Sentences with phrase «eternal pure possibilities»

In effect, she transforms real possibilities into eternal pure possibilities.

Not exact matches

Then there are the unchanging possibilities for realization, the pure possibilities that Whitehead calls eternal objects.

Instead of eternal objects as «pure possibilities,» what we really need are what are often called «real possibilities,» possibilities so rooted in that particular situation as to be actualizable.

The Primordial Nature is God's eternal envisagement of pure possibility, not unlike Plato's «forms.»

One must conceive the being of such an entity as first of all a pure possibility — as a «complex eternal object.»

For example, it is a general or pure possibility that I might win the 100 - meter dash in the next Olympic Games, but this is not a real possibility given my creaky joints, advancing years, etc. «Real potentiality» refers to those possibilities for the ingression of eternal objects which still remain after one strikes from consideration the impossibilities which the conditions of a given, factual world eliminate from the horizon of any particular actual entity or set of actual entities arising out of that world.

«The «primordial nature» of God is the concrescence of a unity of conceptual feelings» (PR 134), which «achieves, in its unity of satisfaction, the complete conceptual valuation of all eternal objects» (PR 48) or pure forms, thereby generating the entire structuring of pure possibility.4 Seen in terms of his everlasting aspect or consequent nature, however, the only way God is directly related to the World, the converse is true.

It is precisely in the introduction of formative elements as conditions of the possibility of actual entities, according to Collingwood, that Whitehead differs from Alexander.25 Furthermore, the status of one of these formative elements, the «eternal objects,» is analogous to that of the «abstract entities»: 26 both are situated between the realism of ideas and pure nominalism.

To be sure, it is possible to interpret those particular possibilities as pure eternal objects, but it seems more likely that Whitehead was contrasting them to eternal objects, but was still groping after their proper ontological status, which I take to be real propositional possibilities requiring divine temporality.

A pure possibility is an eternal object, and can be nontemporally prehended.

Panexperientialism does also speak of «eternal objects,» or «pure possibilities,» which are not physical.

For, the activity of lifting out an eternal object and feeling it as an eternal object, i.e., as a pure possibility in abstraction from all physical realizations, is a matter of degree.

The eternal objects express pure possibilities.

Therefore, no possibility is by definition «pure» (independent of any conditions) or «eternal» (guaranteed to prevail no matter what the conditions).

Eternal objects are pure possibilities.

According to Suchocki, a supplement to God's primordial satisfaction would be impossible because that satisfaction already contains all possibilities.37 It is indeed the case that all eternal objects are envisaged in God's primordial nature according to Whitehead and, by this, that all pure potentials are accounted for.

For we could not think of pure possibilities, if all eternal objects, of which the ideas of mathematics only constitute a subgroup, necessarily had to find an application in nature.