Sentences with phrase «eternal object»

«By reason of the actuality of this primordial valuation of pure potentials, each eternal object has a definite, effective relevance to each concrescent process» (PR 64).

For example, the clause -LRB-(attractive x)(kind x)(Scandinavian x)-RRB- in our simple program symbolizes an eternal object in which potential attractiveness requires (in this example) kindliness and being Scandinavian.

For Whitehead evidently supposes that it is the value which God apprehends an eternal object as possessing, or its suitability for ingression in a particular context, which makes it a lure for action.

The subjective form in a particular actual entity, he tells us, unlike the abstract eternal object, is an «element in the private definiteness of that actuality» (PR 444), and the subjective form can not be torn apart from its particular subject without becoming a mere universal (PR 354, 356).

Moreover, Santayana would agree with Whitehead's statement that» [an] eternal object is always a potentiality actual entities; but in itself... it is neutral as to the facts of its... ingression in any particular actual entity of the temporal world» (PR 44).

From each physical feeling there is the derivation of a purely conceptual feeling whose datum is the eternal object exemplified in the definiteness of the actual entity, or of the nexus, physically felt.

The relevance of an eternal object in its role of lure is a fact inherent in the data.

Any logical or mathematical structure in its pure sense as a potential for actualization of entities is an eternal object.

Understanding a Prolog program as a symbol for an eternal object may also assist us in understanding how an eternal object is nested in another eternal object and how their structures are related.

More generally, an event is «a nexus of actual occasions» (Process 73).4 Just as he used his technical term «eternal object» rather than the standard term «universal» (Process 48), so he used his technical term «nexus» rather than the standard term «event.»

Consequently, it would be better to say this: The relation of prehension is an eternal object.

The eternal object is a common defining characteristic only because the actual entities of the nexus are concretely related by their prehension and objectification of one another.

They are nexus of actual entities that are ordered by means of a «defining characteristic» (i.e., an eternal object).

Each relation belongs to the relational essence of green and together are constitutive of the eternal object green (SMW 230).

Because a sense - datum is an eternal object (61), S and T have conceptual feelings of one and the same eternal object.

But the conceptual characterization of community is an extension of the concrete experience of physical community, just as the common eternal object used to characterize the nexus is derived from the physical feeling of entities - requiring - each - other.

In opposing eliminativism, I have argued that a nexus is not just a set of actual entities and an eternal object (i.e., the relation of prehension).

the eliminativist could enlarge the above interpretation of the fourteenth category of explanation as follows: A nexus is a set of actual entities that are linked together by means of an eternal object, the relation of prehension.

These analogies may be explained, as Whitehead typically does, in terms of a single eternal object which is felt to qualify the diverse actual entities of the nexus.

The mode of togetherness of the actual entities in a nexus is to be understood in terms of the conception of «eternal object.»

Because S and T are interrelated through the mediation of a universal — an entity that is not real, individual, and particular — the interrelatedness of S, T, and the eternal object does not constitute an entity that is real, individual, and particular.

Its individual essence is «the eternal object considered in respect to its uniqueness» (SMW 229).

Because Whitehead himself usually explains this operation by way of a common eternal object which is illustrated in all the actual entities of the nexus, the significance of a transmuted feeling as a feeling of physical community in the actual world is often overlooked.

But that eternal object is not an entity that is real, individual, and particular.

He does not argue, but merely asserts that the relational essence of an eternal object A refers to «a set of extensive relations which give it [A] a status in this abstract system» and «to logico - mathematical relationships» akin to eternal objects of the objective species in Process and Reality (PW 77/79).

As ingressed in a particular actuality, a particular eternal object is just another instance of itself.

But in the eighth Category of Explanation we are told that the objectification of one actuality in another is the particular mode in which the potentiality (or capacity) of the former is realized (or exercised) in the latter, and in the seventh Category of Explanation we are told that the ingression of an eternal object into an actuality is the particular mode in which the potentiality (or capacity) of the eternal object is realized (or exercised) in the actuality (PR 34).

Moreover, as eternally ingressed in God's primordial nature, each eternal object is, relative to the temporal actualities, a transcendent capacity for their determination.

Because it is actual, the principle of limitation is not itself an eternal object.

(The second kind of perceptual error, detailed in PR III.5, occurs relatively late in concresence and involves the mistaken attribution of an eternal object to a perceptual datum.

In contrast, in the putative S - O - T nexus, S and T are interrelated indirectly by means of their conceptual feelings of an eternal object.

In particular, they may be interrelated indirectly by means of their conceptual feelings of one and the same eternal object.

Consider some eternal object such as the color green.

However, instead of the standard term «universal,» Whitehead preferred his own term «eternal object.»

But that same eternal object must make exactly that same contribution to any actuality or occasion in which it is ingressed.

6 In a conformal feeling, an eternal object already ingressed as characterizing the subjective form of an individual objectification given for a nascent occasion is reingressed as a character of the subjective form of the nascent subject's prehension of that objectification (PR 476, 364, 78).

Platonic Form, Idea, Essence, Eternal Object; Potentiality and Givenness; Exclusiveness of the Given; Subject - Superject, Becoming and Being; Evaporation of Indetermination in Concrescence, Satisfaction Determinate and Exclusive; Concrescence Dipolar... (PR 57; emphasis mine)

of an eternal object is merely the eternal object considered as adding its own unique contribution to each actual occasion.

For Husserl every actuality (Whitehead's actual Occasion) is an expression of an essence (Whitehead's eternal object); experience is composed of «individual instances of... essences» (Ideas 113).

By the repetition, or causal objectification, of an earlier occasion in a later one, let me hasten to add, Whitehead did not mean, as so many of his interpreters have erroneously taken him to mean, merely that some eternal object ingressed in the earlier occasion is also ingressed in the later occasion.

These different modes of ingression are a function of the eternal object's relational essence, that is, of its patience for being jointly ingressed with other eternal objects having the requisite relational essence (SMW 229f).

This is one reason (it is not the only one) why Whitehead refuses to identify «universal» with «eternal object»: «The term «universal» is unfortunate in its application to eternal objects; for it seems to deny, and in fact it was meant to deny, that actual entities also fall within the scope of the principle of relativity.

This kind of error might involve the erroneous attribution of an eternal object to CE, but it would not involve incorrect information contributed by CE; thus it is not germane to the question of whether CE itself can involve error.)

According to the twenty - fourth Category of Explanation, the «functioning of one actual entity in the self - creation of another actual entity is the «objectification» of the former for the latter actual entity» and the «functioning of an eternal object in the self - creation of an actual entity is the «ingression» of the eternal object in the actual entity» (PR 38).

By virtue of those two ingressions, the one eternal object is functioning both datively and conformably in the one, self - same occasion (PR 249).

He wants an eternal object to be «the same for all actual entities» (Process 23), and yet needs each creating subject to have its own subjective form of that object (Process 227, 232, 246), in other words, to create its own, novel «eternal» object.

Interestingly, he used the terms «epochal occasion,» «event» and «droplets of existence,» but never «actual entity» or «eternal object,» suggesting that he still may have been working largely from Religion in the Making.

It is the «season,» i.e., the conditions under which an eternal object is actualized, and not its purely formal characteristics, which determine its goodness or evil.

One must conceive the being of such an entity as first of all a pure possibility — as a «complex eternal object.»

In that case there would be some single complex eternal object containing all others as its proper subsets.