Sentences with phrase «eternal objects in»

If we understand the primordial satisfaction of God to be that of the togetherness of eternal objects in valuation, then we must know that this satisfaction is a supreme harmony.

This analysis of mathematics seems to be the reason for Whitehead to attach e attribute of a «particular individuality» (SMW 229) to eternal objects in his later philosophy.

But at another level, Whitehead locates the final supply of eternal objects in a single actual entity he calls God.

The first level is also the most abstract: the collection of all eternal objects in the divine primordial nature.

Does the unconscious prehension of all eternal objects in the primordial nature violate this principle?

Hartshorne's rejection of eternal objects in Whitehead's sense constitutes one of the main differences between him and Whitehead.

I am troubled by the idea of an unconscious appraisal of all eternal objects in relation to a possible world which is envisioned in all its detail, and Cobb does not comment explicitly on whether this appraisal is conscious or not.

Such intervention can be regular and predictable on the basis of intuitions of the order of eternal objects in the primordial nature of God and can, therefore, be taken into account in the planning and responsible free choosing of men.

Therefore, sensa and patterns do not differ in the respect that they must be essentially related to other eternal objects in physical ingression, and this aspect of their relational essences guarantees that no eternal object can physically ingress individually.

In their joint embodiment in the occasion, they relate the entire realm of eternal objects in ascending degrees of complexity to this base, thus providing the inexhaustible intelligibility of the event, its conceptual structure.

Whitehead observes that «A pattern and a sensum are thus both simple in the sense that neither involves other specified eternal objects in its own realization» (PR 115 / 175).

Thus, though the individual essences of neither sensa nor patterns require references to other specified eternal objects, sensa presuppose no other eternal objects in their individual essences, while patterns do presuppose sensa.

This is not a formation of completely novel patterns, but rather of increasingly complex unities of eternal objects in novel patterns of external relatedness.

Kraus says that eternal objects «form the patterns structuring concrete fact» and «the forms structuring the togetherness of data into a datum of experience — eternal objects in Whitehead's language — are given for all times in ordered, intelligible, interrelated sets like mathematical systems» (ME 30).

In that concept, God was devoid of any physical dimension, being rather an entirely conceptual act of valuation of pure eternal objects, that is, of eternal objects in themselves, rather than as actualized in temporal actual entities.

To carry through the process of rethinking the account of actual occasions and eternal objects in the light of the full doctrine of God will be in line with the direction in which Whitehead's own thought was moving at this point and will also alter in subtle, but at times important, ways the precise form of the doctrine of God.

Second, God seems to envisage eternal objects in a way for which the conceptual prehensions of actual occasions provide no analogy.

He says, «I suggest that the primordial nature of God orders eternal objects in the sense, and only in the sense, that in God's envisagement eternal objects are together.

It is easy to visualize just how objectification takes place with the eternal objects in their two-fold functioning.

Then what of the realm of eternal objects in Whitehead's system?

So my twofold task is first to show what it is about the treatment of eternal objects in Science and the Modern World which makes the Aristotelian move possible, and then secondly to suggest a way of handling the source of subjective aims without there being any need to implicate God in the procedure.

An eternal object is supposed to bestow or withhold a specific, precise form of definiteness, but how can this be if every eternal object drags along with it, so to speak, the whole choir of eternal objects in virtue of the fact that its relationships to other eternal objects are internal relations?

His doctrine of eternal objects in both his earlier and later philosophy can be understood as a description of the ontological nature of pure logic and mathematics (EWP 14 - 28).

These latter prehensions would involve eternal objects by conceptual valuation from God's physical prehensions of the world or would bring in eternal objects in the later phases of his concrescence in order to attain the unity of God's satisfaction.

The gradation of eternal objects in respect to this germaneness is the «objective lure» for feeling; the concrescent process admits a selection from this objective lure» into subjective efficiency.

What status have the eternal objects in relation to God's envisagement?

As Whitehead says,» «Change» is the description of the adventures of eternal objects in the evolving universe of actual things» (PR 59 / 92).

From the lack of a final and necessary order of eternal objects in the primordial nature of God it follows that there is no final order of nature.»

According to the twenty - fourth Category of Explanation, the «functioning of one actual entity in the self - creation of another actual entity is the «objectification» of the former for the latter actual entity» and the «functioning of an eternal object in the self - creation of an actual entity is the «ingression» of the eternal object in the actual entity» (PR 38).

The relevance of an eternal object in its role of lure is a fact inherent in the data.

For example, the clause -LRB-(attractive x)(kind x)(Scandinavian x)-RRB- in our simple program symbolizes an eternal object in which potential attractiveness requires (in this example) kindliness and being Scandinavian.

This passage may well include the extensive quotation from Hume on the missing shade of blue, since «the principle of relevant potentials» (86.23), Which Hume's discussion is meant to illustrate, can only refer to «The relevance of an eternal object in its role of lure as a fact inherent in the data» (PR 86.7).

Through the reality of this possibility the status of an eternal object in the event differs from its abstract status in the realm of eternal objects in general.

P. 93: «the ingression of one eternal object in some event necessarily involves the ingression of other eternal objects.»

Kraus explains this as part of the relational essence of an eternal object which includes «the indefinite plurality of relations which constitute the status of the eternal object in the realm of possibility» (ME 34).

Not exact matches

My objection to Ford's claim that an earlier phase exists before a later phase, in a genetic sense of «exists before,» does not conclude that the difference between phases is merely a matter of complexity of eternal objects.

But his insistence that» [t] he envisaging creativity, the continuum of extension, B's anticipatory feeling of C, the disjunctive plurality of attained actualities, the multiplicity of eternal objects, and the primordial nature of God are all alike involved in the creation of C's dative [i.e., purely receptive] phase» (326) would lead one to believe that some sort of objective medium must he present to facilitate the transmission to the new occasion of so many non-objective factors in its self - constitution (e g creativity, the anticipatory feelings of B and other past occasions, the multiplicity of eternal objects, the divine primordial nature, etc.).

Although the eternal objects descriptive of the different phases may differ only by complexity of integration, to identify the genetic process with its definite eternal objects is to miss the dynamism of the decisions involved in the succession of phases (Ford quotes PR 342).

After noting the parallel language with respect to the functioning of eternal objects, Leclerc writes: «It should be noted that the term «functioning» in neither case implies «agency» on the part of the entity functioning.

There are also three paragraphs inserted into chapter 6 on «The Nineteenth Century» (SMW 153 - 55), indicated by the fact that «these individual enduring entities» in the very next sentence refers back to the final sentence just before the inserted material.2 Later new insights about eternal objects and God were added in the two metaphysical chapters, using the new concept of «actual occasion» for the first time.

(3) At first Whitehead tries to derive the subjective aim from the activities of the occasion itself, as it seeks to unify its multiple past in the light of the multiple interrelatedness of the realm of eternal objects (i.e., the nontemporal actuality of God objectified).

Since abstract principles or rules (eternal objects) have no causal efficacy in themselves for Whitehead, they would require some actual entity to envision and to incarnate them.

In the primordial nature, taken in abstraction from acts of becoming... eternal objects have togetherness but not gradations of importance.&raquIn the primordial nature, taken in abstraction from acts of becoming... eternal objects have togetherness but not gradations of importance.&raquin abstraction from acts of becoming... eternal objects have togetherness but not gradations of importance.»

It is only by virtue of God's ordering of the eternal objects that one conceptual feeling, conformal to that of a past temporal actual occasion, can give rise to a new conceptual feeling of an eternal object not present in the prehended occasion.

The connection between the conception of hierarchy in the Universal Algebra and the metaphysical doctrine of eternal objects developed thirty years later is unmistakable, and is remarked upon by Lowe (UW 139).

To pick out just three: that which Deleuze theorizes as «the virtual» bears a certain similarity to Whiteheadian pure potentiality; likewise, the elements of the virtual, namely, what Deleuze calls «Ideas,» play a role comparable to that attributed to eternal objects; finally, the factor in the Deleuzean system which corresponds most closely to Whitehead's notion of creativity — that ultimate principle by which the production of novelty is to be thought — goes, for Deleuze, under the name of «productive difference,» or «Difference in itself?»

There can be no doubt that God makes decisions a propos of the disjunctive multiplicity of eternal objects; the difficulty is to establish in precisely what sense these divine decisions are distinguishable from the choices and calculations made by the Leibnizian deity Whitehead's dilemma seems to be this: on the one hand, the principle of classification is to be challenged by positing the primordiality of a world of eternal objects that knows «no exclusions, expressive in logical terms»; on the other hand, positing pure potentiality as a «boundless and unstructured infinity» (IWM 252) lacking all logical order would seem to be precisely that conceptual move which renders it «inefficacious» or «irrelevant.»

Insofar as the «many» refers to the disjunctive multiplicity of eternal objects it is not representable in terms of a logic of genera and species.

Eternal objects are, in Whitehead's terminology, what had been called universals, but as he himself is quick to point out (SMW 169), the conception is quite different.

Note also PR 46: «Apart from God, eternal objects unrealized in the actual world would be relatively non-existent for the concrescence in question.»)