Sentences with phrase «experiencing subjectivity»

(1) The Testimony of Experience: The persistent belief that the physical universe is unexperiential can be sustained only so long as we arbitrarily and dogmatically exclude from nature our own experiencing subjectivity.

Not exact matches

Other issues he is considering for future iterations are ways to lessen the subjectivity of how experience levels are determined, factoring in a country's tax rate, and a better solution for the few employees who lack a fixed location.

The former seeks what the latter avoids, but the attention of each is less on the objective integrity of the thing than on the subjectivity of experience.

The inner is primary because a subjectivity at the mercy of experience would consist of random impacts.

Microgenesis is firmly committed to the subjectivity of temporal experience.

Subjectivity imposes order on experience.

Value lies in the subjectivity of occasions of experience.

In its experiential dimension, the subjectivity of reflection on personal experience has the strength of vividness and immediacy.

I'm almost sure yr aware of how unverifiable this statement is outside of yr subjective experience of it and you claim to witness the same subjectivity in others.

The principal difficulty with such a service is that innovation can so dissipate form and substance, particularly when planned by persons with little liturgical experience, that the overall experience loses focus or veers too sharply toward subjectivity.

Troeltsch argued that religion is primarily a matter of experience and subjectivity, not dogma and fact.

Troeltsch's theology is a highly sophisticated combination of personal experience and social history, of subjectivity and historicity, of individual and community.

When this occurs, the inherently self - surpassing quality of the feelings of subjectivity, which may either overreach themselves in an expansive quality that knows no bounds or else become blocked by retrogressive and discordant tendencies, instead forms the basis for the religious mode of experience «at the width where the «self» has been lost, and interest has been transferred to coordinations wider than personality» (AI 368).

The physical feelings with which religious experience is primarily concerned are: (a) the simple causal feelings of the conformal phase of concrescence, (b) the transmuted physical feelings, and (c) what I will call the «feelings of subjectivity» or processive immediacy.

Experience or subjectivity that lacks consciousness is also a value for itself and in itself.

Second, unlike Hume's «perceptions,» and unlike intellectual insight, responsibility is experienced not as transient and contingent but as a constant of human subjectivity.

It is the kind of ignorance that perceives the partial and proclaims it to be the whole; that is unaware of its own subjectivity and therefore makes and repeats false and prejudicial assumptions; that can not separate the truth of experience from the interpretation of that experience.

These experiences provide us with our fundamental notion of subjectivity.

My own enduring subjectivity is made up of these moments of experience, each flowing into the next as part of an enduring series of experiential occasions.

Now in our experience of our own subjectivity we do not discover anything like the inert brute stuff into which classical physics attempts to analyze nature.

If we view the whole of physical reality as composed of throbs of nonconscious emotion, we can understand how, out of this, there emerged in an evolutionary process the highly complex subjectivity that constitutes our own experience.

The meeting with God does not rise out of «experience» and therefore out of detached subjectivity, but out of life.

This puts Hartshorne where he wants to be, because to intuit (prehend) actual occasions as they occur is to intuit (prehend) them formaliter, as they exist in the immediate subjectivity of concrescence, and since God is everlasting, and experiences all actual occasions formaliter, actual occasions are preserved everlastingly (in their full, warm, subjective immediacy) in the consequent nature of God.6 This interpretation resolves the question of the status of the past, the problem of how the past is given as datum for concrescing actual occasions, and the question of a ground for truth claims about the past.

We are not imputing conscious experience to the proton or the cell but something analogous that can correctly be called subjectivity.

None of this proves that Whitehead did not attribute subjectivity and experience to all events in nature.

Even unconscious experience has its element of subjectivity.

Thus when a new subject, a new moment of experience, «A,» grasps at an object «B» (itself, so to speak, an ex-subject, a moment of experience that has perished), what happens is that A makes its own an element or «feeling» which formerly belonged to the subjectivity of B, wherein it was perhaps an insignificant, perhaps a decisive, element.

Many thinkers have attributed value to nature without attributing subjectivity or experience.

The aspect of process philosophy to which I have most particularly drawn your attention is its concept of immanence, whereby it affirms an actual sense in which one entity is immanent in another; a sense in which the experiences of one individual «live on» in those of another, the subjectivity of these experiences passing from the former to the latter.

Internal (or prehensive) relations exist among entities to which the attribution of subjectivity or experience would be extremely unlikely.

Griffin musters considerable textual testimony to support the view that already in Science and the Modern World Whitehead attributed subjectivity, mentality, and experience to all actual occasions.

There is a problem also with the relation of subjectivity to our notions of self - consciousness, consciousness and subconscious experience.

Each drop of experience enjoys its own subjectivity during its brief «process,» the growing together of its constituent «prehensions.»

It sees experience as consisting of discrete «buds,» each of which enjoys its own subjectivity during its brief growing together into a unity; it then perishes as a subject, «living on» only in so far as its influence is felt by other moments of experience which make it ingredient — «objectively immanent» — in themselves.

It should be easier to believe that at this point Whitehead was not thinking of events in nature as having subjectivity or experience, when we see how many thinkers today affirm the intrinsic value of the natural world and the interconnectedness of all things without taking this step.

For the unity of an actual entity in its process of coming to be is precisely its unification or growth together (concrescence), which is its subjectivity as experienced from within.

What the mechanistic view fails to account for adequately is our common experience of subjectivity.

But this experienced reality is not so wholly incommunicable that it remains locked up in inarticulate subjectivity.

Faced with these wonderful facts of human life (charity, beauty, etc), evolutionary reductivists default to subjectivity, assume that our impressions of value are illusory and see moral reasoning as a sophisticated mechanism to get what we really want (a free decoder ring to anyone who, without laughing, can explain my Petco experience in these terms).

It might then follow that God's experience would include our creaturely experiences in their subjectivity by virtue of God's including the regions in which those occasions form themselves.

Since every occasion of experience on the Whiteheadian model, no matter how closely determined by its antecedents, has a margin of «subjectivity» by which it forms itself, is something «for itself,» these occasions partially conform to and partially reject or distort the divine aims.

Whereas we experience ourselves as subjects and do not find it difficult to attribute subjectivity to our pets, we are clear that tables and rocks are very different indeed.

This awareness of God's consequent experience is highly indirect, but this is equally true for our experience of any subjectivity other than our own.

In Whiteheadian terms this «That» is understood to be the nonspecific experience of the ultimate process of reality, creativity understood as universal subjectivity.

It is creativity experienced as universal subjectivity.

It is interesting to note that while rejecting Kant's «doctrine of the objective world as a construct from subjective experience,» Whitehead speaks approvingly of the Kantian «conception of experience as a constructive functioning,» though he inverts the Kantian order and sees this functioning as «transforming objectivity into subjectivity» (PR 156 / 236f.).

Through intuitive perception in the pure modes of presentational immediacy and causal efficacy this universal subjectivity could be experienced, the very heart of reality itself.

The realization of» oneself as universal subjectivity might very well be an experience of light, because it could possibly be the realization of the pure energy of becoming.

The ultimate character of the universe itself as pure subjectivity could then also be experienced as the pure, transcendent, unqualified «That» of existence.

Everything that exists is an experiencing subject as this subjectivity becomes in the process of the movement from disjunction to conjunction.