Sentences with phrase «eternal objects formed»

There is secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with, and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the primary phase of the mental pole; the determination of identity and diversity depending on the subjective aim at attaining depth of intensity by reason of contrast.

Eternal objects form a realm — a Platonic realm?

There is secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the first phase of the mental pole.

Not exact matches

While the occasions are indeed individual «creatures,» their distinct individuality depends upon eternal objects as forms of definiteness.

Because every occasion must include some very general and abstract eternal objects as forms of definiteness (i.e., spatial, temporal, «epochal» ones) as well as less pervasive forms, no occasion is constituted as a heap of unileveled components, one as important or unimportant as another.

But eternal objects, we have established, are mathematical or functional forms.

Like the Leibnizian monad, the occasion is individuated by its individual essence, its particular perspective; but unlike the Leibnizian monad this essence is not predicated of the occasion as a substantial substratum, but enters into the inner constitution of the occasion as «a vector transmission of emotional feeling» or, in the language of physics, «the transmission of a form of energy» from past occasions via the eternal objects that communicate the emotional form and make possible the subsequent reenactment by the prehending occasion (PR 315 / 479f.).

But on the other hand, the concatenation of functional forms, or eternal objects, affords him the means to establish relations, indirect, but nevertheless internal, between contemporary occasions, where causal relations proper are not in question at all.

29 More perhaps than do «eternal objects,» these «propositions» show how far Whitehead has come with his new solution to the problem of form: he has provided a free space for the unfolding of creativity in world - process.

Thus for Whitehead the «eternal objects,» or pure «forms of definiteness,» as such, precisely do not constitute actuality.

Now insofar as Whitehead thinks of these «eternal objects» as forms, we have in fact a case of a radical identification of form and potentiality.

For as «forms of definiteness,» «eternal objects» are, by their very mode of existence, «Pure Potentials for the Specific Determination of Fact.»

He wants an eternal object to be «the same for all actual entities» (Process 23), and yet needs each creating subject to have its own subjective form of that object (Process 227, 232, 246), in other words, to create its own, novel «eternal» object.

Since there are no eternal objects or pre-existing forms in Hartshorne's view, the function of the abstract pole of God can not be solely one of the valuation of such entities as it is for Whitehead.

Platonic Form, Idea, Essence, Eternal Object; Potentiality and Givenness; Exclusiveness of the Given; Subject - Superject, Becoming and Being; Evaporation of Indetermination in Concrescence, Satisfaction Determinate and Exclusive; Concrescence Dipolar... (PR 57; emphasis mine)

6 In a conformal feeling, an eternal object already ingressed as characterizing the subjective form of an individual objectification given for a nascent occasion is reingressed as a character of the subjective form of the nascent subject's prehension of that objectification (PR 476, 364, 78).

The latter are not susceptible to cataloguing as mathematical Platonic forms; hence, despite Whitehead's explicit remarks that the Primordial Nature includes all eternal objects (PR 134; cf. 70), the Primordial Nature is identified with the eternal objects of the objective species.

But because the data of conceptual feelings are eternal objects or abstract forms of definiteness, the relationality is one of abstract pattern rather than of concrete particulars.

Then a theological passage, «Eternal objects, as in God's primordial nature, constitute the Platonic world of ideas» (PR 73), is translated: God's primordial nature is an abstract structure of mathematical Platonic forms (PW 59/56).

Mays takes the statement that «The order of nature, prevalent in the cosmic epoch in question, exhibits itself as a morphological scheme involving eternal objects of the objective species» (PR 447f) and renders it: The order of nature is a morphological scheme of mathematical Platonic forms (PW 58/56).

with complete consistency, accords priority to actual entities is that it is only actual entities which are agents, in the primary sense I have endeavored to elucidate, all other entities being «agents» or «efficacious» only either as factors in actual entities, i.e., as contributory to the «act» of actual entities (e.g., eternal objects, prehensions, subjective forms, propositions) or as derivative from actual entities (e.g., nexus, societies).

Reproduction and inheritance are therefore effected through the intermediary of form, or in Whitehead's term, «eternal objects.»

The natural structure of Prolog programs allows us to see in an appealing manner how eternal objects and propositions are nested and related to each other and how they can reveal the form of prehensive structure in the real world.

In both, the object is immanent in the perceiving subject and this, moreover, is effected through the intermediary of forms (eternal objects).

The subjective form in a particular actual entity, he tells us, unlike the abstract eternal object, is an «element in the private definiteness of that actuality» (PR 444), and the subjective form can not be torn apart from its particular subject without becoming a mere universal (PR 354, 356).

On the face of it Santayana rejects all three of these departures from the tradition, since (1) he makes no very explicit move from a continuant to an event ontology, (2) regards the inherent nature of an object as a matter of the individual eternal essence which it actualizes and (3) regards the distinction between matter and form as at least a virtually inevitable way of expressing the obscure manner in which one state of things takes over from another (see RB 278 - 284).

Does there exist a form for representing eternal objects that can also show in a clear manner the prehensive structure of actual entities?

The abstract logical structure of prehensions is not represented naturally by the familiar form of Whiteheadian eternal objects.

The justification for any relevance extending beyond actuality would have to depend upon the internal relatedness of the eternal objects ordered as a realm, The occasion incorporates these new elements in forming its «ideal of itself by reference to eternal principles of valuation.»

In this same work eternal objects as potential structures for actuality do not have an evident form as structures for prehension but maintain their original logical and mathematical interpretation.

The logical structure of a Prolog program is the same logic, in a slightly different form, from which Whitehead's mature understanding of eternal objects developed.

The conclusion I want to pull out of these considerations is this: if there is at least one actual entity in the world characterized by at least one eternal object, one specific form of definiteness, then this actual entity provides all the ontological ground required for the realm of eternal objects — an appeal to God is not necessary.11 And, indeed, in Whitehead, as in Aristotle, there is an eternity and an abeternity of becoming so that within the terms of the system it is inconceivable that there be any region of the extensive continuum, no matter how far it be extended fore or aft, where there is not a generation of actual entities exhibiting concrete forms of definiteness.

As conditions of the possibility of our experience — whatever that experience may contain — he postulates three formative elements: the realm of forms («eternal objects»), creativity, and the Principle of limitation or definiteness of becoming («God»).

An eternal object as a form of definiteness, may be realized in one actual occasion after another, through each prehending that form in its predecessor.

Hence, new qualities that emerge are not merely empirical qualities of new «occasions,» they are also «eternal objects,» belonging to a world of what Plato called forms or ideas; they are both immanent and transcendent: «Here Alexander inclines towards an empiricist tradition... which identifies that which is known with the fleeting sense - datum of the moment; Whitehead, with his mathematical training, represents a rationalist tradition which identifies that which is known with necessary and eternal truths.

In connection with eternal objects my move is to play Aristotle to Whitehead's Plato by giving forms of definiteness their ontological grounding in the concrete world of flux.

An eternal object is supposed to bestow or withhold a specific, precise form of definiteness, but how can this be if every eternal object drags along with it, so to speak, the whole choir of eternal objects in virtue of the fact that its relationships to other eternal objects are internal relations?

«The «primordial nature» of God is the concrescence of a unity of conceptual feelings» (PR 134), which «achieves, in its unity of satisfaction, the complete conceptual valuation of all eternal objects» (PR 48) or pure forms, thereby generating the entire structuring of pure possibility.4 Seen in terms of his everlasting aspect or consequent nature, however, the only way God is directly related to the World, the converse is true.

«Eternal objects» are potentialities, which as forms of determination can enter into the becoming of actual entities and without which actuality is impossible.

Rather, in the unity of the proposition, actual entities assume the form of «logical subjects» and eternal objects are transformed into the «predicative pattern.»

Furthermore, the exigencies of his system required him to conceive of the initial aim in terms of single definite form: the «aim determines the initial gradations of relevance of eternal objects for conceptual feeling and constitutes the autonomous subject in its primary phase...» (PR 244).

5To simplify the following analysis, I shall assume (with Whitehead) that prehension is the only form of causal influence between actualities and that all eternal objects are uncreated and hence definite.

The anger is a form of definiteness which I allow to characterize my experience; it is what Whitehead calls an eternal object.

It seems that some form of the doctrine of eternal objects was recognized as part of the theory of existence in Principia (WRL 144f.).

A definite eternal object is what it is apart from creativity, while an indefinite form depends upon creativity for its further determination.

Instead of being definite eternal objects, however, which can be modified only by being replaced by other definite eternal objects (or selected from an infinitely dense array of eternal objects), it could be an indefinite, partially vague form by which creativity was instanced.

In the realm of eternal objects — a realm in which the relationships between objects are simultaneously unselective and systematically complete — we discover the musical tone «B.» Considered purely with respect to its relational essence, «B» entertains the possibility of many relations: it may be a tonic, a dominant, a subdominant, a neopolitan, a relative minor; it may form the base of a fully diminished vii chord, or the seventh tone of a V / V chord, the third tone in a twelve - tone row, the fourth interval in a five - tone cell, and so on.

In the first phase of concrescence, eternal objects are felt as embedded in the particular actual entities which form the initial data.

However, a subjective form in abstraction from the subject of a feeling is merely an eternal object (PR 233 / 356).

On the other hand an occasion, as long as it is not defined simply through qualities or eternal objects, is not to be defined except through its concrete relationships to other occasions with which it forms a nexus in reality.