Gradually, during the 1990s, the Security Council began to use Chapter VII much more to impose economic sanctions, arms embargoes, and to deploy large peacekeeping forces and
even military attacks in many civil wars.
Not exact matches
You shrill ignorance, your hatred of anything different, your bigotry and lack of knowledge of
even your own religion, your stunning lack of education regarding basic science and history, and now your
attacking the men and women of the
military?
Russia felt betrayed, double standards were applied where the West would get a pass for not sticking to the letter of international law to defend its interests far outside its borders, while the West would throw the book at Russia
even when dealing with outright
military aggression (note that Georgia launched a large scale
military attack against Russian forces in South Ossetia).
In other words, that paragraph authorises the use of force to prevent
attacks on towns and cities, whether those
attacks are directed at civilians or
even at what would be legitimate
military targets.
Any hypothetical
military engagement where a nuclear armed country were to be in danger of being completely overrun would change the calculation on whether they would be willing to use nuclear weapons, but Russia probably would not, for example, use their nuclear weapons as a deterrent against
attacks against their conventional troops in Ukraine,
even if they were in danger of being forced out of Ukraine completely because the retaliation would cost much more to them than what they would be losing.
Even if the fear of
attack is low, having a stronger
military presence can be appealing.
Therefore, as Yoram Dinstein claims, «
even after the endorsement of the principle of proportionality... the danger of incidental injury to civilians — as a collateral damage resulting from
attacks against
military objectives — can not be lightly dismissed.»
Even the current level of
military success is not treated as a vindication of the group's strategy, but rather a result of Nato bombing strikes, which have debilitated Gaddafi's
military resources while he defends against sporadic and opportunistic rebel
attacks on front lines.
But today US can only have sanctions against Iran; US can not
attack Iran, because Iran in return can
attack US army bases in middle east and
even attack israel (The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution touched on the Israeli threats of a
military invasion against Iran and stressed: «If they make any such move, the Islamic Republic of Iran will raze Tel Aviv and Haifa to the ground.»)
The said sum has not been paid
even as the
military is poised to carry out further
attacks against the people.
The complex event and its aftermath can also be further illuminated via discussions of larger themes in social and political history, such as balancing national safety and civil rights — comparing reactions to 9/11 with those following the
attack on Pearl Harbor, for example — or the grounds for overseas
military interventions — such as the recent U.S. engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan as compared with the U.S.'s position on the League of Nations after World War I. «These themes put a light on it,» Brodsky Schur says, giving teachers and
even parents a way to integrate such a seemingly unteachable event.
If adopted, the legislation would allow (1) using
military force,
even if Japan is not
attacked, if another nation is
attacked and the administration deems this situation a threat to Japan's survival; (2) sending SDF units anywhere in the world where the U.S. or other
militaries are waging war and having them provide support in close proximity to combat zones, and (3) deploying the SDF alongside U.S. and other allied forces and authorizing them to fire their weapons ostensibly in defense of their
military and other supplies.
The
attacking team
even begins each round by hurdling the trench wall and launching themselves at the enemy, going «over the top» in a slightly chilling reenactment of the most well - known
military tactic of the entire conflict.
Granted,
even if erstwhile civilian facilities are
military objectives potentially subject to
attack as a result of Hamas» actions, Israel would be precluded from
attacking such faciliites where the likey civilian casualties would be «clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall
military advantage anticipated».
And the IHL concept of proportionality — that
attack on a
military target is permissible
even if there will be civilian casualties as long as the civilian casualties are «proportional» to the
military value of the target — is expressly utilitarian and inconsistent with Kant.