Sentences with phrase «eternal object has»

The temporal and the eternal are mediated by the divine, in whose primordial valuation... each eternal object has a definite effective relevance to each concrescent process.

Despite these contrary characteristics, what an eternal object has in common with an actual entity is its determination through the category of the one and the many.

Since Whitehead says: «Every eternal object has entered into the conceptual feelings of God,» (Process and Reality, Corrected Edition, ed.

The realm of eternal objects is properly described as a «realm,» because each eternal object has its status in this general systematic complex of mutual relatedness (Science and the Modern World 231).

«By reason of the actuality of this primordial valuation of pure potentials, each eternal object has a definite, effective relevance to each concrescent process» (PR 64).

In the primordial nature, taken in abstraction from acts of becoming... eternal objects have togetherness but not gradations of importance.»

If some certain eternal object were actualized [for a particular actual entity], then all other eternal objects would be relevant in some way or other [to that entity]» (IMW 274).

God's ordering of the eternal objects has particularized efficacy that takes account of every detail of the actual situation, but this does not mean that God successively produces a new ordering as each new occasion arises.

The relational essence is the necessary interconnectedness that all eternal objects have with each other.

Selection among eternal objects would imply the so - called unity of the subject, its aim, would be a multiplicity, not a unity.

These different modes of ingression are a function of the eternal object's relational essence, that is, of its patience for being jointly ingressed with other eternal objects having the requisite relational essence (SMW 229f).

Originally as the principle of limitation, the principle of concretion determined which of the eternal objects would be actualizable in the world, now each occasion actualizes itself in terms of God's gradation of values.

B may prehend A in such a way that although important aspects of A are re-enacted, the source of these eternal objects has no importance.

First, the ordering or valuing of the eternal objects has to do with God himself as an actual entity.

Formally viewed, the plurality of eternal objects has a double aspect like that of occasions.

Indeed, if all the passages in which God is presented as the conceptual valuation of eternal objects have been inserted in an already existing text where God is always described in much more general terms, the logical conclusion is that the views expressed in the insertions must be conceptually later than those expressed in the text where they have been inserted.

Christian holds that «in the primordial nature of God... eternal objects have togetherness but not gradations of importance» (IWM 275).

At best this could be expressed in counterfactual conditionals: apart from divine activity, these eternal objects would have been unordered.

As a range of potentiality; the eternal object would still be «eternal,» but the concrescing entity would create not only a new self - identity, would not only actualize a new combination of eternal objects, but would also create a new determination of the ingressed eternal objects, and those determinations would not be «eternal.»

In one way or another, the fact that Suchocki sees concrescence chiefly as a synthesis of eternal objects has a part in this (see, for example, MGWG 242).

Not exact matches

Feelings are positive prehensions, and prehensions have reference to actual entities and eternal objects.

But his insistence that» [t] he envisaging creativity, the continuum of extension, B's anticipatory feeling of C, the disjunctive plurality of attained actualities, the multiplicity of eternal objects, and the primordial nature of God are all alike involved in the creation of C's dative [i.e., purely receptive] phase» (326) would lead one to believe that some sort of objective medium must he present to facilitate the transmission to the new occasion of so many non-objective factors in its self - constitution (e g creativity, the anticipatory feelings of B and other past occasions, the multiplicity of eternal objects, the divine primordial nature, etc.).

For example, the analysis of sensa and pattern (11.4.3) may well have been excerpted from the discussion concerning the two species of eternal objects (IV.1.6).

Instead of four types of objects, he now had just two, eternal and enduring, yet the function of these objects was basically the same.

Since abstract principles or rules (eternal objects) have no causal efficacy in themselves for Whitehead, they would require some actual entity to envision and to incarnate them.

There can be no doubt that God makes decisions a propos of the disjunctive multiplicity of eternal objects; the difficulty is to establish in precisely what sense these divine decisions are distinguishable from the choices and calculations made by the Leibnizian deity Whitehead's dilemma seems to be this: on the one hand, the principle of classification is to be challenged by positing the primordiality of a world of eternal objects that knows «no exclusions, expressive in logical terms»; on the other hand, positing pure potentiality as a «boundless and unstructured infinity» (IWM 252) lacking all logical order would seem to be precisely that conceptual move which renders it «inefficacious» or «irrelevant.»

Eternal objects are, in Whitehead's terminology, what had been called universals, but as he himself is quick to point out (SMW 169), the conception is quite different.

Note also PR 46: «Apart from God, eternal objects unrealized in the actual world would be relatively non-existent for the concrescence in question.»)

to the complex of relations an individual actual occasion has with past actual occasions and eternal objects (cf. EMW 116).

We have already recognized the sense in which eternal objects are internally related: the more general or abstract function includes the less general as a constituent or term.

But eternal objects, we have established, are mathematical or functional forms.

What status have the eternal objects in relation to God's envisagement?

Over and above the «special relevance» which selected eternal objects may have in relation to particular, finite actual entities, it is necessary that there be a kind of «relevance in general,» a real togetherness of all eternal objects amongst themselves, effected by an eternal, infinite actuality: «Transcendent decision includes God's decision.

So the only remaining conclusion is that the «eternal objects» have their ground in a supertemporal entity, in God, who «conceptually» holds within God's «primordial nature» the totality of possibilities for creation.

29 More perhaps than do «eternal objects,» these «propositions» show how far Whitehead has come with his new solution to the problem of form: he has provided a free space for the unfolding of creativity in world - process.

In terms of eternal objects we may say that he reaches as far as the most distant standpoint he has made relevant by associating it with a specific eternal object (thereby perhaps making that eternal object first relevant).

But just because eternal objects bear no sign of their origin need not mean that they have no origin.

In that case there would be some single complex eternal object containing all others as its proper subsets.

Vorhanden, which Heidegger uses of the peculiar mode of being characteristic of inanimate objects, as contrasted with responsible human Dasein, I have translated by «tangible», as in Bultmann the antithesis is not so much between Vorhandensein and Dasein as between the tangible realities of the visible world and eternal realities, very much like the Pauline contrast of kata sarka and kata pneuma.

Now insofar as Whitehead thinks of these «eternal objects» as forms, we have in fact a case of a radical identification of form and potentiality.

Interestingly, he used the terms «epochal occasion,» «event» and «droplets of existence,» but never «actual entity» or «eternal object,» suggesting that he still may have been working largely from Religion in the Making.

He did seem to acknowledge some such reality, while observing that a Whiteheadian would no doubt give more emphasis to the realm of eternal objects But his objections to this realm and to such speculation was nevertheless made clear.

In order to interpret this core - principle of revelation, we must understand its essential presupposition; namely, that events are present «in» other events - present not just abstractly (through «eternal objects»), i.e., mediated by the «general,» but as singular events that effect their further history by their unique concreteness (PR 338).12 Whitehead recognizes precisely this constellation when he says:» [T] he truism that we can only conceive in terms of universals has been stretched to mean that we can only feel in terms of universals.

He wants an eternal object to be «the same for all actual entities» (Process 23), and yet needs each creating subject to have its own subjective form of that object (Process 227, 232, 246), in other words, to create its own, novel «eternal» object.

This kind of error might involve the erroneous attribution of an eternal object to CE, but it would not involve incorrect information contributed by CE; thus it is not germane to the question of whether CE itself can involve error.)

Regarding knowledge of possibility, we can, for present purposes, avoid discussing the well - known difference between Whitehead and Hartshorne as to whether God has a primordial vision of all eternal objects (possibility), as Whitehead asserts, or whether God derives eternal objects from the world, as Hartshorne does.

By the repetition, or causal objectification, of an earlier occasion in a later one, let me hasten to add, Whitehead did not mean, as so many of his interpreters have erroneously taken him to mean, merely that some eternal object ingressed in the earlier occasion is also ingressed in the later occasion.

They have recognized also that actual entities and eternal objects are the closest analogues, in Whitehead's metaphysics, to particulars and universals, respectively (PR 76).

This latter way of characterizing the objectification and ingression of actual entities and eternal objects, respectively, has the advantage, for our purposes, of emphasizing the distinction Whitehead makes between an entity or object qua capacity for being a realized determinant and that same entity or object qua realized determinant.

As a unique, determinate entity, the color green has a set of definite relations to all other eternal objects.