In fact,
esthetic worth tends to have an inverse relation to practicality, since forms are ideal in the degree to which they transcend the necessary limitations, confusions, and compromises of ordinary life.
It is this property of ideality that justifies the nonutilitarian view of
esthetic worth.
Nevertheless, some suggestions can be offered concerning the criteria that are appropriate for the evaluation of
esthetic worth.
Not exact matches
It is here assumed that judgments of
worth in the
esthetic, moral, and religious fields require a similar presupposition of the givenness of an order of value which is to be discovered and universally recognized and honored.
Truth is one kind of value, different in quality from
esthetic excellence, justice, or holiness, but like them in being part of an objective structure of
worth.
Esthetic value is not in an independent realm, where its own criteria bear no relation to other measures of
worth.
In a democracy of
worth, standards of
esthetic excellence are presupposed.
Serious
esthetic education makes sense only when dedication to qualitative
worth is acknowledged.
In contrast, under a philosophy of
worth the major purposes of
esthetic education are: first, to enable individuals to respond to higher orders of qualitative significance and insight; and, second, to stimulate criticism of popular mediocrity and to discourage uncritical conformity to mass convention.
The principle of
worth further presupposes that
esthetic experience is an act of discovery.