preserver of all things, visible and invisible; and yet there are three Persons, of the same essence and power, who also are coeternal, the Father, the Son, and the Holyessence and power, who also are coeternal, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

These different modes of ingression are a function of the eternal object's relational essence, that is, of its patience for being jointly ingressed with other eternal objects having the requisite relational essence (SMW 229f).

This understanding of God is evident in Pannenberg's link between the immanent Trinitv (God's eternal essence) and the economic Trinity (God as active in salvation history).

For Husserl every actuality (Whitehead's actual Occasion) is an expression of an essence (Whitehead's eternal object); experience is composed of «individual instances of... essences» (Ideas 113).

Platonic Form, Idea, Essence, Eternal Object; Potentiality and Givenness; Exclusiveness of the Given; Subject - Superject, Becoming and Being; Evaporation of Indetermination in Concrescence, Satisfaction Determinate and Exclusive; Concrescence Dipolar... (PR 57; emphasis mine)

Perhaps the best way of thinking about this is to distinguish between the loving unity that the three divine Persons experience, on the one hand, and the loving unity that defines God's eternal essence, on the other.

Each relation belongs to the relational essence of green and together are constitutive of the eternal object green (SMW 230).

The realm of essence is the home of an eternal infinity of qualities and forms which the flux of physical existence (the realm of matter) may or may not actualize from time to time as the character of one of its phases (or which spirit may or may not conceive or imagine from time to time) but there is no dynamism in the realm of essence to determine which shall thus enter the concrete world (see RB 385 - 386).

But, in fact, mind's main choice is between the correct, though finally improvable, acceptance of most of the essences it intuits as a description of a world in which mind has no special primacy and a confinement of attention simply to the eternal individuality of the essences immediately present to it.

On the face of it Santayana rejects all three of these departures from the tradition, since (1) he makes no very explicit move from a continuant to an event ontology, (2) regards the inherent nature of an object as a matter of the individual eternal essence which it actualizes and (3) regards the distinction between matter and form as at least a virtually inevitable way of expressing the obscure manner in which one state of things takes over from another (see RB 278 - 284).

It is because he fears that speaking of pure essences as existing will encourage assimilation of their status to that of efficacious particular things that he insists that so long as they stick within their own eternal realm they only have pure being.

Each actual entity is, viewed from this perspective, a process of emerging definiteness where the process is the decision whereby the essence of each and every eternal object is either included or excluded from positive aesthetic feeling — is either positively or negatively prehended, to use the terminology of Process and Reality.

To talk about an eternal attribute which is different from the divine Essence but coexistent with it is to personify it and give it the status of a substance — a position very similar to that of the Christian Trinity.

748) in his refutation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, which he considered a plurality of eternal attributes in one Essence.

The substance and essence of Christianity, as I understand it, is eternal and unchangeable, and will bear examination forever, but it has been mixed with extraneous ingredients, which I think will not bear examination, and they ought to be separated.

In the realm of eternal objects — a realm in which the relationships between objects are simultaneously unselective and systematically complete — we discover the musical tone «B.» Considered purely with respect to its relational essence, «B» entertains the possibility of many relations: it may be a tonic, a dominant, a subdominant, a neopolitan, a relative minor; it may form the base of a fully diminished vii chord, or the seventh tone of a V / V chord, the third tone in a twelve - tone row, the fourth interval in a five - tone cell, and so on.

i) the relationships of any eternal object A, considered as constitutive of A, merely involve other eternal objects as bare relata without reference to their individual essences, and

In classical theism, which insists upon God's simplicity, immutability, and eternality, the eternal essence of God was all that could possibly be revealed of God.

With respect to its individual essence, in the realm of eternal objects «B» simply is what it is in isolation.

The general belief seems to be that an eternal life with God and each other will, of its essence, be attractive and forever satisfying.

Nevertheless, we do not feel that he has made full use of the resources available in process theism when he restricts what is revealed in Christ to the eternal essence of God.

He argued that while each human being has a very tiny life span, or finite appearance in the whole of space - time of the universe, humanity is also an eternal intelligible essence.

act as a distinct causal agent upon the parts which constitute him and the cosmos.48 Moreover, panentheism includes the notion that God's abstract essence or eternal existence is logically independent of, and hence distinguishable from, every particular world.49

Others eliminate the force of the difference, but not the difference itself, by making various distinctions, for example, between the historical «accidents» and the eternal «essence» (as in Harnack), or between the familiar present worldview, which is normative, and the strange, alien past one, which is not (as in J. Weiss and Schweitzer), or between what a text «says» and what it «means» (as in Bultmann, whose approach attempts to resolve the tensions involved in the former two enterprises).

Having reduced my perception of God and his purpose to the bare essence without any theosophical definition and having renounced any expectation of an eternal reward with any connection to my current mode of existence, is my affirmation of a supreme being and a supreme purpose meaningful?

To what extent is the being of occasions a real and concrete being in contrast to the abstract being of eternal objects whose abstract essence can be defined solely as the possibility of a concrete actualization in an occasion?

Similarly, Baptists hold that «the eternal triune God reveals Himself to us as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, with distinct personal attributes, but without division of nature, essence, or being.»

The same proposition can constitute the content of diverse judgments by diverse judging entities respectively..., this requires that the same complex of logical subjects objectified via the same eternal objects, can enter as a partial constituent into the «real» essences of diverse actual entities.

But the essence of the Hellenistic idea of God is that deity is by nature all that men by nature can not be: God is uncompounded, absolutely simple, hence static (a state identified with perfection), unchanging, subject to no variation, eternal, impassible, unmoved.

If all is to be conceived by analogy with our human nature, then either Spinoza is right and the eternal, immutable essence of the cosmic soul necessitates everything in the cosmic body, and there is no chance, randomness, or genuinely open alternatives either within the world or as between this and other possible worlds; or there is freedom both in our decisions and in God's.

Moreover, sensa are declared to have some form of realization that differs from that of patterns: «But the realization of a sensum in its ideal shallowness of intensity, with zero width, does not require any other eternal object, other than its intrinsic apparatus of individual and relational essence; it can remain just itself, with its unrealized potentialities for patterned contrasts» (PR 115 / 176).

That aspect of the eternal object which is its for - the - world perspective is also indicated by the characteristics of non-unique relational essence (3), element of associative hierarchy (5), pattern (7), and repeatability (9).

Now, it seems that such «ideal» realization primarily pertains to what Whitehead calls the «individual essence» of an eternal object (PR 165 / 251, cf. PR 44 / 70), and he means by this that every eternal object regarded abstractly as an entity unto itself — in its individual essence — requires no reference to other specified eternal objects.

Thus, though the individual essences of neither sensa nor patterns require references to other specified eternal objects, sensa presuppose no other eternal objects in their individual essences, while patterns do presuppose sensa.

Therefore, sensa and patterns do not differ in the respect that they must be essentially related to other eternal objects in physical ingression, and this aspect of their relational essences guarantees that no eternal object can physically ingress individually.

This is to say that the physical ingression of all eternal objects involves their relational essences.