For Bergson, like many process thinkers (Peirce, James and Dewey come particularly to mind), the entire concept
of «necessity» only makes sense when applied internally to abstractions the intellect has already devised.11 Of course, one can tell an evolutionary story about how the human intellect came to be a separable function of consciousness that emphasizes abstraction (indeed, that is what Bergson does in Creative Evolution), but if one were to say that the course of development described in that story had to occur (i.e., necessarily) as it did, then one would be very far from Bergson's view (CE 218, 236, 270
of «necessity» only makes sense when applied internally to abstractions the intellect has already devised.11
Of course, one can tell an evolutionary story about how the human intellect came to be a separable function of consciousness that emphasizes abstraction (indeed, that is what Bergson does in Creative Evolution), but if one were to say that the course of development described in that story had to occur (i.e., necessarily) as it did, then one would be very far from Bergson's view (CE 218, 236, 270
Of course, one can tell an
evolutionary story about how the human intellect came to be a separable function
of consciousness that emphasizes abstraction (indeed, that is what Bergson does in Creative Evolution), but if one were to say that the course of development described in that story had to occur (i.e., necessarily) as it did, then one would be very far from Bergson's view (CE 218, 236, 270
of consciousness that emphasizes abstraction (indeed, that is what Bergson does in Creative Evolution), but if one were to say that the course
of development described in that story had to occur (i.e., necessarily) as it did, then one would be very far from Bergson's view (CE 218, 236, 270
of development described in that story had to occur (i.e., necessarily) as it did, then one would be very far from Bergson's
view (CE 218, 236, 270).
Our data on the
evolutionary conservation
of digit
development are in support
of the
views of many developmental biologists that the identity
of the digits in the wing
of birds can not be homologous to the identity
of digits in the forelimbs
of their hypothesized dinosaur ancestors, unless the identity
of digits in theropods is erroneous.